Twists and turns of British strategy

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TWISTS AND TURNS OF

BRITISH STRATEGY

The Hillsborough Agreement signed in November 1985 continues to provoke widespread confusion over British policy in Ireland. Loyalist unanimity in viewing the Agreement as ‘the slippery slope to a United Ireland’ has been strengthencd with each meeting of the intergovernmental conference; while amongst Nationalists the failure of even minor reforms to materialise bolsters fears that yet again their needs and aspirations are being trampled on

NO SOLUTION!

The Agreement was hailed as an ‘historic landmark’ by both London and Dublin at its inception. This hyping of the Agreement raised expectation that something wholly new vas going to happen in the North. In fact the tendency to invest every political initiative with historical grandeur has characterised British policy all along. What it covers over is the plain fact that Britain has no cut and dried.

solution. For most of this century the rule of British imperialism in Ireland has rested on the partition of the country into two separate statelets - both of which have inexorably been sectarian in character. All attempts to democratise these statelets have floundered, generally defeated through’ legislative and/or physical repression. This is true even of sovernment sponsered reform, underscoring the realities behind a Protestant state in the North, a Catholic state in the South. Imperialist attempts to restore political stabliity in Jreland are entrapped and disintgegrated in the web of its own strategic instrument for the subjugation of Ireland.

partition

NO REFORMS

The prolonged decline of British imperialism since World War Two has long demanded modifications in Britain’s relations with Ireland and consequently in Britain’s political strategy for securing its interest in Ireland. A more sophisticated political framework than the sectarianism of partition became necessary. Instead of fostering artificial divisions it became necessary to maximise unity and integration. There was never any possibility of abruptly bringing about such a change. A long-term strategy of rationalising Ireland’s political structures and enveloping the whole country more tightly within Britain’s orbit was projected.

In the second part of the 1960's this strategy became entangled with a genuine democratic upsurge amongst the Nationalist masses in the North. The agitation to extend elementary civil rights to the Catholic population unmasked the vicious sectarianism of the Stormont statelet. This unbalanced the system of imperialist control and initiated the crisis that continues today. In the process the struggle for civil rights within the framework of partition has been transformed into a struggle against partition itself - a war of national liberation. This revolutionary dynamic was fully confirmed with the proroguing of the Stormont parliament in 1972; following on a period of generalised mass struggle provoked by internment inAugust 1971 and Derry’s Bloody Sunday in January 1972. Since 1972 every attempt by Britain to find a substitute for Stormont has failed miserably. The challenge of the republican resistance blocked any retreat to reliance on the traditional alliance with loyalism while loyalist intransigence spiked the development of new political structures reflecting the strategic importance of ‘constitutional nationalism’.

THE HUNGER STRIKE

Between its Assemblies and Conventions British policy had concious or coherent strategy on the part of the offensive against the national liberation movement.

‘Ulsterisation’ and Criminalisation’ were complementary strands of this offensive designed to obscure Britain’s imperial role in Ireland and isolate the republican resistance both within Ireland and internationally.

Then came the hunger strike. The latter did not reflect any concious or coherent strategy on the. part of the republican resistance. It arose out of the determination of the republican political prisoners to defeat British attempts to portray and treat them a's ‘gangsters’ rather than prisoners of war. The heroic struggle of the prisoners stirred tens of thousands throughout Ireland and__ internationally, mobilisations not witnessed since the aftermath of Bloody Sunday in 1972. The first of the hunger strikers - Bobby Sands - was elected to the Westminster parliament for the Fermanagh - South Tyrone constituency while another, Kieran Doherty, was elected to the parliament of the 26 counties, Dail Eirann. Some 100,000 people marched in the funeral of Bobby Sands in a massive display of the anger of nationalist working people.

‘The intransigence of the British government blocked a victory for the hunger strikers and the republican prisoners in Long Kesh and Armagh. But the British victory over the prisoners was purchased at the price of bringing to the surface mass resentment against British rule and influence most notably in the 6 counties but also in the formally independent 26 counties. The effects of partition and the unresolved national question were now centre-stage.

THE SINN FEIN CHALLENGE

Barely a year after the hunger strike was ended Sinn Fein recieved 10% of the vote in elections to a new Northern Ireland Assembly. In 1983 Sinn Fein increased its share of the vote and ousted the renegade nationalist Gerry Fitt from his West Belfast constituency. Two years later 59 Sinn Fein candidates were elected in the “North’s local government elections. While in the 26 counties the republican vote declined in the post - hunger strike period, the results were modest rather than insignificant.

