The Leninist Theory of Party Organisation

LENINIST THEARY OF PARTY ORGANISATION

og, fhe questicn of organisation is a very important one for revolutionaries.

Organisation has been correctly described as the link between thecry and yractice. With ut a orceper attitude to organisation it becomes impcssible tc translate theory inte practice, and without a constant checking of theory against real practice, thecry itself degenerates ints irrelevant academic sonhistry. "Organisation is the form of mediation between thesry and practice " wrote George Luckas with some insight - "and, as in every dialectical relat-ionshin, the terms of the relatjpn only acquire ccncretness and reality in and by virtue of the mediation't, “In this much at least, Luckas was right.

A lot is explained about the different tendencies on the so-called "far Left" by understanding this; it explains why they are unable to ct-exist in one organisation despite their apparent similar yolitical pcsitions; why they multiply into innumerable little sects, proclaiming their own organisation as the one and true repcsitcry cf genuine Marxism. This phenomonon is not such a great mystery as the sceptic would have it, when we grasp the exact significance of organisation. Luckas again puts his finger on it. “The ability of organisation to mediate between. theory and practice" he says Wis seen most clearly by the way in which it manifests a much greater, finer — and more confident sensitivity towards divergent trends, than any other sector of political thought and action". (2) Given the numerical lack of strength on the''far left"? and the inevitable operation of centrifugal forces within it, it is easy to understand how much more sensitive organisation is to even minor differences on strategy and tactics. For any small organisaticn, and that includes miniscule grvuns with a handful cf members, to grouns several thousand strong, the vroblem of intervening in the class struggle i.e. cf relating to practice, because of nhysical factors, is enormous. This in turn, means that the pit falls in develoning thesry are more numerous and treacherous than they would otherwise be. And finally it means that the prcblem of organisation, as a mediator between thecry and practice kas a dimension all cf its own. As much as for the mass organisation which because of its size, automatically has certain organisational difficulties, the small group has its problems alsc. The tendencies towards bureaucratism or vcluntarism, towards centralism or federalism, towards hom genity or amorphcusness, although generated by different factors are no less strong. For this reason it has been cbligatcry on all small groups despite the limited size of their infrastructure (or more correctly because of it)

-2to nay particular attention ty organisation. A very fruitful discussion on this subject has been going on in the amorphous new revolutionary vanguard which has emerged to the left of the traditicnal reformist Jarties since the second wrld war. A wealth of new material has been produced in the process and old and half-forgotten names have gained a renewal cf popularity. Many attempts are being made to revive or re-interprete, former stalwarts such as Luxemburg, Gramsci, Trotsky and even Robert Michels.“ “But. | Asnetheless the name of Lenin continues to outshine the rest. Today, pnerhans, nm re than ever, a real attempt is being made by the new revoluticnary van- i guar tc assimilate and anply his theories. From the ex-Castrcist currents i ‘yn Jatin America to the Official Sinn Fein in Ireland, an effort is being ; mode to create sorganisations “on the Bolshevik model,

THE STALINIST ECLIPSE

But, of course, for nolitical currents like these, having no sclid Marxist trait ion, the task of internvreting Lenin is very great. Sc encrmous is it, thit it is hard for some necsle even to Legin to see the prcebleus involved.

ts leads very often to an ywnconsdous mbibing of widely circulating bourgesis ~talinist distortions of Lenin.

tgnin never actually sat down and systematised his organisational views in oye comprehensive and ccherent work. What he has left us with however, is , thecry moulded in a definite historical context; a theory which can only ye fully grasped by sifting that ccntext. Among other things this requires saying particular attention tc Lenins* own voluminous writings. It will wrely be admitted that one of the most striking things to emerge from such ; study, is his own warning on how to interpret the thecry and method of temocratic-centralism. Jor one thing he warned against a simplistic ahistcrical approach which g.A.% yould reduce the “application” of demccratic-centralism to an act “of pray- L jng to an icon in a corner” (4) (Does this not ring a bell for some latter -b-™, y super-Leninists?). At the Fourth Congress of the Commmist International $n 1522, he spoke on this very subject. He refered tc the long thesis on ’ sarty structures which had been passed at the previcus congress and while he agrea with them formally, he cauticned, that formal acceptance was entirely \ jnsufficient. Above all he cauticned the non-Russian delegates about their inexnerience. He expressed the view that they had voted for the thesis without actually studying them. The only way to really understand and sssimulate the Bolshevik organisational experience, acccrding to Lenin, was zo take it in its Russian context (5).

