The Prospects Before Us (perspectives document)

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t THE STCRY SC: FAR in the sight decade of the irisaltdle ara, trofand's ‘position Is 0g tt hos been for fifty years: that of o neo-colony {in tha north-east, a colony) with a north Atlantic (i.e. developed bourgaois democratic) suparstrichulte The ultimate causes for this lie in two basic aspects of roland prehistory and eorly history:~ (1) The fact that Ireland was not supplied with sufficient mineral resourcas to be ecsily exploited, save with the most modern contemporary equipment; (2) The fact that lraland wes on offshora island of the European seaboard. Thus it got, if at all only tha tell-end of the invasions that destroyed Caltic society elsewhere in Europe, until such time as the new order had daveloped into’a highly centralised form of feudalism.

To these might be added a third, later point, connacted indirectly to the other two:- (3) The fect that the cavities uniqualy suited to denifiate Iretand as its colony was also tha first country in the world to establish its industrial pra-eminence (partly at the. expense of Ireland, of course). it was able to try to use its prot ts from this to + SRR to buy off Irish loyalty to its legionary. i The three points listed above beens exsated basteally the situation In which the | irish find themselves today.

{n relation to the rest of the workd, Iwetand is.a colony ruled indirectly by the matropolitian impertalist powers. This is a part couse of tha-wecknass of — tha Irish working~class (as wall as the. Irish bourgeosi2). - The facts of colonial exaloitation on top of {reland' $ relative. .(to Sritain) lack of raw materials .

meant the weakening of any potential strong industrial working-class and the dapartura abroad of potential leaders of sucha class. “Mattars are not counterbalanced by the contradictions specific to the neo-colonial societies of the "Third World", The emigration boat has led to a thinning of Irish population so as to wacken the threat to the status quo that exists in the shanty suburbs of most neo-colonias. Similorly , because of the distribution of monopoly profits, tha landlord class has be2n bought out. This process has established a class of rural small property~holdars such as gives a firm : base to formal bourgeois parli famontary democracy in Ireland.

Mowevet, copitolism has never been able to elfminete all possibte ¢ontra~ dictions in the various rational socisties within it. It is least abla to do s0 now thot it is in its death agony. Irish capitalism has only bean able to avold the contradictions of the two types of sociaty to which it ralotes by | developing contradictions of its own. Basically, and even despite the cir cumstances that formally strangthan it, Irish capitalism - north and south has less ability to manoavre than its fellows in the naighbouring countries, | ft is aven lass able to supply good wages and to maintein full employment | hat its neighbours. This fact was undoubtedly at the core of the high rata | of strikes in lraland since 1964, In themsalves, these would not be ) fmprassive, but Irish capitalism's political weakness is laaiiiied effactive, ~ evan within the formalities of bourgzois democracy. ot only has a | United Irish *Jation not been craated, but its creation was muffad ina - fashion that meant, as is being sa2n today, an assentially unstable political

Fy Politically and culturally, laws based on raligious superstitions that might have baen acceptable in Latin America, are being felt incraasingly as darogatory to London rights in an offshore island of agnostic Europe. And, while the existence of parliamentary democracy does raveal the security of a region, it also provides greater opportunities for opponents of that regime than exist in totclitarian states.

The point of the special situation in Ireland is not that it makes impossidle the Socialist revolution but that it imposes upon those who would make such a revolution the extra duty to analyse the specific situation. In many of its ospects, it is different from anywhers else. To give a concrete exemple that is known to all comrades: The Protestants of iVorthem Iraland are in a position relative to the Catholics therein that is superficially like the position of tha Europeans in South Africa. Yet, as the some tims, they are ina far lass isolated position than the mambers ‘of the other castes. Thus, they cannot ba said to ba axoloiting the Catholics os the Whites, the Slacks; the Cotholics era eble to join Trade Unions; in the last resort, ao Catholic can lapse asa Bleck can't. Thus, at different times (1919, 1932) there has been co-operction batween the working classes of the two communities, as hos been literally impossible in South Africa. (Cur general analysis shows of courses, a relatively doser resemblance between the Israelis and the Ulster’ Protestants.) Any consideration of Irish society that is aimed to change it must begin with the lack of real development of the Irish economy, and the society based on it. As has bean shown, the contradictions that exist are different from those in either the metropolitian or the normal. colonial /neo~colonial countries, but the contradictions exist, nonethelass. The question is: how to exploit them ? ; The instrument thet must carry out such a task does not yet existy the task of the Revolutionary i‘arxist Group is to craate one. Such e task has been often incorrectly, counterposad to tha participation of the nucleus of the prolitarian vanguard in the events that must maximise the contradictions.