The electoral interventions however had an importance beyond the number of votes achieved. The hunger strike’ campaign reawakened and remobilised people around the national question in a period when a developing crisis of political instability in the 26 counties is converging with the chronic instability of the past 20 years within the North.

Sinn Fein came out of the campaign a real political force with a new radical leadership seeking to do more than bang the big drum for the IRA. This leadership wanted to make

republicanism relevant ‘to much wider social, economic and political questions than the armed struggle; it wanted to transform Sinn Fein into a vibrant political party and it was prepared to question traditiional principles such as the ‘Holy writ’ of abstentionism. An abstentionist, irredentist Sinn Fein could be very troublesome, a major irritant, but would remain a peripheral force in Irish society; a radical republican party prepared to challenge the bourgeois parties and state in their own institutions would be much more serious, might possibly even with a limited electoral impact secure the balance of power and force a polarisation in Irish society not witnessed since partition. No wonder bourgeois politicians in the 26 counties froth at the mouth at the hint of SinnFein deputies in Dail Eireann.

BRITAIN’S MISASSESSMENT

British imperialism was quick to take advantage of the failure of the hunger strike to launch a new political initiative by aiming at co-opting a section of the Nationalist population into running the affairs of the 6 counties. ‘Prior’s Assembly’ as it was dubbed rested on a mistaken assessment of the effects of the hunger strike on the Irish people and in particular the nationalist minority in the North.

Thatcher’s intransigence outlasted the determination of prisoners but provoked massive resentment throughout Ireland which became deep-rooted in the 6 counties. This not only represented itesif in spiralling electoral success for Sinn Fein but also in blocking any possible move by the SDLP to take seats in the Assembly. Any moves towards devolving power to the Assembly would have strengthened loyalist demands and further weakened the SDLP.

The SDLP and the Southern establishment did not make this mis-assessment of the impact of the hunger strike. Closer to the ground they could’nt afford to show any contempt for the increased anti-British sentiment and the growing conviction that the Northern struggle would embroil the South.

BOURGEOIS POLITICAL OFFENSIVE

The British and the middle class nationalist parties had and have a common objective - to isolate.and destroy the republican resistance. In the midst of the hunger strike Charles Haughey, leader of Fianna Fail, ‘The Republican Party’ had initiated the ‘Anglo-Irish Talks’; this ‘tea-pot diplomacy’ as it was then ridiculed, offered increased security collaboration in return for concessions from Britain to lessen ‘nationalist alienation’. The collaboration was delivered, the concessons not.

The advent of the Coalition government of Garret Fitzgerald initiated a propaganda operation involving the Southern political parties, the SDLP and the Catholic church stressing the ‘alienation’ felt by Northern catholics, the ‘concern’ of the Dublin government for ‘nationalist interests’ and at the same time ‘outlawing’ Sinn Fein both politically and ‘morally’. Dublin also launched a political initiative ‘the Forum for a new Ireland’ to which all loyalist parties were invited but from which Sinn Fein was specifically excluded on the spurious grounds that it ‘supported violence’.

IMPERIALISM BARKS! - DUBLIN JUMPS!

‘Thatcher’s conrmptuous ‘Out, Out, Out!’ rejection of the forums three options in 1984 seemed a devastating blow to the parties of so-called ‘constitutional nationalism’. In fact ‘constitutional nationalism’ was put in its place and reminded who was boss. Those who believe that the British had a ‘change of heart’ which led to the Anglo-Irish agreement are quite simply wrong. What was ‘out’ in November 1984 is still‘Out!’ today!

What actually happened was that ‘constitutional nationalism’ emasculated its demands. This is patently clear when one examines the aspect of the Agreement hailed as ‘historic’ - the consultative role given to the Dublin government. Eight months on from Hillsborough not one concession has resulted from the exercise of this consultative role. Yet there have been many meetings of both the inter-governmental conference and the Secretariat. There have even been agreements, such asthe British pledge in response to Dublin representations, that Orange marches would not be permitted through nationalist areas. Britain will consult, Britain will promise and Britain will then do what it wants.