That is the obscure paradox of the statement in the thesis he refers to, which says that in building their crganisaticns “the parties in different countries must adapt to the historically determined peculiarities of the ccuntry concerned’ (6). It is clear that in order to do this one must study the historically determined peculiarities of Russia sc that it is possible to see the specific adaptation of Russian Bolshevik demecratic-centralism. Lenin's fear was that an inability tc distinguish between what was accidental and what was essential in Bolshevism would lead to schematism, dogmatism, or what today has becom known as “orthodoxy.

~3- As it turned cut, his worst fears were fully justified. The first place the Russian exnerience was dumped overboard was Russia itself. Because of the strategical role of the revoluticnary party in the dictatorship of the preletariat, it was the first institution to be attached by the nascent bureaucracy. It proved no easy task, since a real Bolshevik structure contains a built-in resistance to political and org anisational degeneration and disintegration, as the repeated Stalinist purges testify in a negative way. But perhaps one of the most important conditions for the eventual Stalinist victory over the Party, anart from the objective factors underlying the growth of the bureaucracy, was the rapid influx of unexperienced people into its ranks. As early as 1622, only 2% cof the party membershin had actually been in the party before the revolutionary events of 117 (7).

Even while Lenin was still alive this caused many problems which he reccgnised and sought to rectify by shedding the more backward anslitical elements. In a major offensive in 1622 for example, un to 24% of the party membership was either forced to resign or was expelled.(8) But of course after Lenin's death, Stalin quickly restored the balance through the infamous Lenin levy.

And his right-hand man, Molotcv, never snoke a truer word when he said that "the development of the narty in the future will undoubtedly be based on this Lenin enrolment(9)*.

Gn the basis cf an unexnerienced membershiy which knew practically nothing of the history and traditions cf Eolshevism, Stalin was able to “smuggle in (to use a favourite expression of his own) a completely bastardised version of what the Bolshevik party shculd be. He summed up his concocted version of the Leninist narty by describing its "style in work" as a cross between "the Russian revolutionary sweep" and “American efficiency” (10).

How and where Lenin picked up “American efficiency” is not explained). The bureaucratic nature of this formulation shines through on its own.

Once the Leninist ccncenticn of the internal varty structure had been crushed in Russia, it was an easy task to exourgate it from the non-Russian Communist parties. This needless tc say was in large measure due to the fact that Lenin's earlier warning had gone unheeded. The “orthodoxy” which becanie the hallmark of Sycophants like Toglatti, Thalmann and Thorez. >aved the way for the strangulation of any Leninist concentions which might have taken rceot. On top of that the Stalinist-Soviet machine moved in and carried out a thorough "cleansing" operation. It is worth reading Ruth Fischer, who was a leader of the German Cormunist party, for a detailed description of how Stalinism physically uprooted, crushed and cbliterated all the revolutionary and Leninist traditions of the non-Russian secticns of the Third International (11). In places where independence of Stalinism was too strong, as was the case of the Comaunist Party of Poland, which had supported Trotsky, entire layers of the leadershipnwere lured to their deaths before the firing squad, and their narty disbanded (12).

It is cnly when one realises the magnitude of the offensive and “counter revolution” against Lenin, that one can comprehend how deeply the real Leninist theory cf organisation has been buried and the amount of effort that has replaced that of Lenins’.

But it was not a desire for “American efficiency’ which motivated Lenin.

~-4- Of course that is not to say that he did not demand efficiency; he did.

But organisation and efficiency were identical for him and so it would have been tautological to pose one as the means and the other as the end. Instead Lenin, as always, started from the standpoint of the class struggle and it was the vroblem of relating to this struggle, which was his chief consideration when he came tc the question of organisation. Put ancther way: it was the reccgnition of organisation as the link between theory and practice, which led Lenin to attach sc much importance to it.

A look at the objective situation in which he began to develop his organisational theories, testifies to this. The RSDLP was born in the lull befsre the storm. The pericd of 1864 te 1898 during which its foundations were prepared say the consolidaticn of the Russian working class and the yegining of its struggle against capitalism. It was at this point that Yarxism became a social movement. But the structure of the RSDLP was yet sery frail and the sterm of economic discontent that broke out in 1858, 3nd found its iighty climax in the whirlwind of 1905, tcre it asunder again.

the unity of the party dissolved under the pressure gf police renression nd the uneveness of the struggle itself. The party not only stagnated sut lansed back into its pre-1898 days, when it was nothing but a collection sf autonomous committees and groups. A dialectical misfortune cone could say, Since the impulse of the workers struggle might have been expecycd to reinforce, rather than render the only movement which represented the historical interests of the nroletariat.

the upsheot of all this, was a paralysis of Russian Marxism, thus preventing t from seizing the lea adership of the growing struggle. And as we can see rom his early writings/ "crevice which was Widening between the RSDLP and the class struggle, that Lenin approached the problem cf organisation "The ‘nmediate task of cur movement" we find him saying ",...is te call for the establishment of a revolutionary org anisation capable of uniting all the forces and of guiding the movement not only in name but in practice." (14) So it was nct so much his recognition of the need for organisation but the yay in which he saw this need, which was the distinctive feature of Lenin.

this is seen by contrast with the Menshevik Martov, who also agreed with the necessity of org anisation, but who conceived of it, not in the context of the class struggle, but in the context cf pure administration. This introverted conception was sumed up by him when he descrilved organisation ' as a "fly-wheel" which sets the party in motion. (15).