In practice, we have baen carrying out such o saparation. ‘//2 have not bean doing so in theory, rather we have been doing so for lack of theory: the theory of how to participate. .

In answering this need, it has been necessary to summarise the fects already put before us hr MacGragor in the perspective document for the February Conference. It is now as well to consider the implications of the facts as applied to tha history of the Irish Left. ; .

The outstanding fact here is the low devalopmant of the movement. Cf course, this follows on from the odjective facts mantioned. In the absence of a stable, highly daveloped industrial economy (outside the north-east, where it was maintained ot the political os well as the normal, economic expense of its workers), the fragmented proletariat has been dernteeted | by Republicanism. This idzology makes only fitful pretence to the Socialism claimed as the ideal by the movements in Britain and Europe. °.ere, of course, we refar to militant Republicanism (Gardiner Place and Kavin St.)

At a later stage of devalopment, we will have to face up to a further fact: that the fonn of Republicanism that exercises most hegemony over the workers is, still, neither that of Gardinar Place nor that of Kavin Street, but the pretender of Upper Mount Street: the Fianna Fail cuckoo. The extrema vaguenass of Kepublicanism precepts (basically: "Break the connection with England and you'll be all alright") enabled this situation to coma about. The victory of ths "Yes" vote in the recent refereundum exposed the limitations of militant “Separatism, and the creed could give no reason such a vote as incompatible with their basic views.

wet Senly by using tha fight as e besks for axplatning Soclattem could anything a, __- heve been ratrlaved from the wreckage, The circumstances thar have made for the predominance of Republican Ideology in the Irish working closs have prevented any sort of serious — oppostion from baing counterpesed to it, The Irish Labour Party developed from a rigorous application of « syndicalist economist interpretation of _certain aspects of the teachings of James Connolly inevitably becoming an expression of patty bourgeois Social Democracy. Such an idsology only hes - is staying power in the metropolitan statas of Imperialism. Basically, Irish .. » Social Democracy accepts that Ireland ts another such state. This is at loggerheads with the facts. [It has cut off the 1.L.P. from any permanent claim on Republicans, and has left it to depend entirely on imperialism's ability to industrialise Iraland: an ability, os we ore sezing, of only limited range. Tha development of an apparent "Tribunite" tendancy around the Liaison Committee of the Loft.is not based on an internal "Trisunite” bese, but on theinflux of debased Trotskyists and Stalinists.

If trish Social Democracy foils because of its. vulgarly aconomist approach to Its moterial tectity, the even greater failure of Irish Stalinism is more interesting. Since the end of the 1940's campoign, the appeal of Stalinism for tha patty bourgeois ideology of separatism has been revealed as wholly logical. Stalinism has tendad generally to over-emphasise the patty bouregois anti~imperial struggle. {ts view of the rigorous division of that struggle into stages does little harm to the ideas of simple "separatism".

But thers have bean probleme. Inevitably, Communism, even mora than Social Mamocracy, hos suffered from the lack of development of Irish Industry and the class employed therein. The seme debility that keeps the workers Republican and Fianna Fail hinders them from turing to aven formal “communism”, except in revolutionary circumstonces. A Communist Party, such as thot of France or of Italy Is an impossibility, This is not only due to the objective facts of the undavaloped economy, but to the subjective fact (arising from this} of the religious question in Ireland: The dominanea of the Catholic Church in tha Republic: the religious division of the (orth East ara both handicaps to any genuine dialectically materialist party.

