Letter: prisoners speak out!

page 12

| LETTER

PRISONERS SPEAK OUT!

It is now eight months since the Hillsborough accord was signed and sealed yet nothing tangible has been delivered.

What keeps it in the public spotlight is the Unionist response rather than the substance it supposedly contains. A real basis for the Unionist fears rather than a percieved one is hard to detect. Perhaps the Unionists genuinely feel that the British are about to impose a political solution which would weaken partition and subsequently alter the balance of political forces in Ireland. The general media view and one shared by many political analysts is that some form of political solution is in the making. However it is more likely that, contrary to this general opinion, the British in line with past behaviour are in no way serious about implementing and sustaining any significant political initiative and that they. are simply opting for - as they have always done - a military solution. Furthermore it is incorrect to see the ‘accord’ as an actual agreement.

between equal partners. Rather, it is an imposed arrangement which reflects the political and ideological hegemony exercised by Britain over the island of Ireland.

' That the arrangement ever came to be seen, as an ‘agreement between two sovereign states’ has much to do with the misconception about the supposedly equal extent of concern displayed by the political establishments in Britain and the 26 counties regarding the rise of Sinn Fein. Upon reflection it is difficult to see how both the above parties could be equally aprehensive about the Sinn Fein phenomenon. From the point of view of the British the most that Sinn Fein can do is alter the political balance within the Nationalist community in the North. But this in no way effects the structurally imposed and protected political balance which exists in the North as a result of partition.

Furthermore, Sinn Fein’s large reliance on a conservative bedrock of support both in the South of Ireland and in the United States has given rise to an obscure Janus-faced ideology which in turn finds organisational expression in a political party ill-equipped for serious revolutionary development. This can do little to convince the British that Sinn Fein pose a long-term radical threat. On the other hand, however, the Southern establishment feel they have less cause to be optimistic; the structural limitations faced by Sinn Fein in the North don’t apply in the South. Plagued with a.

debt -ridden economy and faced with the potential disintegration of the existing concensus, the establishment can draw little consolation from the fact that in the South the distinction between Rebuplicanism and conservatism is often blurred. Sinn Fein’s potential to gain a ‘protest inspired’ vote from the disaffected in the urban areas and to appear as an extreme version of Fianna Fail in the rural areas is sufficient to send shivers down the Fine Gael - Labour spines.

It is only when the arrangement is viewed in the context of the British and Southern establishments percieving the potential threat posed by Sinn Fein in widely differing ways can any sense be made of its origins, or an insight acquired into the direction it is most likely to take. The Southern establishment fear of Sinn Fein prompted it to throw a life-line to the SDLP in the form of the Forum. That the British responded to this” Forum in the arrogant ‘Out, Out, Out’? manner was nof only a lack of concern about Sinn Fein Potential but was also an exploratory exercise in establishing just how far they could push Fitzgerald. The purpose behind the push was to ascertain just how susceptible the South would be to British’ dictated terms for a military solution - not a political one.

Somewhat paradoxically, it may seem, the British were actually aided in this process by the increasing electoral success of Sinn Fein - the greater the precieved threat to the Southern establishment, the more susceptible it would become to any initiative which might curb Sinn Fein. In view of the total lack of political content to emerge since the arrangement it can only be assumed that the British spelt out to the Dublin politicians that the key to success lay in a coherent security policy aimed at defeating the IRA which in turn would remove Sinn Fein’s raison d’etre. Not only would Dublin have the task of co-operating in the military initiative, they would also have to package it up concealed in green political jargon and sell it to the Nationalist community in the North. Viewed in this manner it is therefore no surprise that despite the arrangement’s huff and puff it has still to blow down one single house of repression. Objectively, Nationalists stand to gain nothing and Unionists stand to lose the same amount. How successful the arrangement will be depends ultimately not on the unionists but rather on the ability of Republicans to meet the challenge it poses.

Whether the British succeed in their aim to crush the IRA and cause the demise of Sinn Fein remains to be seen. To say that they cannot succeed is absurd. The IRA and Sinn Fein, since 1922, have experienced a number of defeats. Historically, within the confines of the Northern state Sinn Fein have made no impact in the absence of IRA activity. That various IRA campaigns have ended in defeat is as much linked to their having no effective political organisation - doing radical socialgroundwork concerning issues which are not directly linked to, or immediately supportive of, the armed struggle - as it was connected to British military capacity. Although many Republicans argue that the situation today is different and that Sinn Fein is a radical progressive organisation complementing the armed struggle of the IRA, this view hasn’t been bourne out in Sinn Fein’s response to the new arrangement, a response which seems to say ‘We've been through it all before so we’ll be alright this time’ Perhaps Sinn Fein with its substantial number of elected representatives are of the opinion that they need only hold their own and that a combination of Fianna Fail, Unionist and IRA opposition will ultimately bring the arrangement to a halt. If this is so it is a dangerous notion which reflects political inertia, not activism. The interests of constitutional nationalism (as expressed by Fianna Fail) and Unionism impose limitations on the extent to which they will be prepared to go with their opposition, while the IRA’s interests necessitate that they bury the arrangement they too are effectively constrained by the amount of meaning which can be attached to their activities by those on behalf of whom the struggle is supposedly waged (i.e. the majority of the Irish people). A reliance on armed struggle and nationalist sentiment alone can only but seriously dilute such meaning.

Armed struggle can’t always be seen as the panacea for unemployment or as a solution to the problems faced bf the.

battered wife. This is much more true in the South than it is , in the North, as in the former nationalism is no longer the integrating force it once was, nor in the country as a whole can any discernable capitalist impulse towards unification be detected. In circumstances of this type slogan or policies based on the; ‘One Ireland, one people - the only alternative’

theory are meaningless. The fRA can only effectively defeat the arrangement if it is complemented by a professional political machine continuously upgrading the socialist content of its party, programme and ideology, and which. ties together every strand of oppressed thought and form of protest in order that the oppressed can organise themselves and prepare for extra-parliamentary activity. Elected representatives have a part to play but they can only be a small cog in a big wheel. US support, moral and otherwise, like that of conservative republicanism will ultimately contribute to the struggle walking the treadmill of dispair.

Sinn Fein are obliged to fulfill a new revolutionary role.

While, inits present form, it does help to keep the question of British involvment in Ireland open it does little to provide an Subscribe now!

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page 13 answer to that question. In this context the London-Dublin arrangement could provide an answer - the wrong one .and one which will ultimately give rise to more questions than it answers. Is the endless process to go on? Only the Republican movement can decide on that.

is sinne Antony NelIntyre and Micky McMullan Republican POWs

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