The SDLP's ‘New Ireland’

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~ The SDLPs New Ireland’ Humphrey Atkins’ conference on the constitutional future of Northern Ireland has attracted little interest from the British media. This cannot be explained away by the fact that such things do not make good news or provide television with enough action-packed newsreel. The London talks on the future of Zimbabwe were the subject of regular TV reports, for example. Part of the problem for media reporters is, no doubt, the fact that talks and Northern Ireland don’t, somehow, go together. For TV and newspapers, reports on Ireland are concerned with upheaval and violence. Disruption, not coherence, is the key. Rational talks are difficult to explain in what is reported to be the Northern Ireland context.

This also goes some way to explaining the way in which the proposals of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) have been ‘overlooked’ by British reporters. As we ; Shall see the SDLP have put forward proposals — which have ' the support of Irish-Americans and the Premier of the 26 - counties — that approach a solution to the ‘Irish problem’ from a different stance than the need to defeat ‘terrorism’ (see the box below for details of the SDLP’s position on ‘security’). As such the SDLP are immediately out of sympathy with the consensus of, say, the British Government, the Unionist Parties and the media. Accordingly there is now little room for the SDLP within media notions of ‘balance’.

(See Carl Gardner’s article in JSR4 for a closer examination of this notion.) The Irish Dimension When first invited to attend the conference the SDLP declined. Their main reason was Atkins’ insistence that discussions about the future relationship between the North and the rest of Ireland (‘the Irish dimension’) would be ruled out of order. SDLP chairperson, Brid Rodgers, was reported as saying that structures of government must be found and agreed on which would allow the ‘Irish in Northern Ireland’ to express their Irishness without being branded as extremists.

She added that they must be allowed ‘to participate as of right in the formation of legislation which governs their lives’ Urish Times, 4.12.79). SDLP leader, Gerry Fitt, resigned from the Party when the decision to abstain from the conference was reached.

When, subsequently, the SDLP — now lead by John Hume — reversed its original decision it was not a matter of surprise to find Unionists suspicious. Had Atkins changed the agenda to facilitate discussion of the Irish dimension? Molyneaux insisted that Atkins had. ‘It must now mean that that item (the Irish dimension) has been inserted on the agenda. That takes us back to Captain O’Neill’s time and it takes us back to Sunningdale. Such things definitely endanger the Union’ Urish Times, 17.12.79). What in fact was the basis for the SDLP’s decision to participate? It seems that Atkins conceded very little but it was enough for Hume to claim an honourable victory.

Amongst the agreements was one which allowed for the parties participating to present a paper to the conference outlining their proposals for the future government of - Northern Ireland. The SDLP would, therefore, be able to put forward its views. Having done that, however, it was to be left to conference to come to a decision as to how to deal with points made. Paisley would, presumably, move next business when ‘the Irish dimension’ was raised. In practice this is what happened. Atkins got round this by arranging a second tier of talks with each party. Paisley boycotted these.

It was another agreement that Hume regarded as being especially historic. The Government was prepared to concede that if at any point in the future the majority of the people Keith Savage of Northern Ireland decided to change their constitutional status — in favour of Independence or unity with the 26 counties, say — then the Government would not stand in their way. At the same time this ‘concession’ did not affect the Government’s position that no constitutional change could be made without the express wish of the majority of the Northern Irish people. Hume claimed that this meant that ‘Britain is saying she no longer has any interest in remaining here — in the past the Union was two-sided. The British Government hasn’t said that since 1973’ Urish Times, 17.1279). Towards a New Ireland When the conference opened on January 7 the SDLP had its policy proposals ready for presentation. Their document is called Towards a New Ireland, It is worth quoting from this paper at length because the views of the SDLP are likely to strike a sympathetic chord in British socialist traditions. The - whole paper is written in eminently reasonable terms and, unlike the views of Unionism, can be judged as a positive - contribution to a settlement in Ireland.

The SDLP start from the notion that any solution must be based on ‘partnership between the differing traditions in the North and partnership between both parts of Ireland’. , Quoting from the 1975 SDLP Report to Parliament they continue, ‘“‘we are not irrevocably committed to anyone system of power-sharing in Government’’, and that North- South partnership would be on the basis of that which was “freely agreed between North and South’’’.

