CHAPTER ONE: THE DESTRUCTION OF IRISH SOCIETY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRISH NATIONALISM 400 A.D.-1847

CHAPTER ONE

THEDESTRUCTION OFIRISHSOCIETY

AND THERISEOFIRISH

NATIONALISM (400-1847)

‘I hate all Monarchs and the thrones they sit on from the Hector of France to the Cully of Britain,’ John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester I Original Sin Ireland’s geography was Britain’s opportunity. The two small islands’ relative positions caused them to have relations in the first place. They decided that these relations should be too close and yet not close enough: that under colonialist conditions the stronger power should interfere with the weaker, but that its interference should never become complete.

At the break-up of the Roman Empire in the West, such relations favoured Ireland. First, it attacked Britain with arms. Then, more successfully, its culture and peculiar form of Christianity gave it a hegemony over its neighbour and, thence, over most of Europe. But the fragility of the latter uaedaniee facilitated its destruction by the European monarchs with the Pope’s blessing, in a manner known also to Sicily, Prussia, the Levant and, indeed, England itself. For the feudalists the forms of the Roman civilization ensured their authority over their subjects.

Why should Irish society be so obnoxious to monarchs? The answer is that, during its “golden age,’ the chiefs were general factotums to their tribes (or tuaths) under the formal authority of the greater chiefs, or kings. This was formulated consciously in a system of non-autocratic law that constituted a juridical challenge to the Roman theory. | : : 9

But apart from this, Irish social institutions must be understood, because confused memories of them helped justify the most successful struggle of Irish nationalism. At this time, a view of early Irish society as ‘primitive communism’ was held, most conspicuously by James Connolly. Later, with post-treaty disillusion, a reaction set in and it became customary to emphasize the aristocracy and class divisions of Ireland’s early Christian period.

Both versions were correct enough for their sponsors’ purposes.

What concerns us is that Ireland was, at this time, organizationally pre-feudal. It was hierarchic and slave-owning, yet it maintained in its laws the principles of social flexibility that ‘a man is better that his birth.’ Its most attractive feature was the high standard of learning that is associated with it.

Despite cattle raids and piratical exploits, it was peaceful, until the ninth century, when the Norse began major military attacks.

These wars necessitated a militarizing of Irish society. This meant giving greater powers to the chiefs as military leaders of the tuaths. Even more, it meant, for efficiency’s sake, strengthening the powers of the provincial kings. They began, in turn, to look enviously upon the High Kingship of Ireland, which few had coveted before. Mercenary armies replaced the provincial hostings of all able-bodied males. Inter-provincial war became crueller.

The kings were aided negatively by the fact that there were now towns in Ireland. Viking settlers had founded them. Naturally, in seeking order, these looked to the rulers rather than to an attempt to revive the native, and wholly agrarian, social order.

Such a task would have been the less possible in that the old order of law-makers and artists was itself weakened by the ninth and tenth century disorder. Its ally, the Church, was similarly hurt, being divided between its pre-Viking rural monastic system and the new, efficient, episcopal organization championed by the towns. Reform was gradual and the clergy began to look towards Norman England where they saw their estate strong and healthy. The kings saw in Norman England a centralized feudal state.

Such might save them from both their rivals and their subjects, guaranteeing their regional status as vassals of a national landlord. | By 1150, kings and clergy were united in their desire for feudalism. In these circumstances, whether it came from England, or from a provincial ruler, seemed, really, immaterial.

This was a mistake. When it came, English domination proved to have one major basic defect. It was impelled by fear: immedi- 10