But, of course, thers is « further complication. 2eal Communists might have been able to survive and develop better than:the vanguard with which’ (until recently) the frish working class has ozen lumberad. The history of trish Stalinism Includes 14 Hquidations of its party. The first (1923) was to acco~ modate to the Syndicolist, Larkin. The second (1941) (in the Twanty~Six _ Gaunties only) was aimed to overcome the embarrassment that would be given the USSR by its allied party supporting tha war effort of Russia's ally and Ireland's oppressor. In iorthern traland, the CP*1 gained a great deal of support among the Protestant workers, {In fact, all its Protestant working class) by its scabbary for the UK war crisis. Cn such occasions, -as the CPI did exist, it tonded.to follow a line almost entirsly subserviant to the Repub= lican }fovemant, if not to tha militant that to Fianna Foil, In its first life (1921-1923), this was, of coursa, not dua to V.V. Stalins it does help explain how that man was able to toke over the comintern so easily.”

If Stclinism has found it ‘difficult to survive in lnsland, itt is not surprising that Trotskyism has had:to fight for.occasional existance, The classical marxism of this theory does not allow for major petiy bourgeois vulgorisation.

At least, the theortes of Social Democracy, Stalinism and Anarchism (a theory of workers in under-cdeveoped metropolitan countries) all agpaal to separatists in their accaptance of the possibility of "Socialism In a Single Country". Trotskyism does not.

Further, in the influenca of Catholic philosophy operates at a low, agitational leval against Stalinism, but influences far more deeply opposition te dialectical materialism. It is no accident that Irsland gave to the workers of the world, James Connolly: the only leading iarxist theorist not to havea university ‘education’. ‘.ad hs been to. University College Dublin, the world would probably not hava known him (except, perhaps, as a Labeur-Radmetcitta), The formal logic of the schoolman, the idealism of tha priests have to be fought ralentlessly by anyone who wants to achieve or maintain. his or her marxism.

i these circumstances, it has been difficult for Irish Trotskyism to establish tsalf except as a nucleus for leadership in « revolutionary situation. This is not necessarily a cause for defeatism or for panic measures: it is worth remembering that the above description comes close to fitting the original Bolshevik: Party. Concern with building a mass party and maintaining its numarical strength, even whan there is no prospect of revolution is the work of the Menshevite, or Chernov, the "Social Xevolutionary", and of the Communist Parties of France and Italy. Such a concern tands to accompany e readiness to scals when revolution becomes an actuality. (i :ot to do se is thought to imperil tha Party). If we can get together enough trained ravelu= tionaires to provide leadership in overthrowing the Irish states, we need not worry too rauch avout the numbers of our rivals.

‘Yea should consider the history of Irish Trotskyism at this point. Such considaration can only be very sketchy. It is hopad that the F.1. will bs able te supply data for a more detailed description at a later stage of the pre-conferenca discussions, ‘lowever, it is as well that comrades should hava an idea of the vicissitudes of thair predecessors in this country.

Vihat might be called, accurately, the pesieraty of Irish Trotskyism i is centred mainly mainly on ‘the personality of tha Socialist Republican, i:ichael Price.

As to how far Price was, in fact, a real Trotskyist i is doubtful. | iowaver, he has bean the victim of a smear campaign aided by saveral who once claimed to be his friends. This is one of the reasons for suspecting that he moy have been more formideble than he has been made to appear. This suspicion daepends when his actual positions during the last tenyears of his life (1933-1943) are examined.

Before this period, admitte odly, Price's position was doubtful. In 1931, he engaged in a polemic with his comrades in the (original) Seor Zire /ovemant.

In it, He attacked’ the "Godlessness" of their "State Socialist" theories and defended the ideas of equal distribution of property bsloved by the more "progressive" clergy of the time. [le was defsated therein and never again put forward his erroneous views. Indaed, on several occasions, he is recorded as putting forward views more similar to his 1931 opponents. ieweaver, this did not pravent them being dredged up in a faction fight three years later.