They then go on to account for the political vacuum that has strangled Northern Irish politics. ‘The response of the Unionist parties, however, has been one of absolute intransigence... British Government reaction has been equally negative, allowing the disastrous vacuum of the past four years to develop without any serious effort to take the initiative in seeking agreement... they have consistently insisted on and upheld as a basis of policy an unconditional guarantee of the basic political position of those same Unionists. Yet what has this guarantee achieved?’

Answered their own question the SDLP say that this very * guarantee accounts for Unionist intransigence. ‘As a result of the ensuing vacuum, violence has flourished, extreme political groupings have prospered and the capacity to find agreement through the normal process of negotiation between the Northern Irish political parties has been substantially diminished.’ Given this the SDLP look to the Irish and British Governments — as the two sovereign Governments involved — for an initiative. ‘Neither Government can afford to act or deliberate about the Northern Irish problem in isolation from the other; both owe it to those whom they govern to create jointly political stability, which will in turn promote real and lasting peace, economic development and social stability ...’

“As a first step they should make it clear that there are no longer any unconditional guarantees for any sections of the Northern community, but rather a commitment to achieve a situation in which there are guarantees for all.’ ” This, for the British Government, must mean an acknowledgement that the whole basis of its past policy is wrong: that guarantees to Unionism are only a guarantee to intransigence. “The Irish Government in turn, must acknowledge that its claim to unity, while it remains undefined in that they are reluctant to spell out its economic, social and political impliee

cations, is interpreted by many Unionists as a real threat. They must clearly demonstrate that they are prepared to accept the a tsacrifices involved in real unity, including the social changes ‘which will demonstrate that Irish life is not dominated by any tone section or tradition.’

This would involve for both governments a commitment to the establishment of ‘a clearly-defined process which will enable progress to be made in all areas directly and indirectly affecting Northern Ireland and its relations with the rest of the island, with Britain and the EEC... a process of integration of the differing traditions on this island, a process designed to lead to an agreed Ireland with positive roles for all.’

‘One of the initial steps in this process might be the creation _of a viable administration in the North, based on partnership ‘' and participation at every level, which would command the active support of all sections of the Northern community. The i two Sovereign Governments should agree to, and be seen publicly to agree to, the structures, responsibilities and modus operandi of the administration . . . Simultaneously, ‘the Governments should set up a Standing Commission to examine in detail the development of Governmental structures in Northern Ireland and the special position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom and within the EEC...’

; They then go on to talk rather vaguely about the economic + and social common ground that exists between both parts of ’ Treland and the need ‘to identify and promote projects which ’ would be of benefit and which would develop the obvious _ areas of common ground...’.

‘ ‘In making these proposals, the SDLP is aware that some parties in the North will initially refuse to participate in this process of creating a solution as they blindly refute the -« , constructive and conciliatory Irish Dimension which it ; obviously contains. However, short-sighted intransigence must not be allowed to postpone further the political, economic and social stability which the people of Ireland, North and South, so desperately want and deserve. No longer can the veto of one small section of the Irish people be allowed to condemn the vast majority on the island, who wish to live in peace and agreement, to further decades of suffering and strife. The process must start and the dialogue continue without them while leaving the door open for their eventual participation.’ t Internationalising the Irish Question The main problem as far as the SDLP is concerned is the application of pressure. As they point out they are seeking to get Britain to admit that its whole past policy was doomed to failure, to get British acceptance that Ireland is one country and that the whole of the Irish people should have a say in the government of the six counties that constitute Northern Ireland. Hume and the SDLP have cultivated friends in United States Democratic Party circles in the hope that sufficient pressure can be applied through the Presidency. This policy has been dubbed ‘internationalising the Irish question’.

As a proposition ‘internationalisation’ has been canvassed in Britain (by the Guardian’s Peter Jenkins, see Hibernia, 9.8.79, and by academic Bernard Crick, see New Statesman, 7.12.79) but the significant developments have taken place in the US. On October 25 1979 Margaret Thatcher had dinner in London with the US ambassador, Kingman Brewster. On the same day her government announced plans for a new political initiative on Northern Ireland. This ‘coincidence’ was fortunate since it allowed Thatcher to convey her determination to do something, thereby answering her international critics. Irish-American concern over British policy is, of course, long-standing but it is only necessary to go back three years to trace the present phase. In August 1977 President Carter made an offer of financial aid to Northern Ireland once peace had been established. Speaking on behalf of the US State Department Hodding Carter said, ‘As a nation, the United States has close ties of friendship and to all those involved in this situation — Irish, British and the people of Northern Ireland alike .. . In our judgement, a solution can

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come about only through the efforts of the parties directly involved.’ This clearly echoes the SDLP Anglo-Irish dimension, and recognises rights and interests of the Irish Government which Britain and Unionists continue to deny.