While Dublin and the SDLP protest, they cannot afford to protest too loudly. The pretence of ‘concessions’ must be maintained. Take the Flags and Emblems Act as an

example. It is often stated that the Tricolour is an ‘illegal flag’ in the 6 counties under this act and that the repeal of this act is a significant reform. This fiction is maintained and promoted by ‘constitutional nationalism’ to bolster the illusion of reform. In fact the Tricolour or any other flag is perfectly legal in the North. The Flags and Emblems Act simply gives a special status to the ‘Union Flag’ and empowers the RUC to prohibit the tricolour where its display might lead to ‘abreach of the peace’. Repeal or no, we can expect that the RUC will continue to’ implement this policy.

A DANGEROUS CONFUSION

Imperialism desires an end to the conflict in the North which has continued now for 17 years. Chronic, ongoing instability makes Ireland, North and South, a less attractive place for lucrative profits for multinational investment ana a neavy economic drain on both Britain and the 26 counties.

But imperialism seeks an end on its own terms.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement expressed British terms. It may “not be ‘historic? but it does represent the most serious and significant initiative since Sunningdale and from the anti-imperialist perspective the most dangerous.

Much of the confusion surrounding the deal springs from seeing it as a deal between two equal partners which it is not! When Peter Barry ‘agrees to differ’ with Tom King, in reality he buckles under British dictate.

When Tom King describes the Agreement as a ‘bulwark against a United Ireland’ - this is the assessment which counts. It is true that both imperialism and its native capitalist allies are increasingly desperate for a solution in the North.

But imperialism retains a wider range of options than either ‘constitutional nationalism’ or loyalism. We can be certain that whatever the future of the Agreement, ‘constitutional nationalism’ whether the Hume, Fitzgerald or Haughey variety will cling to it to the bitter end.

THE CRISIS OF LOYALISM

The Orange monolith that guaranteed one-party Stormont .Government for SQ years was cemented by sectarian page 3 privilege. Any challenge to this privilege immediately threatens the monolith and consequently the supremacy of loyalism itself. This explains the virulent response by loyalism to any tampering with this privilege - the 1969 pogroms, the 1974 and 1977 strikes, and now their increasingly violent protest against the Hillsborough Agreement. The mass resistance struggle of the anti-unionists 1969 -72 struck major blows against Orange Supremacy with the disarming of the RUC, the disbandment of the B Specials, the exclusion of RUC from anti-unionist areas and culminated in the fall of Stormontitself.

To a certain extent British imperialism was able to limit the dynamic of the fall of Stormont - the dismantling of the Orange statelet - and use it to better defend partition.

Stormont, around which both anti-unionists and loyalists had focused the conflict, was gone.

The republican resistance had neither the political maturity or the physical capability to provide a line of advance which could generalise opposition to imperialism on a 32 county level. The unionist monolith which cracked under the pressure of’ the civil rights struggle now began to show deep fissures a process exacerbated by the shrinking of the traditional Orange capitalist class. Three strands have formed in unionism over the past two decades; those prepared to do a deal within the framework of the Northern statelet which would permit a measure of ‘democratisation’ (Alliance Party, a section of the OUP); those who see no long-term security other than through full integration with Britain (some in the OUP); those who remain committed to Orange supremacy (rest of the OUP, the DUP, the loyalist terror gangs) At moments of deep crisis these strands have found an uneasy unity, but only temporarily. The ‘moderates’ have no real or substantial interests apart from those of Britsh imperialism [many in the professional middle classes are directly paid by the British state]. The ‘extremists’ on the other hand see their interests entirely bound up with the system of graft, discrimination and privilege and are ; FREE. THE RISONe ee

FREE THE PEOPLE

and SDLP didn’t. The British underestimated the hunger strike - the Free State |

Page 4 ——So trenchantly opposed to any tampering with this system. The The” political” ambivalence however distorts the armed recession has had a contradictory impact of both those wings: the former feel increasingly nervous about British strategy and the consequences of opposing it while the latter’s sectarianism and ferocity is reinforced. : This contradiction is expressed in the retreat of the OUP (symbolised by Molyneux’s pathetic self-imposed media silence) on the one hand and the occupations of Hillsborough, Swatragh, Clontibret and the heightened activity of loyalist terror gangs. While it would be extremely naive to understate the dangerousness of the ‘extremists’, the reality is that while they can sustain a terror campaign against the nationalist population for some time, without loyalist unity their political demands cannot be won. Undoubtedly part of Britain’s gamble was that all-out opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement would assume a UDI dynamic and that this would be unacceptable to the majority of loyalists.