That occured over the strategy to be followed by the Remsblican Congress.

This was a bocly of Socialist Sepublicans that, in 1934, broke from the essentially non-political leadership of the azpublican Movement in order to carry on ¢ more active fight against the poiitics of ths Fianna Fail government. It could not maintain its unity, however, A few months after it solit with the mainstream, o new and damaging split occurad init. .

Cn one side was Price and the Connolly family: on the othar, were some* of the traditional leaders of Irish Republicanism Socialism, allied to the nawly-reconstituted CPI. Sut like that, however, the issues are over simplified. The Stalinists and their fellow-travallers were united in putting forward a stretagy that ecame known later as one of a “Popular Front".

As such, thare was a broad unity of Floft-wing and laft-centra foreas on tha lowest common denominator of “anti-imparialism as opposed to anti- --capitelism of socialism. With this analysis, they were agreed in rajecting an "ultra-left" the call of their apponants to demand a “Workers’ Republic®.

“The Left was not united, except on the slogan. The Connollys (who had been inthe Labour Party for soma years and wera determined to stay in it) “were Indeed ultra-lofts, wanting the People's Front, but believing that it could ba achieved on the Workers’ Republic" slogan. Price alone rajected the whole Front idea and demanded a vanguard party to fight for the Workers’ Republic. ‘‘/han his proposal was rejected, ha broke completely with the Congress, unlike the Connellys. Finally, it must be stated that his analysis bore the test of history. Aso Popular Front, the Congress was a flop, being ignored by all left-wing forces excapt the tiny CPI. A nuclgus Bolshevik ’ Party could not have done worsé. nn "ae it was held against Price that oftar a few yaars in the wildemess he joined the Labour Party. But really, thera was nowhere else for him to go, unless +he triad his luck in isolation with the embryonic forces available to him.

The CP was Stalinist and the non-pcliticism of ths Sepublican ovement approached Fascism at times. Labour was larger than both the other two . put together and was going through \ left-wing phase. Entry work in it was an wholly reasenchle proposition. ‘lowaver, one thing might b2 held against Price. |'e daas not seem io hava teken, what would be termed as.a Pabdloite= Liquidationist line (if, indzed he was that much conscious) rather than preparing any sort of vanguard grouping while he was within the Labour Party.

- But apart from the — waoknass, Price put forward mangnlsalily Trotscyist policies, in a debate in 1937, he opposed the line of feddy Connolly, that if dritain was to afly with the USSR, Irland should not ambarras her emploiter. Price replied stressing the need to fight the Irish _ favolution in traland regardless of the so-called Socialism of a singla country.

‘In the newspaper, The Torch that tha Tublin fegional Executive ran from 1939 under his direction, basi¢e facts of Trotskyism were aired for a time.

Then in 1941, whan membars of ths liquidated Dublin branches of the PI bagan to join the Labour Party and counteract Prica's work. In the same pariod, his supporter, Patrick Trench, whose more definite Trotskyist leanings : had been stimulated by his experience of Stalinism in the SpanishCivil Var, died. Trench's friend, Geoffray Coulter (who had once tried to get an F.1./ RAS alliance) also droppad out of active politics. Price himself. was plagued by ill-health. > cis last political act was to resign the Party's nomination of the S’orth-East Dublin Candidacy to Big Jim Larkin. This holed tha latter to Le Finally isave the political wildernamt. Price died in 1944, A more: cartajn Trotskyist strain was clready developed, This w was s omongst certain of Price's followers (netably F Cowan), but alse amongst members _of Fianna fireann who wera disillusioned with the lack. of politics. of the _» Rapublicen leadership, and by the diosters that if caused. The leaders.

in this latter tendency were John (Johnny) Syme and Vincant /. hue Rowrall.