Another aspect of SDLP thinking was contained within Edward Kennedy’s 1978 St Patrick’s Day statement. “Time and time again in recent years, movement towards a negotiated solution has been halted by the intransigence of extremist elements in the Protestant community and by Britain’s failure so far to end the festering stalemate.’ John Hume’s cultivation of Irish-American friends has given him some muscle within US politics. The ‘Big Four’ Irish- Americans are reckoned to be Kennedy, ‘Tip’ O’Neill, Hugh Cary and Daniel Moynihan. Of these O’Neill is the most powerful -- especially now that Kennedy seems to be out of the contest for the Democratic candidacy in this year’s Presidential election. O’Neill is the Speaker of the House of Representatives and is, as such, one of the three most powerful people in US politics. It was O’Neill who earned a rebuke from British politicians and papers last April for his comments in Derry. ‘I have been deeply concerned by the lack of political progress in Northern Ireland over the past few years...

together with all sides in Ireland we insist that Britain bears a responsibility for the failures of recent years on the political front. We have been concerned that the problem has been treated as a political football in London or has otherwise been given a low priority .. . we do insist on an early, realistic and major initiative on the part of the incoming British government...’ . Arms Ban O’Neill was abused from all sides for his ‘interference in British affairs’ though it is ironic that Thatcher has since offered her version of an ‘early, realistic and major initiative’ in the shape of the Atkins’ conference. What, for their part, can the Americans do though?

To date there is little that is tangible to point to. Apparently Irish-Americans have secured a promise from Carter that Ireland will be on the agenda whenever he meets i Thatcher Urish Times, 20.12.79). The seriousness with which , Carter takes pressures from Irish-Americans is evidenced by - his insistence on the banning of sales of 3,000 Magnum ' revolvers to the RUC. Apparently neither the US State Department nor Jack Lynch’s Government objected to the sales but Carter insisted that the ban remained. New York Congressman Mario Biaggi is closely involved in the Carter re-election campaign and he commented on the President’s decision: ‘The RUC has been cited by Amnesty International as well as by a British Government-appointed commission for human rights violations.’ Biaggi — who is also Chairperson of the Ad Hoc Congressional Committee for Irish Affairs — introduced an amendment to the 1980 State Department appropriations bill seeking to bar funds for military assistance to Great Britain or the Republic which could be used to ‘further oppress the people of Northern Ireland’ (Hibernia, 9.8.79). Hume and the SDLP cannot rely on continued American pressure this year. With the Presidential election getting nearer, and bigger international issues — like Afghanistan and Iran — in the political pool it is likely that Ireland will drift as an issue. Moreover, the sooner Kennedy is eliminated from the candidacy the sooner Ireland will be a dead issue.

All this assumes, of course, that nothing happens in Ireland to push it into the centre of world attention again.

Such events could have one of two sources — British policies or Irish governmental attitudes.

Haughey Election The election of Charles Haughey as leader of Fianna Fail, consequently elevating him to the post of premier, reflects a mood of impatience at the pace of developments in the North.

Haughey has indicated his concern to find a solution: ‘A start must be made. In my view, a declaration by the British government of their interest in encouraging the unity of Ireland, by agreement and in peace, would open the way

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towards an entirely new situation in which peace, real lasting peace, would become an attainable reality.” (Sunday Times, 17.2.80). So, Haughey also echoes the SDLP. The problem still remains, however, how can Britain be persuaded that the policies adopted for the past sixty years are fundamentally wrong? What power does Haughey have? In his favour is the certainty that his argument makes sense. If Ireland was a peaceful and united island then that would make a lot of sense to Britain and the EEC. For Britain, however, this would require the breaking of Unionism, the making of Loyalism as the enemy ~— not violent Republicanism.

These things would not be beyond Britain but why should Thatcher, or anyone else, undertake such:a risky venture?* ’. Such considerations suggest that things are less than bright . for the SDLP, Haughey and Irish-Americans. If pressure from the US is uncertain the same is true in relation to the 26 county government. Haughey has more immediate problems. Cutbacks in public spending are on the way, cuts in the rate of economic growth and living standards and all the rest that is so familiar. On top of this Haughey has to

SDLP ON ‘SECURITY’

If you apply the system of majority rule in a divided society like ours you get a situation where the majority think of “our law, our Courts, our Police”’ but the minority think of “their law, their Courts, their Police’”’.