It is important.tc understand the way in which Lenin saw organisation because it has a direct bearing on the methods of organisation he adopted. As we can see, he had a dynamic view of organisation as something acting on the class struggle. His opponents on the other hand, had a static, introverted view more suited.to the bureaucrat than the revolutionary. Organisation to them was only an interna] matter of the Marxist vanguard and not a relationshin between the vanguard and the class. Such a passive view was ‘bound to lead to adaptation, since if the revolutionary organisation dces not assert itself - the class struggle will. And the class struggle in its most elemental form, is so extremely uneven, diverse, and punctuated, it is only capable of throwing up a federated, disorg anised, movement,

-5spontaneously. _ Herein lies the secret cf the Economists and Mensheviks gravitation tc federalism and Lenints firm. ‘insistance on‘ centralism,

POLITICAL CENTRALISM

A common distortion cf Lenints concent of centralism is to divorce it from its. political ccntent. Thus we get the juxtapcsition of centralism and democracy. This distcrticn is, of course, entirely misleading. The subject matter of the debate in which Lenin participated on this question was not: super-centralism -v- democracy and moderate centralism, but centralism ~v~- federalism and anarchy.

To comphrehend the full meaning of this, we must turn to the context of the debate. » As we have said above, the RSDLP, since its foundation in 1898 had béen & federation of local groups which | functioned autoncmou 'y. The RDSLP was: therefore net a separate entity, but merely an arithmatical sum ofits ~~ various groups. - something less than a united front. Lenints - afm:was: to transcend this situation and create a real party, which united and:.subordinated these grouns within it, The method he envisaged to. accomplish this, was connletely in accord with the dialectical method and was based on’ the princinle : the whcle is greater than its parts; and its coroslleny: the part is subordinate to the whole. "A single narty and consequently a centralised one" was how he put it.(16) In practice therefore: hé called for a structure where local organisations would be subordinate: to a centre, and where lower party crgans would function under the leadership of higher narty crgans. In short he believed that it was necessary ' to begin by "building the party from the top downwards. w (17) Perhaps this formulation and approach seems’ bureaucratic. Indeed Lenin described it as such, in ironical naranthesis, for he knew that his fcrmalistic and empirical opponents would be incapable of grasping that this was the only way. to build an integrated organisation actively rejecting bureaucratism.

The idea of building the party from the bottom upwards, the apparently demowatic proceedure, is actually only an idealogical reflex of bureaucratism.

It is conditioned by:the fact that bureaucratic cliques, by their very nature tend to become ex usive and restricted in size and are consequently faced with the threat of being swept away on the first major impulse of mass action. Accordingly the bureaucracy is forced to widen its base as far as possible, to. draw in behind it. every backward and diletantish element; to create a mass "democratic" crganisatich which in reality is only a shell.

The membership despite all their apparent rights, are not functioning parts of the whole (are only "platonic" members, to us an incisive characterisation of Lenin's) but merely a-rubber staup for. the activities of bureaucracy.

As Robert Michels perceived "the party in which the circle of the elite is unduly restricted, or in which, -in - other words, the oligarchy is composed of too msall a numbe r of individuals, runs tHe risk cf being swent aay by the masses in a moment of democratic. effervestence. Hence the modern party, like the modern state, endeavours to. give its cwn crganisation the widest possible base and to attach to itself in‘ financ#l bond, the largest nossible number of individuals’ (18). In this way crganisation is transformed into

-6the mode of existance of the bureaucracy, which becomes like a worm in | an apple, and ceases to be an organ of the class struggle.

£ "Mechanism becomes an end in itself Despite this, it is always necessary to be on guard against the bureaucratic connotations of Lenins tory precisly in order to combat any atteiipt to use it as a cover for bureaucratism.

The"building of the party from the top downwards" does not help to mechanically do away. with bourgeois individualish, or different forms of politicaYoppertumismior conversely does it mechanically creat a common will leading tc smooth onerations, “American efficiency in style cf work" etc. Such an interpretation stands Lenin's concept on its head.

