Lessons of the Gulf campaign

The Campaign against the war in the Gulf showed once again a generalised anti-imperialis: sympathy among the mass of the Irish population, not shared by the capitalist parties who all gave fervent support to the war.

The campaign against the war did not succeed in mobilising this sympathy. As in other countries the campaign was divided. A social-democratic and liberal movement balanced opposition to the war against opposition to Stalinism, obscuring where the danger to world peace lay and peddling delusions about the role of the UN.

A smaller campaign of the far left [excluding a few sectarian groups who abstained], did activate a number of significant mobilisations but a mechanical and opportunistic leadership by the economistic Socialist Workers Movement [SWM] tended to smother political debate and stultify the development of the movement. [The Communist Party and Militant tended to shuttle between the two campaigns, with Militant running their own campaign also. | The left campaign tended to build on greater activity. There was no protest about the division into two campaigns because it suited the SWM leadership to have their own fiefdom. One memberexplained that their campaign was “more angry” [whatever that means politically]. In the North there was almost no connection at all between the two campaigns - leaving the Trade union leadership and the Communist party torun a paper campaign that took no significant action. Even in the left campaign the issue of British Troops patrolling the streets as immediate representatives of the Gulf savagery was left in abeyance, In the South the left were able to focus on the Dublin government’s collaboration in US overflights and refuelling at Shannon, but with an active social-democractic campaign it was even less clear why their were two campaigns and the eventual witchunt and expulsion of left forces went almost without comment.

This political lack was even more crucial in relation to Sinn Fein. They reacted in a routinist way with articles opposing the war and individual participation in the campaign by members in some areas. A political debate to explain the need to react toa world offensive by imperialism would have held out the prospect of substantially increasing the forces available to the campaign and giving ita real mass orientation. If anything the SWM tended to avoid the question of Sinn Fein. In the event the campaign died with a burst of “Rank and Filism” from the SWM aimed at excluding formal participation by representatives of political parties. They then pulled back quietly from the wreckage.

Overall however the lessons of the campaign were positive. It tested the politics of existing left forces and found most wanting, but it also showed that there is a significant anti-imperialist layer outside Sinn Fein. This is diffuse and politically fragmented, but there will be more tests of the “new world order” and more imperialist offensives in Ireland itself. It the present political paralysis of republicanism continues the anti-imperialist left will have an influence out of all proportion to its size.

LEMUEL GULLIVER.

AN REABHLOID Page 16