Our analysis so far has emphasised the disparateness of British strategy, constitutional nationalism and Joyalism. In” immediate terms this desperation flows from the rise of the H-Block movement and the consequent electoral prominence of Sinn Fein. Both London and Dublin governmental spokespersons have articulated the key aim of the Hillsborough Agreement as the isolation of Sinn Fein and the defeat of the IRA. Despite this, republican analysis of the Agreement has been ambivalent and the response halting and confused. The Agreement has been at one and the same time denounced as ‘the copperfastening of partition’, and described as embodying ‘concessions’ sewcured by the armed struggle of the IRA Underlying this ambiguity there appears to be an impressionistic and rather naive assessment that the Agreement does not represent a ‘direct’ attack on republicans. The confrontation between Britain and the loyalists, the problems within the loyalist camp are put at the centre of analysis. Thus the proposed electoral pact with the SDLP where Sinn Fein offered to set aside ‘party differences’ (opposition to the Agreement?) in order to deprive loyalists of seats in the ’ Westminister Parliament!

It may be suggested that this proposed electoral pact was designed to expose the SDLP’s refusal to seek anti-unionist unity. Unfortunately it was Sinn Fein’s political immaturity that was exposed. The SDLP was founded, and its whole history has confirmed that it is a party of accommodation with loyalism and more fundamentally accommodation with imperialism. In the bye-elections following the Agreement (an Agreement of which the SDLP were happy to be seen as architects) the way to counter the SDLP was through explaining the treachery of the Agreement around a platform unequivocally for British withdrawal and Irish unity.

This was of course difficult if not impossible for a party that viewed the Agreement as offering concessions. It also pointed up Sinn Fein’s expectation that if the Agreement does not deliver significant reform of partition, constitutional nationalism will autornatically be exposed. In reality it is only through the contrast of the crumbs of constitutional nationalism with principled consistent anti-imperialist demands that support will be broken away from parties like the SDLP.

If this presentation of republican analysis seems overly polemical then in mitigation the question must be posed: ‘What political alternative does Sinn Fein counterpose to the Agreement?’ The only answer possible is that no alternative has been presented!

DISTORTED ARMED STRUGGLE

Not surprisingly this vacuum is being filled by the armed struggle. It is here that the republican response to the Agreement is being delivered - no truck with collaboration.

struggle. The campaign against those who one pundit has coined ‘the tea and buns merchants’ evokes hysteria and distracts from the indiscriminate nature of loyalist terror; it allows the Brits and RUC to slide into the pose of ‘protectors’.

The generalisation of this campaign to all those whose work brings them into contact with the RUC is unsustainable and aggravates the isolation of the anti-imperialist movement in Ireland as a whole.

FREEDOM CHARTER

The key tasks of anti-imperialists in both the political and armed organisations are:- 1. To explain the real nature of the Agreement 2. To expose the shallowness of the promised ‘reforms’.

3. To prepare defence of nationalist areas against loyalist terror gangs and state forces through the democratic mobilisation of the working people.

4, To present a political alternative charting the road to a united, free and independent country.

The proposal for a FREEDOM CHARTER made by PEOPLE’S DEMOCRACY could serve to focus a campaign around these tasks. It would underline that British rule continues to rest on military occupation and can only be maintained by repression, both in the North and increasingly also in the 26 Counties. The illusion that Fianna Fail and the SDLP can negotiate freedom from imperialist domination is what leads to and sustains collaboration. ; Such a campaign could provide a forum for the nationalist working people to declare their solidarity with all other oppressed sections of Irish society. At the 1985 Ard Fheis of Sinn Fein Gerry Adams spoke of the national movement as something much broader than the constituent parts of the Republican Movement. If this was a recognition that the Republican Movement had to develop alliances with all those ' who share the objective interest of smashing imperialist rule it may herald a coming to grips with one of the Movement’s main weaknesses, precisely that of building and maintaining alliances with other anti-imperialists, trade unionists, women and youth. Up to now, while the Movement through Sinn.

Fein has made major strides on social and economic policy, it has not been able to effectively work with people outside its ranks. It is almost as if the Movement has no confidence that in a broad open movement of the oppressed it would be able to win support for its policies. This seems to apply not just to bureaucratic structures like the trade unions but even the loose campaign structures of the women’s movement.

The trajectory of the Republican Movement since the last Ard ‘Fheis has unfortunately failed to clarify the promise of Gerry Adams’ Presidential Address. Rather than Sinn Fein using its new found political and electoral strength to promote the necessary mobilisations against imperialist attacks it is displaying a remarkable inability to give leadership to those layers who have placed confidence in the Republican Movement.

JOHN MAGEE