In actual fact for Lenin, a “common- political will" in the form of a party programme is an absclute prerequisite for centralism. He repeatedly warned that cchesion could not be introduced by administerativ2 meathods. "Such unity cannot be decreed”,he said "It camiot be brought about by a decision,say cf a meeting of representatives (20) And parallel with his emphasis on centralisu, went an equal insistance on the need for ideclogical homogeniety and a party programme. This intertwining . .. . of centrelism and a common party programme is apvarant in Lenin's writings from an early stage . For instance in the series of three articles for Rabochaya Gazata(21) of 1859, which seem bo be his first written thoughts on the subject ,;he begins by stressing the unifying choesive force of a programme in an arti.le entitled “Gur Programme! and then follows up with “Our Inmediate Tasks", where he deals in a general theoretical way with organisations, questions and he concludes with an article entitled'Urgent auestions which deals in a practical way with such questions. The connection between the two things was cbviously already established in Lenin's mind and he took the oppertunity of his essay on A Draft Programme of Our Party , written in the latter half of L859, to develop the theme “ From comrades active in Russia we have heard the opinion expressed that at this particular moment there is no special need to draw up a programme; that the urgent question is one of developing and strengthening local organisation” Naturally Lenin disagreed with this opinion, his view being that it was necessary to transend local organisation and create a centralised party. And this he insisted “is a step for which a programme is n ecessary", (22) Early in 1500 with the publication of Islora his views were made public for the first time and here he spelt out the connection between party and programme. "To establish and consolidate the party means to establish and consolidate unity among all Russian Social-Democrats®. But, he warned "such unity cannot be decreed, it cannot be brcught about by a decision".

Instead “In the first place, it is necessary to work for solid ideclogical unity which would eliminate discordance and confusion..... And “this ideological unity” he continued "must be consolidated by a Party prog ramme" (23) It is clear from that in Lenin's concept of centralism the bureaucratic desire to promote homogenity and discipline is completely absent.

Although centralism and ideological unity condition and reinforce each

-7other, ideological unity is clearly the only foundation upon which centralism can be layed. ,

DISCIPLINE

There is another problem associated with what we have just been discussing and it is often a sore point with populist-type organisations moving towards a Leninist position. That problem is the need for discipline. And it is a problem which is all the more prominent, especially (in all honesty) if their turning towards Lenin is a product of stagnation and decline; if they have the illusion that the Lenninist method of organisation can improve their position on a purely administrative level. But, of course, it is not a problem confined merely to these organisations; it is alsc experienced by many small dogmatic sects where a tendency to organisational neurosis and demoralisation, manifested in a cyclica 1 fall of in committ- bt ment, is constant.’ _ io nq Just as it is wrong 'to think that centralism can be introduced by administrative methods, so it-is wrong to think that discipline can be "tightened up" merely by intréducing new organisational procedures. Discipline, among other things, means the negation of bourgeois individualism. Bourgeois\\__ pylons our = itself is the negation cof individualism in general, isnce the unilateral freedom of one person is founded on the restriction of the freedom of everybody else. (Example: if the employer takes the surplus social product in the form of profit, then his workers cannot take it in the form of increased wages). Discipline, therefore, necessitates a different concept of fréedom;.one which at once allows for the full development of the individuals potential but without restricting the potential of others. This may appear as.an attempt to develop a method whereby one can eat one's cake and keep it. But it only appears so because we have been conditioned by a society where individual freedom is a reflex of individual ownership of the means of production, which because of the mechanism of capitalism.implies competition and struggle against all other individual owners of the means of production.

This new freedom can only be gained in the struggle to change the present (i.e. the capitalist order in which we presently live) which is the negation of freedom. This is the. very object of the Marxist programme, hence’ it is in common struggle with other Marxist militants around this programme that the imividuals potential gains full scope and that he is. consequ ntly free to conmit himself. Gnly from this self-—commnitiment on real. discipline be forged within the revolutionary organisation.

A double-edged obstacle here confronts an organisation like the Ufficial Sinn Fein. Firstly for historical reasons, members are not attracted on any precise programmatic basis, but rather because of the general revolutionary traditions of Republicanism, which are practically the only revolutionary traditions of the country. This means that recruits are in no way prepared for a common disciplined struggle. Secondly, the Officials still cling tc the eclectic aims of traditional Republicanisn, which is the nearest thing they have tc a programme This emludes the

-ané thus both leaders and ranks, punishers and punished are © qually -8possibility of developing a ccrimon will to action within the organisation.

This is born out negatively by the fact, that, when d cisions are taken, it falls to the lot of an exceptional few to carry them out in practice.

Here we have the exact symptcms of the *” ndiscipLinet from which the Offidals are manifestly suffering.