ately, lest the disaffected Earl of Pembroke use Ireland as a base to war against his king: then, that others might so do (as, indeed, they did) and, finally, that a foreign pistes might do so at a time of England’s difficulty. Fear hallowed greed: not of Irish se but of English adventurers (small barons, landless younger sons) whom the King of England encouraged with economic and cultural incentives to keep ‘his’ other island divided and weak. Occasionally, Irish chiefs were guaranteed their lands as the King’s vassals, but such agreements were rarely kept. The final and most ambitious attempt at such a policy (the sixteenth-century ‘Surrenders and Regrants’) not only tried too quickly to turn tribal potentates into English courtiers of the Tudors, but was jettisoned for a new and compelling reason. In sixteenth-century Ireland, the English Reformed Church was as foreign as Roman Catholicism both in language and control. In addition, its foreignness was too much that of the occupying power. It could gain little popularity. Accordingly the English Government proselytized by planting Ireland on neo-feudal terms with good Protestants, and, only where necessary, by massacring Catholics. Outside the northern province of Ulster (the last area planted and, because of this, the planters’ most thorough achievement) the Irish reaction destroyed these settlements. Most of the colonists sold up. A large minority let their estates to anyone (mainly, the ‘mere Irish’) who would take them. There developed a class of Protestant and English (or anglicized) landowners, opposed to a class of Catholic and Celtic tenants. The schism was deepened by the defection of leading Celtic and Celticized families, either in Protestantism and anglicization, or in death, deprivation or exile for supporting one of the sixteenth or seventeenth-century Irish risings. By 1703, Catholics owned about 14% of all Ireland’s land, and due to the anti-Catholic legislation the percentage was to decline steadily over the next eighty years. Outside Ulster, the great bulk of the Irish holdings were tenanted by a Catholic and mainly Celtic tenantry-at-will, owning nothing save its religion and culture (and these despite their rulers). The alien landlord had full powers over his estate. Use of them to increase productivity was made by few of his class. It was a garrison population, conscious of the fact and doubting its ability to justify itself except on its own terms. In such circumstances, estate improvements were doubtful investments. It was easier and more obviously profitable 11

to get full value for the unimproved land by taking all the tenant’s money and leaving him to live off his potato patch.

Thus the inertia of the landlord discouraged thrift in the tenant, Such Celtic customs as ‘rundale’ (or communal) holdings became, accordingly, further handicaps to productivity. All reasons against early marriage disappeared. Not surprisingly, the British began to discover that the Irish were a lazy, improvident and feckless people. In addition, they were ‘priest-ridden’. The parish priest, tied to this office by vocation, however much persecuted, was at least an educated figure closer to his parish than the landlord. Such peasant education as existed depended on him. But his power was less than was obvious. He provided a break on the peasantry’s rebelliousness, if anything. He opposed its aspirations to win back the land and to punish the worst landlords. But even more quiescent than the local priesthood was the hierarchy; the former hoped to weaken the Penal Laws: the latter to appease Britain and, thereby, to win its confidence and, perhaps, even to convert it eventually. The few remaining Catholic landlords tended to side with the hierarchy; when it came to the rub, they could ensure that their lands would remain somehow within the family. Less complaisant were the Catholics of the towns.

If the rural Irish, and the clergy, had suffered from the connection with England, despite greater readiness to be anglicized, the bourgeoisie had gained little. In medieval times, it found itself ground between the recurring disorders of the country and the financial demands of the King. As circumstances developed, so did English policy, but not for the better. In 1494, Poyning’s Law stated formally the embryo Irish parliament’s direct subservience to the person of the King. In the seventeenth century, this royal power was one of those taken over by the English parliament. It was this body that passed after 1663 the acts that interfered with the one promising commerce that Ireland had built up: that of provisioning the British Army. Throughout the next century, new investment prospects were aborted by the Irish landlords’ growing tendency to spend their money outside the country. Such absentee rents grew from £91,652 in 1691 to £1,200,00 in 1785.

Irish capitalism failed to outgrow the Guilds. Finally, during the same period, the Penal Laws intensified bourgeois religious devisions by placing definitive limits on Catholic entry to trade and professions. In the colony of Ulster, the situation was confused by the fact that many of the settlers were Protestant Non-conformists, both 12

attacked as such by the Government and divided from the Catholics, their rivals for the land. To induce their settlement, the Protestant tenants had received advantageous leases, When these lapsed, they won, instead, in exchange for agreements to pay larger rents (5/- more than elsewhere, for worse land on average), some security of tenure. This was the ‘Ulster Custom’.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, a Huguenot emigré founded the Ulster linen industry. This strengthened the Ulster Protestants, even if it gave them only the fare to America, and enabled them to develop a small bourgeoisie around the Lagan River Valley in the north-east. The Irish linen trade (which expanded elsewhere in the country) was less discouraged by England than were other ventures; England had no such enterprise of its own.

It was from the towns (especially in Ulster) that the first major breach was made in the eighteenth-century status quo.