When the institutions of the state come under attack this peculiar attitude of both the majority and the minority community towards the state and the police becomes obvious... ‘Since (1974) the Province has been clamped in the full rigours of the Emergency Powers Act for scheduled offences: — no jury, one judge trials: virtually no bail: very lengthy remands in custody: dangerous changes in admissability of evidence: very wide powers of arrest and search without warrant: detention without trial for up to 7 days: severe sentences.

‘Though these measures were designed to combat specific terrorist activity they have increasingly been used in addition as devices to gather and computerise information generally with the result that very large numbers of innocent persons have been adversely: affected often seriously.

‘These measures were never intended to remain in long term operation because of their restrictive effect on Human Rights and their erosion of the due process of the law; yet imposed in 1973 they are still in operation in 1980, Their impact has also been discriminatory, bearing most heavily on Catholic areas even though paramilitary terror groups operate with equal ferocity from both traditions.

‘One of the most serious consequences of the continued operation of the Emergency Provisions Act has been the involvement of the security forces (police and army) in patterns of grave breaches of the law.

‘We welcome the recent declaration of the Secretary of State that the Rule of Law is to be enforced in security operations. However the primacy of law and order has been challenged by the appointment of a former undercover supremo (Sir Maurice Oldfield) to head security and by the announced expansion of undercover activities which are inherently dismissive of legal convention. ‘Future security policy envisages the continued Ulstérisation of security. This involves the gradual withdrawal of British Army personnel and their replacement by the RUC and UDR. It is a decision which appears to have been taken nat in the best interests of Northern Ireland hut to enable the British resolve the question of taxation which brought 700,000 onto the streets to protest in January. For him actions on Northern Ireland may well be confined to the occasional speech, So What? This brief review of current SDLP policy and the support given to it by politicians in the US and the 26 counties should suggest that the British government will face concerted pressure in the immediate future. For British socialists and the anti-imperialist movement this will present a new set of problems. Over the past decade there has been no sustained and credible critique of British strategy from other bourgeois powers. The developments within the SDLP and Southern Irish parties should now convince people in Britain that the demand for British withdrawal now commands popular support throughout Ireland.

* See articles in JSR no.5 on federal and independent six-county solutions. Government to meet its troop commitments elsewhere, It will inevitably cast the RUC in an ever increasing paramilitary role even though exercising just such a role for the former Stormont government Uestroyed its acceptability in the past.

‘Indeed many young policemen who joined the force in the light of the post-Hunt assurances must now feel betrayed knowing as they do that paramilitarism and real police work are antipathetic.

‘The UDR which in Ulsterisation becomes the RUC’s back-up service has by far the worst record for serious sectarian crimes of any Regiment presently in service with the British Armed Forces on land, sea or air. ‘Former members of the Regiments have been convicted in the Courts of (inter alia) sectarian multiple murder, sectarian murder; sectarian attempted murder; sectarian pub bombing in Northern Ireland, England, the Republic of Ireland; sectarian arson; sectarian assault; sectarian intimidation; arms theft of their own weapons, murder to pervert justice; arms offences and common criminality of all kinds, including social security frauds and the robbery of post offices.

‘The more serious of these crimes have often been connected with loyalist paramilitary activity with which the Regiment is known to be seriously infiltrated...

‘In addition both the RUC and the UDR are overwhelmingly (96 percent and 98 percent respectively) drawn from the loyalist tradition and are therefore completely unrepresentative of the community at large.

This to an extent represents Westminster’s failure to convince the minority that the dispensation of justice here is evenhanded. ‘The exclusive pursuit of a military solution to the problems of Northern Ireland has failed to end the violence, which was its sole objective and only justification. ‘In the process it has found even the penal provisions of the Emergency Powers Act inadequate and forced the security forces into massive breaches of the law.

‘The end result has been to brutalise the security forces, alienate large sections of the community and weaken support for law and order in a community which is now more polarised than ever. A grim legacy is to be found in the jails of Northern Ireland which now house a ten-fold population explosion in the past decade.’

(From paper submitted to Atkins’ Conference 30.1.80)