The lessen here is clear: discipline is not an administrative problem but a political one. And there is a warning inherent un this: any attempt to deal with a general problem of discipline in an administrative way will unleash centrifugal forces. and reinforce bureaucratic tendencies. Centrifugal forces are guaranteed to be ashed because they are already inherent in a situation where an organisation is not bound together by a coaerent progranme, and all that is required to set them free is some aciinistrative insensivity. And bureaucratism will be reinforced beCause tae leadershin is permitted to perpetrate "legitimate injustices" - Megitinate injustices" in the sense that the fault of indiscipline lies not with the individual alone but with the movement as a whole, 5 And , quilty of the crime. OT

-DEMOCRACY AND CZNTRALISM

aes, When Lenin warncd against a f° «11 acceptance of democratic centralism without gaining az understand::.; of its dynamic in the Russian context, he was, in-ef fect, saying that genuine democratic-centralism, while being & conscious application, must alsc evolve as a process. Put another way this means that the revolutionary party functioning in accordance with ‘the Leninist concent cf organisaticn, can cnly be forged in struggle.

This incidently throws an interesting side light on the nature of sectarian grouplets, that. have littered the history of our movement, especially ‘in Ireland. Because they prefer to function within the limits of what they define as the class struggle, they never become involved in the real struggle and hence democratic-centralism always remains for them a set of abstract rules and regulaticns which are imposed cn the organisation. This leads inevitably to the “regime of dess sotism’ which is such a familiar characteristic of all these grcuns.

Lenin's idea of building the organisation in struggle, of ccurse, has nothing to do with the economist concent of “organisation-as-orocess", which simply means that the revoluticnary organisation miraculously springs up during the course of the class struggle. This in particular was Rosa Luxenmburg's failing. She was not against a centralist organisation as many of her latterday folowers like to believe. In fact,she frankly admitted that there was strong tendency tc centralisation in the entire labour movement, which she was unopposed to. But she Saw this not as something conscious, but rather as a »oroduct of the centralising tendencies of capitalism itself. "This tendency springs from the economic make-ws of capitalism which is essentially a centralising factor (24) she wrcte.

the corner stone of her annroach consisted in the maxim "The unccnscicus re

-S~ _ ene comes before the conscious” (25) But the relationshin between: the unicon= | scious and the conscious is much more complex than Si¢ imagined. As ~ is clear from the‘ cont xt, Luxemburg used. her formulation not merely as an historical. tryisa but also as: a sShenia for solving immediste problems.”

In: doing so*§he ‘reduced their dialectical réationship to a purely temporal one. Such a e@lolutionary concept vrevented her from seeing how the unconscious and ‘the conscious fuse in the actual ‘struggle.

It was Lenints ability to grasp this complex relationship waich was at the core of his o¥ganisaticnal concept. (26) As he saw it, the party (the conscious), demarcates itself from the class (the unconscious) but only in order to assimilate its essence and. ‘reacting jipon it. become its essence,, ‘Thus ‘the process is: first the unconscicus,’ ‘next the conscious and then the dialectical interaction in which the conscious begins to permeate the unconscious. Thus we see the real meaning of the old definition of the party as the "conscious s nokesman of the unconscious process" (27).

A good example of the intricate relationship between the conscious and the unconscicus, between the party and the class. >» is given by Trotsky from .

those crucial five days cf the February Revolution, when the inexperience and spontaneity of the urban masses seemed to lead inexorably, towards a major clash with the Czarist troons. (28). Such a clash would have resulted in the crushing cf the revoluticn at its birth. While the masses had been failed in leadership, from.above, by both the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, the rank and file Bolsheviks, who were naturally an inherent part of the upsurge gave exemplary leadership from below in their individual canacity and averted the impending clash. Thus when commentators refer to the spontanicus nature cf the February Revolution, they overlook that complex relationshin between the conscious and the unconscious, by wnich what seems to be unconscicus, is actually determined by a maxinun. .

of conscicusness. 7 os 7 Dy ee we i It is essential ‘to understand thi s, in order to uhderstand the relationship between democracy and centralism in Lenints theory | of organisation, It. ag.

only the tempéring of centralism with democracy that ensures tnig link: between the conscious and the unconscicus, which in effect means the ~ leadership of the class by the Party. The Leadershin organ cf the party is the: erbodiment of the party over and against its indivicual sarts —othat is the significance of centralism for Lenin and this is why ‘lower party organs are suborcinate to higher ones and not the other way round. But it is only through its individual parts, “the peoples tribunes", that the panty projects its will, which is the historical will of the_ ‘class, and actually becomes “the conscious spokesman forthe unconscicus. process".