II Grattan’s Parliament and Tone’s Republic In 1758, Britain began to dismantle its legislation against Ireland’s cattle trade. The following year, there was established the first feeble Catholic Relief Association. Further British legislation extended the freedom of the Irish provision trade. The growth of Britain’s early industrial population necessitated that supplies be guaranteed for as long as possible.

But Britain’s economic needs caused conflict with her political interests. Increased prosperity reduced the towns’ acceptance of their remaining disadvantages. A Volunteer Force grew at the end of the American War of Independence. In 1782 its potential threat caused the repeal of Poyning’s Law and the resultant establishment of the assemblies collectivized as ‘Grattan’s Parliament’, This was the second of the legends that were, in varying degrees, to inspire the nineteenth and twentieth century Independence Movements. What were its elements? They included as independent a legislature as any since 1494. This stimulated by its policy a general, and significant, increase in commercial activities (including, though this was generally exaggerated, manufactures). In addition, there was a general weakening of governmental anti-Catholi- 13

cism. All this makes the parliaments appear as great advances on previous regimes, In addition the first two benefits mentioned were not to be enjoyed between 1801 and 1921. Their existence explains ‘Grattan’s Parliament’s’ enforced suicide in the former year. But that event would not have happened had to parliaments between 1782 and 1801 pertained genuinely to Henry Grattan or to those whom he represented. Though free of direct ties to Westminster, their manipulation through controlled elections and placemanship benefited Britain’s representatives in the bureaucracy. The dice were still loaded against anyone who did not see his interests as being England’s. This category included bourgeoisie, as such, Catholics, as such, artisans and, especially, peasants.

Concessions were given to most of these. Wiser, perhaps, than its living heir, Parliament rejected Pitt’s propositions for Anglo-Irish free trade in 1785; it protected cotton and gave bounties to other industries. Pressed by the threat of the French Revolution, it enfranchized (but did not allow parliamentary candidates from) the Catholics down to the forty shilling freeholders. But these surrenders did little to weaken the executive’s power.

Nor did they help the majority of peasants, that is, of the population. The improvements of the second half of the country had, if anything, depressed their status further. The revived provisions trade gave landlords the opportunity to improve their lands by evictions and enclosures for cattle. The repeal of the Penal Law against Catholic landowners inflated land values further. Between 1760 and 1815 the value of the Irish rental quadrupled. It is about the earlier year that the Whiteboys begin to appear with their agrarian and pro-tillage demands. In Ulster, the religious divisions handicapped such movements and often turned them in upon themselves. But the small merchants and workers were similarly (though less extremely) disgruntled and their dissatisfaction was argumented by the events following 1789. Insurrectionary and corresponding societies arose under the inspiration of the French Revolution. The demand for universal suffrage was raised. The Government’s feeble attempts at conciliation combined with more determined coercion merely encouraged disaffection. Finally, the various classes (now united in a national group) accepted French aid for their armed revolt in 1798.

The United Irishmen’s Rising was defeated (like previous ones) by lack of co-ordinated plan, by treachery, and by the failure of foreign aid. But, above all, it was harmed by dissensions in the 14

movement between the wealthier bourgeoisie, who were prepared to threaten, but not to fight, and who were the official leaders, and the professional revolutionaries (like Wolfe Tone), the peasants and artisans who were less squeamish.

But it represented a major development in nationalist theory.

For a century, since England’s James II (Seamas a’Chaca’ or ‘Crappy Jim’ to Irishmen of the time) had been defeated leading an Irish National Party despite himself, Irish Nationalism had been associated with the Jacobite cause. The United Irishmen delivered it from this strait-jacket. From then on, the extreme demand of Irish patriots was to be a republic based on universal suffrage. This was itself a minimum demand: the left wing of the United Irishmen was to demand slightly more when Robert Emmett led them in 1802. Even so, when formulated, it implied revolutionary changes in society and as such was not again to be accepted fully by a national movement for nearly sixty years.

Another and associated significant development was that internationalism no longer meant the monarchism of the Stuarts’ followers but association with the forces of international liberation, including those in Britain. Like the previous innovation, this was to be forgotten (though only for fifty years) and would, when revived, be remoulded in new and different ways as international horizons broadened. But there was a third new tradition that appeared at the same time. From the Young Irelanders to the various groups of Irish communists, a secularist tradition has proceeded. At times, this has developed into anti-clericalism. But it has never been a theory of the majority of Nationalists and has often, indeed, been associated with their opponents. That this was, was due partly to the readiness of anti-Nationalist elements to talk in its terms, but above all, to the naturally more popular tradition that would be developed by Daniel O’Connell.