(Thus Lenin stood firmly against any centralism which led to exlusivness of leadership, independent or above the rank and file of the party. The nolicies and decisions of the leadersniz, even in conditions where elective procedures were non-vperative, nad to be firmly and honestly based on the experience of the ordinary party members. Trotsky exnertly captured the svirit of Lenin's concent when he wrote that “leacers are often impatient in seeking to remove the bstacle in the path cf the narty's activily. In such mses, the party can and must correct the precipitatedness cf the icaders, since it is not only the leaders who educate the party but the

i a ; party as well which educates the leaders. Herein lies the salutary dialectic of democratic centralism® (2S).

Lenin was driving at just this when he wrote: "This brings me to a highly important principle of all party organisation and all party activity : while the greatest possible cengralisation is necessary with regard to the ideological and practical leadership of the movement and the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, the greatest possible decentralisation is necessary with regard tc keeping the party centre ( and the party as a whole) informed about the movement and with regards to responsibility to the party."

He makes this plain when he writes a little further on that "This decentralisation is an essential corrective to itt? (30) Thus for Lenin the only centralism permissable is that which enables the rank and file to control and educate the leadership.

This principle cf centralisation and decentralisation is summed up concretely by him in yet another principle. "We define it as unity in action, freedom of discussicn and criticism’? (31) he wrote. It is the action of the party which brings it into contact with the masses, and this contact can be .

retained, strengthened and deepened only on the condition that the experience of this action becomes the guideline for the party leadership in the formulation of its positions. But this experience can only be assimilated by the party as a whole and not merely by its central organs. Consequently there is an absclute need for full and open internal discussion especially amongst the rank and file in which this experience is distilled. Only — after this party metabolisation, so to speak, can the leadership take the final product and get on with the job of presenting. the will of the party as the will cf the masses. Thus we see that for Lenin in his concept of the party as the conscious articulator of spontaneous process, there is an organic connection between centralisation and decentralisation, unity in acticn and freedom of criticism — in a word : there is an organic unity between democracy and centralism in his concept cf democratic centralism.

FACTIONS

But to say that.democracy in the form of freedcm to discuss and criticise is necessary, dces nct exhaust the matter. Even Stalin could boldly proclaim this necessity. Every.difference is a contradiction and contracicticns in acccrdance with the laws cf the dialectic must work themselves out in struggle. Therefcre discussion and criticism must not be seen merely as an “exchange cf ideas" but where necessary, aS a clash of views. From the standpoint of internal party orgenisation, it is precisely the difference on this which separates Stalinism from Leninism. This is manifested in the attitude to factions. Stalin adopted a categcrically hestiie attitude to the formation of “independent ideclogical groupings within the varty, and he elevated this hostility to the level of a vrinzinle. "The existence of factions is comatible neither with the party's unity, nor with its iron discipline” (32) was his formulation.

-—IIhaat As against this, Lenin adcpted a mucn inore flexible positicn.Generaily speaking he was in faveur ¥ facti.os. Pus wisn le was arguing against federalism in the »arty, he was careful t. stress that he was not uox.sed to facticns. Speaking “Oa the place «f the Bund in the ASDLP (33) fur example he said ® As it is, there will always (ur enmhasis) be different gruunings in the party, groupings of comrades wac do not think quite | alike om questivns if pregramic, tactics or organisation; but let all lik C of minded members join in a single group...." Aad later OM, + Ccrienting seers eset = more generally cn the question of discussicn and criticism he wrete: "When we have a Party programe and a Party organisation, we must not only hcsvitably throw spen the cclums of the ty organ for excnanges of oninicn, but must afford those groups which 4 cma inconsistency suppert some of the dcogias of revisisnism, cr for one reason or another insist uncn their senarate and individual existence as grouns, the opp vrtunity of systematically setting forth their differences, however slight these may be. Precisely in urder t; av.id being toc harsh and stiff-necked... towards ‘anarcidistic individualism’ , it is necessary in cur copinin, to du the utmst,- even if it involves a certain denarture from the tidy natterns cof centralisi and from absclute, cbedience to discipline, - to enable these grouns to speak cut and give the wis Le narty the cnoportuiiity to weigh~ ‘the iiipertance-cr unin rtance .

of these differences and determine just where, how and on wise part inconsistency is shwn', (34) Té is clear from this that Lenin did nt see the devarture from “the tidy natterns cf centralism leading t. the disruoticn of centralisa but cn the centrary to its strengthening.

But it was not caly in the ry, but alsvin oractice, that Lenin adopted this flexible attitude. Beginning with the differences in the iskra group at tne second conference of the RSDLP in 1593, the history of Bolshevisia is one ©f ceaseless internal struggle, in which varicus grouss, tendencies and factions fought over every “question of programme, tactics cr organisation".