III

The Union Settlement The United Irish Rising strengthened English determination to end the independent Irish Parliament. In 1801, the Act of Union of Great Britain and Ireland was passed, by extending contempor- 15

ary parliamentary management techniques through ‘Grattan’s Parliament’, That had been an intrigue that could not have lasted long, but the manner of its disappearance, accompanied by a broken promise to the Catholics, was a bad omen for the Union.

The immediate task of the Unionists was to broaden their support. With the failure of Catholic emancipation, the groups in Ireland that supported the Union were all Protestant, and, indeed, mainly Anglican. They included most landlords, many Protestant business and professional men, many Protestant peasants (especially in the north-east) and, above all, the government bureaucracy.

This left the Catholics and Dissenters: the vast majority of the population. To win a sizable part of these, the supporters of the Union hoped for the success of two complementary policies.

Firstly, the non-established churches (Catholic and Protestant) would be bought up. Secondly, Ireland’s prosperity would be increased to benefit everybody.

The first scheme succeeded as far as the Presbyterian Dissenters were concerned, Their clergy accepted an increase in their traditional ‘regium domum’ in 1803. Henceforth, they were mostly lions under the British throne, encouraging anti-anti-Unionist feeling amongst their flocks. In 1834, the reactionary Anglican body, the Orange Order, was opened formally to all non-Catholics. The Union’s cause was augmented, also, by many such of its opponents as Plunkett and Saurin, who accepted the fait accompli. But though the bulk of these Presbyterian clergy was won for the Union, its Catholic equivalents were not to be bought. They _ might have been, but for their congregations. The laity was horrified at the proposal, even with emancipation thrown in. A young lawyer, Daniel O’Connell, led the opposition to the measure and prevailed upon the Catholic clergy to reject it, on the occasions that it was offered. Failure to control the Catholic hierarchy was paralleled by failure to win great economic benefits. For the Government to end landlordism was, at this time, literally unthinkable. Now events magnified the landlord’s deficiencies.

Between 1778 and 1831, the population rose by 159%. At the same time, especially after 1815, the enclosure of land for rearing England’s provisions proceeded apace, This was most pronounced in the rich lands of the south and east, for geographic and agricultural reasons. Thus, by. 1841, the poorest areas of Ireland (mainly west of the river Shannon) were the areas most densely populated. 16

At the same time, the Union caused Dublin’s social decline visa-vis London. Many more landlords moved from Ireland and their incomes went with them. The absentee rent roll rose to £6- 7,000,000 p.a. The loss of such a sum to national investment further reduced the reasons for staying in Ireland.

Investment was handicapped at a time when new industries were needed to maintain economic diversity. For want of coal, Britain’s steam power could not be developed in the larger part of Ireland. Accordingly its embryo textile manufacturers could not compete with their rivals across the Irish sea. Few could see, anyway, what economic function Ireland could have except as supplier of livestock to the industrial island; even within the cattle trade, shipping ‘on the hoof’ was allowed to flourish at the expense of the slaughtering interest.

The rule had exceptions. Brewing, distilling, lace-making in Limerick, and, later, biscuit-making flourished for reasons peculiar to themselves, in the British market throughout the nineteenth century. Tobacco and some coal survived to the Famine. The expansion of ranching by land clearances stimulated the use of money, which led, by logical progression, to the growth of Irish banking. : In the north-east evolved what would be the most important exception of all. Linen had little British competition and could be expanded as an offshoot of the south-west Scotland industrial complex; its production flourished while the general Irish textile trade declined, It was soon rationalized by the factory system. In this, the owners saw that religious differences could be used to discipline their workers. Jobs were divided between Protestants and Catholic to cause maximum mistrust. Linen profits financed ship-building yards. Again, the aim was the British market: the greatest fleet in the world: again the bosses divided and ruled.

The non-conformist radicalism of Tone’s supporters allowed itself to be perverted into the paleo-Fascism of the Orange Order.

By the Famine, it was clear that the Union’s supporters were limited essentially to the Protestants. They included most of the remaining landlords and of the larger trading concerns, an unduly large proportion of the professions, and most of the workers and peasants of the north-east.

All these groups other than the last supplied the dominating element of the Irish Civil Service, it would continue to be so controlled until 1922. This led to a dichotomy in its position. It was made by the Union, Ireland’s effective controller, free from even the limits set on it by Grattan’s Parliament. But it could not tran- 17

be tee foo Ss ES TS GS A ND LS =e en I i tt AI ttre el, NE tg scend the limits set by its backers’ interests. Thus, its most successful achievements were the founding of the Irish Constabulary and of the Dublin Metropolitan Police. Society nullified its other attempts at reform. The establishment of a non-denominational national primary school system and of the non-denominational Queen’s University were cancelled out for many Catholics by the first institution’s Protestant proselytizing. The education of the tenantry in scientific farming remained pointless because of the steady growth in the rackrenters’ powers. When, later, the Irish Civil Service was reformed in line with that of Britain, it lacked the thorough-going rationalization that it should have had. It took the brilliant but shortlived Whig Undersecretary, Thomas Drummond to scotch the Orange Order. Such an equivocal record of achievement could not win Ireland’s Catholic majority from the resurgent national movement.

IV King Dan and his subjects Unfortunately, Daniel O’Connell was the source of the mainstream of Irish opposition to the Union. In part, this was due to the readiness of many outspoken Nationalists to take jobs under the established regime: in part to the exiles and deaths of most United Irish leaders. But also it was due to his status as a leading lawyer and orator: to his position as personal link between rural Celt (he was a landowner in Kerry) and Anglo-Irishman (he was also a Dublin lawyer): later (after 1829) to his place as ‘the Liberator’, To these advantages was added another: the fact that he had had nearly half a century of leadership in which to initiate a persisting Irish Nationalist tradition. Such an opportunity could not be avoided.

But O’Connell never tried to use it. He was Ireland’s first charismatic national leader. His only clear aim seems to have been a separate Irish legislature with a place secure for him at its head.

Beyond this, social, economic, or, indeed political radicalism were matters of tactics in his campaigns for Catholic Emancipation, for Tithe relief, for municipal reform, and for Repeal of the Union.

His views varied according to whether he was wooing the Whigs, or the Radicals, or attacking the Tories, or anyone from whence 18

came a threat to his own position. But even tactical decisions were bound to influence the movement according to the social framework. In the 1800s, this framework had yet to become an organic entity. Its parts included English landlords opposing Celtic tenants, a slowly growing Catholic bourgeoisie opposing an established Protestant equivalent, both taking their mores from the landlords; three denominational groups of clergy — Catholic, Anglican and Dissenter, artisans in Dublin and the Lagan Valley, and, over all, the Civil Service. Of these groups, some were, or became shortly, Unionist per se: the bureaucracy, the Church of Ireland and the Protestant landlords and bourgeoisie. The Catholic peasantry, artisans, landlords and bourgeoisie were equally anti-Union especially after the breach of promise of Catholic Emancipation in 1801. Also Nationalist were the nonconformist peasants and artisans; less so were the non-Anglican clergy.

This situation provided grounds for various different possible causes of Nationalist action. The Penal Laws injured the Catholics: similar laws injured the Nonconformists. Landlordism weighed on bourgeois, artisan and peasant. To all these groups the Union became an additional burden. A Nationalist might raise his standard on Repeal alone, as O’Connell did at the beginning and end of his career, He might fight for better treatment for Catholics, as O’Connell did in the twenties and thirties. He might develop the principles of the United Irishmen to the circumstances of the Union, and ally to the most advanced interests in Ireland and Britain to achieve universal male suffrage supporting separate parliaments, and O’Connell did this briefly in the 1830s, until it became impossible to reconcile with the Whig alliance.

It is clear that O’Connell used a fourth method of procedure.

He campaigned for limited, and at first arbitrarily chosen objectives. As a young arriviste between 1808 and 1815, he won preeminence by preventing the Catholic hierarchy following the Kirk into the Union establishment. From 1823 (and, more especially, 1824) to 1829, he worked with the parish priesthood, and despite the Hierarchy, to emancipate his co-religionists. In the next decade, he whittled down a radical programme to demands for Tithe relief and municipal reform, under pressure of Whig alliance and Feargus O’Connor’s rivalry. At the last, in the 1840s, after a final, abortive, attempt to gain Repeal of the Union, he became dependent on the Catholic hierarchy’s good-will and on shifting and halfhearted expedients that caricatured his previous tactical ingenuity.