Mo less than fifteen immartant factions can be counted in fhe twenty years of the part?’ys existence. And it was in the course of the conflicts surrowding the formation of these factions that some of the more unique and distinctive features cf Bolshevism were given sueh an incorruptible and unconpromising form — hostility to social~democratic opportunism, internationalism, the permanency of revolution in backwaré cuuntries, the strategy of constructing a socialist economy and reinforcing the dictatorship of the proletariat in backward countries, to mention but a few. Can anyone doubt that it was the vigorcus, healthy and even bitter struggles within the party that made Bolshevism the most nersistent defender on a world scale of the historic interest of the working class on all these issues? Bolshevism without these internal struggles would not have been Bolshevism, and in this we see the facile nature cf the pseudo-scientific attemmts to depict Bohahevisn as the father of monclithic Stalinism.

But while facticns have their nositive side, it would be wrong tc glorify them as a virtue. There are obvicus dangers. AS Trotsky pointed out:in any (35) sericus factional struggle the interests of different classes assert themselves.

—12- | Just aS in the class struggle the conflict cf these interests tends towards the disruption cf socities equiliberium, so too within the party unity in action can be disrupted by the clash cf factionalinterests. Once that happens the faction ceases to be an integral functioning element of the party and in actual fact becomes a separate party . In that case the revolutionary party is forced to adopt a hostile attitude and just as it demarcates itself from other class parties it is ferced to draw a clear line between itself and its disloyal opponents through expulsions.

Given the negative factcrs involved in factions it would nontheless* be disasterous to try and place a restricticn on them in advance. Even where disruption or a split is the finai outcome we cannct .4dook back with hindsight and say that the struggle shculd not have been permitted in the first glace. If we take for example one of the very few instances in the history of Zolshevism in which the cutcome cf facticnal struggle was a split ~ the Recallist dispute - we can still see many positive achievments not the least of which was the formation cf a real leadership within the party. In additionmost of those who were expelled obviously learned something in the course cf the ‘three years struggle since the majority of them found their way back intu the Bolshevick camp before I917.(36) The strangulation of the Bolshevick party itself during the mid-twentiesis a fearful warning against any attempt to judge the effects uf factions a priori. Both Lenin and Trotsky favoured the move tc clamp down on factions within the narty in I92I because of the general precaricussstate of affairs Of course it must be pointed cut that they did this withreluctance and only as a tempory measure. Moreover while the eganisation of free discussicn and criticism through factions was forbidden thry cnntanued tostress the need fr the .“ organisation of free discuss&on and eriticisin bby the party in the form of special journals for dissenters, more oppertunity for debate etc. It was cnly latter on when Lenin and Trotsky both attempted to form a block against the threat to the narty from the bureaucracy that the magnitude .f their error became apparent.

THE RELEVANCE OF LENIN TODAY

To understand the unity < of Lenints thecry of organisation as we have tried to outline it above, is tc see immediately its universal and continued relevance. An inability tc grasp this unity always leads to the familar raticnalisations: dem cratic-centralism was permissable, even necessary, in a repressive, backward country like Russia, but in advanced capitalist countries with bcurgecis democracy it is not practical. Or; Lenin worked out :.

out his thecry over seventy years ago ~ a lot has changed since then.

Salvaging their conscience with these megre excuses, many revolutionaries w=: inevitably proceed to pick Lenins brain for ingrediens tc make their cwn "yaupers broth’ a little tastier. They take from him what they feel they need - this rule, that regulation. They debase democratic-centralism to the level of a lifeless schema - like a stone from which chips may be knocked without imparing the unity of the chips or the remnant, and not like a «: living body from which limbs cannot be torn without destroying both the limbs and-the bcdt. The idea of taking bits and pieces from Lenin makes as much sense as the

= rr reece ernie mtenanmatetintestatemnseneitlhasansnaspatnnnmnenrensnba ithe nt TT CL idea of grafting on limbs. to a stone in the hope that it will walk. It — fails tc see hovw the. methodology of democratic-centralism is related to the class struggle. Where ever there is class struggle the methodology of lenin is relevant. In conclusion therefore, it si necessary to stress the unity of Lenins theory of organisation. It is the only way that we can comprehend its importance fcr all revolutionaries in the class struggle today.

‘It is only by taking it in its unity that it can have any contemporaecy relevance at all. . oe

NOTES AND __ REFRENCIS

(i) Goerge Luckacs, History and Class Concious, » 299. Luckacs was a young communist philosopher wh tried to Hegelanise Marx and posed a number of important problems in the nrocess, Later he rem unced his ceviations for Stalinism. Ue participated in the short lived Hungarian Soviet of ISIS and _ the 50s.was active inthe workers upsurge against the bureauoccracy.