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What did he leave? An emerging people, say his admirers. But it cannot be said that O’Connellite liberation answered the needs of his supporters, or, indeed, that the O’Connellite nation represented all those groups that might: have co-existed within it.

Throughout his ‘reign’, and for some thirty years after it, agrarian agitation continued (except during the tithes war of the 1830s) separate from, yet contemporary with, the national struggle.

Trade unions were distrusted by him. The advanced elements among the non-conformist Protestants were deserted and their followers allowed to surrender to the gentle leadership of their Unionist bosses. Only the Catholic gentry, bourgeoisie and Church can be described as real beneficiaries of O’Connellism. The first two were the gainers by liberation and municipal reform. The second was saved by him from the ties of the Union and was then enabled by his policies to establish the position of its aims at the centre of Irish Nationalism.

The policies that brought this result were ones that would naturally appear as reasonable to an opportunist. The break-up of the Celtic social order left the parish as the only nationally accepted unit of local organization: its priest, usually its most educated figure. With him organization was easy; without him, it was handicapped. It could have been done, as it had been done by the United Irishmen; but such a task appeared unnecessary to O’Connell. His policies’ weaknesses were magnified by circumstances, in some of which he had little influence. It was not his fault that the Presbyterian Nationalism’s economic bases were sapped steadily during his career. It was not his fault that the spread of money and evictions in the eastern agricultural counties drove men into Dublin to swell the labour force there and weaken its political radicalism. He could not help the trade depression that further weakened the working-class morale and basis for political development. He was not to blame that Protestant abuses in the new secular primary education system gave excuse for Catholic denunciation of the secular principle. Nor was it his fault that the Union slump allied to growing opportunities for emigration (most notably, the Liverpool Steam Packet, from 1824) encouraged many of Ireland’s potential radicals to use their talents abroad. (He was, however, certainly to blame for never making the best use of the subordinates that he had, and, often, alienating them from him and, in practice, from the main Irish National Movement.)

But in one matter, he did act consciously to magnify his own mistakes, although, until his last decade of life, he was at one with 20

most of his upper-class contemporaries in his error. By his very important example, he discouraged the use of the Irish language.

In this the Dublin lawyer triumphed over the Kerryman. But his action was also a part of the clerical alliance; the Church preferred to preach and teach in English, as more helpful to its international apostolate, though its teaching orders, such as the Christian Brothers, were more nationally-inclined. Thus was stifled another basis for Irish Nationalism: a cultural one as was developing over most of the European sub-continent at O’Connell’s death.

This ideal would have been of its nature more susceptible to coherent social thought than the clerical ideal that actually dominated Irish Nationalism. The possibility of preventing the entrenchment of this ideal existed always, though in decreasing strength. In the 1840s the “Young Ireland’ group developed similarly to contemporary movements in Europe. But these others did not have to contend with an O’Connell. Against him, by then, something was needed more than nineteenth-century bourgeois idealism. This was offered by only the Mitchellite minority of the Young Irelanders. Their successors of the 1850s, the Tenant Rights Leaguers, formed the last secularist Nationalist movement and it was dispersed by the opposition of the Catholic hierarchy and by its own isolation from the tenants whose spirits were broken by hunger. All that the Young Irelanders left behind were their writings. But these were to start a process of cumulation with powerful results.

From the 1850s, Secularist Nationalism in Ireland was a matter mainly of individuals, rather than of movements. The leading future Nationalist groupings tended either to renounce secularism or to avoid issues covered by it such as education. But clericalism coloured other aspects of policy. The internationalism of the United Irishmen became limited to the Anglo-American world, that covered both where British imperialism was subduing further peoples and where Irish emigrants had set up homes. Association with European liberation movements declined with such actions as the Irish Brigade’s defence of the Papal states in the 1860s. Above all, clericalism was without any countervailing influence and could not, of itself, encourage the development of a coherent national social ideology. Irish Nationalism became socially oppor-.

tunist, fighting on organizational, cultural, religious and political terms set by the upper classes, even where its chosen strategy threatened the social order. Only once, in the second half of the nineteenth century, was this process threatened, and then it reasserted itself more strongly than before in a new form.

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’s total achievement. His heart was embalmed and sent to Rome. His car- , its original motivator had been long dead. After case was returned to his native country.

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