. (2) ibid. (3) c/F Richard Hyman. Marxism and the Sociology cf Trade Unionisn.

Pluto Press IS7I. (4) Lenin.. Five Years cf the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revcluticn. Collected Works Vol 33 p.431.

(5) ibid (6) Thesis on the Structure ¢ Communist Parties andthe ‘Métdod Of ang Content of their Work, in Documents of the Communist International 1519 to 1934. Uxfurd University Press 1456. Jane D egres. (ed). Vol I». 257. Tilese thesis written by W. Kuenen., a German C.mumumist were ‘Submitted to the Third Congress on July 16 I¢2I. ioenen admitted that they had been draw up hastily and consequently they were referred to a special comission four disscussion. They were subsequently ¢re submitt: 3 ed on July 12 and adopted unanimously without disscussion.

~ (7). Issaac Deutscher .. The Prophet Unarmed. Vintage Bovks IS5. p 213 (8) E.u. CARR The Bolshevicl Revluticn. Vol I Pelican Is71-p2i3 (©) E.H. CARR. The Interregnum. Pelican I969. p 363. .

- (10) Stalin The Foundations cf Leninism . Foreign Language Press I¢65. oe a oO » iI8. (iI) Ruth Fischer. Stalin and Geraan Communism. Cambridge 1648.

See in particular chpt 23 p4eS to 54. Fischer tells us icw the cohesicn of the party was destroyed; local district and regicnal organigaticn being _. disbanded and reformed cn a completely different basis; hiw the Soviet *"ureauccracy bought over whole layers of the Party-~ cf £25000 meinbers in 1627, 4,300were »aid cfficals(!) and Fischer estimates that as many mre. -¢ cu: “ec also in receipt of scme maney from Muscow;-how in 1926 the Lenin School -wasre opened in Moscow where the leadership of the Party were re educated.

{ - (125: Isaac Deutscher. Russia China and the West. 1653 to 1666. Pelican IS7c p44-tco 45 Deutscher himself was a mamber of the Communist cf Poland.

-I4- (13) A.G.Meyer. Leninisi. Prague University Series 1968 pS8.

(14) Lenin. Where tc Begin C.W. VOL 5 p 20.

€£5) Tiesdore Dan. The Grigins OF Bolshevism Seeker and Warburg.

664 » 245. Dan was cne 6f the foremost leaders of Menshevism.

(16) Lenin. Our Immediate Tasks.C.W. VOL 7 p 218.

wae. €17) . Lenin, One step forewards , Two steps back. 7" C.W.VOL 7 p+ 206.

--e- (8) Robert Michels. Political Parties .The Free Press 1657 (original © “> ~~ iSI5). p. ISS Michels was a left wing German socialist economist.

. Is) Ibid . fhis is the organisational counterpart of Bernsteins Famous war cry "the mvement is evertthing the final goal nothing."

(20) Lenin. Declaration to theldditoRal Board of Iskra CW.VOL 4 p 355.

(21) Rabochaya Gazata (Workers Gazetta) was adopted as the central ergan of the RSDLP in I8S¢. The paper was suppressed before Lenins articals could actually be »ublished. The articles mentioned are ib Vol 4 cf Lenins collected works.

(22) Lenin. A Draft Programme cf Cur Party. CW. Vol 4 P230 (23) Lenin . Dfclaration to the Editorial Board of Iskra. CW Vol 4 337 (24) Rosa Luxemburg Speaks. ed. Mary-Alice Waters. »II6 (25) ibid. pI2I (26) Acccrdi ngly the Thesis on the Structure of Communist partys...etc.

says: "Sucessful leadership presupposes moreover the closest contact with . the proletarian masses.. Without such contact the leaders will not lead but at bestoxiy follow them. These organic contactw are to be sought in . : . . . 5 the Communistparty organisation through democratic centralism "Degras op eet (27) Lenin. One Step Forward Two Steps Back.CW Vol 7 p247.Martov first used.

the phrase but its correctness was fhly accepted by Lenmn ++ (28) Trésky,~ History of the Russian Revolution. Voll. pI0off (29) frotsky. Writtingsoof Leon Trotsky (1935-1936) p25.

(30) Lenin. A Letter to A Comrade on Organisational Tasks CW Vol 6 p248-S.

(31) Lenin. Party Tipéipline and the Fight Against Pro-Cadet Social Democracy CW VolII p20. (32) (32) Stalin op cit pIl4. (33{ Lenin Speech on the Place of the Bund in the RSDLP.CW Vol6 p487.

(34) Lenin Letter to Iskra CW Vol7 pII6. (35) Trotsky In Defence of Marxism. n77. (36) R.V. Daniels. The Conscience of the Revolution... P25.

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