After the Var, thesa formed a short-lived Revolutionary Socialist Party of Ireland which constituted the only Irish section. of the Fourth International to date.: This never grew beyond twenty. If was liquidated early-in 1956 by its leading theoreticisn, the Israali student, Ygail Gluckstain (Tony Cliff) perhaps inspired by the liquidationist teachings of Michal Pablo. (This must have been the last act of Cliff on bahalf of the F.1. before he was himself expalled for refusing to support the Gnti-imperialist struggle of the ?.orth Koreans). ° Those of the 8SP who remained in Ireland during the 1956's played a major role in the Labour Party and the Trade Unions politics; having @ particular strength in the “ublin Trades Council,

ww) Leter, many of tham wera to be prominent around .oal Srowne, during his last paricd of organisational independenca. ‘lowaver, by this time, thay hed lost most of thair original revolutionaty fervour. They did not try to reate a propar Solshevil Party out of : cel Srowne's : ational Prograssive memocrats. Since 1963, they have ben all too happy to liquidate into the lish Labour Party. In : ‘orthem Iraland, their cadras liquidated into the ‘,1LC.?. ‘and oriented incraasingly to the Protestant working-class and tha Sritish Chauvinist politics of Ted Grant and the RSL, Th continuous tradition of Trotskyism in Iralond | begins during ths (24 /Saor tNadh border carapaign of 1955-1962. CAany “epubdlican Interneas began to aducats thamselves. Thay included G. Lowless, S. Geraghty, L Daltun and others. Cn release, they ware without jobs and hed to amigrate. In London in the sarly 1960's, they formed various combinations based en tha Irish emigrants in the city. Thess were mainly in opposition to the "conventional wisdom" of the Stalinite Connolly 4 sociation, but with tha (vary) long-term: aim of returning to Iraland to. build a iarxist Revolutionary Party. AI these bodies were loose organisations of /iarxists, and would be Marxists, outside both the Fourth International and its rivals for thet titls, debilitated by the nature.of emigrant politics, and divide ad even more by sareonal feuds than by politics. ; $ The.final stage in tha. process began in. 1944, Lawless, Daltun and Phil Flynn joined in the traditional basis of enti-Pussian Stalinism with a group of ivaoites, centred on Brendan Clifford. After a year, the inevitable (though for ones, political) split occured. Sut it was on terms that left the Trotskyist/ Cantrist majority with a larger nucleus than before and with the real possibility of acing serious work in Ireland itself.

Cf course, this was due to the social circumstances rather than to luck. In Britain, the long-awaited Labour Government was proving to be as qualitatively as Tory as any other (in Irsland, as well as elsewhere). In Ireland, the new industrial militancy, stimulated by the naw maturtty of ha-worlears in the protected industries set up in the thirties (as well as by the 66's boom) provided an opportunity for acticn. The [rish Labour Party was beginning to benefit from the new situation. The Irish \/orkers' League in the twenty-six counties (heir to the branches therain of the former CPI) constituted itself a Party, and: ‘praperad fo boiled a Youth Crgonisation. trish Trotsky ism could . } not fail to snefit from such opnortunities.

The Irish Workers! Group (as the anti-ecoite majority of the pre svious orgeni=sction called itself) was cble, ct first, to take full advantage of the situction.

For the first time, since 1950, « branch of on Bish Trotskyist organisation wes sat up in Dublin in May. 1967.. Pouring the naxt few months, branches were storted in Belfast and Dundalk. The Irish Militant was the longest lasting Trotskyist paper known in Irelend (1963-1945). The IW provided the impetus for the formation of Young Socialist bodies. In September 1967, the Group astablishad a constitution with a preamble that wus overfull of jargon but, nonetheless, formally correct. All seamed set for cn even more rapid expension quantitatively and qualitetively., Yet within three months, it was to be solit by « bitter faction fight and twelve months efter this, it wos in existence only in name. Why wes this? The answer is not an ecsy ons to formulcte. Basically it appears thet it wes a political-psychological cause such as maddens the economic determinists.

The IVS was @ group of young, and somawhet subjective revolutionists.

Coly Lawless, Maltun and the ‘atgamnas had hed any previous experiance of Trotskyist politics. (Sean Metgomne wes on Irish emigrant and veteran of the SLL and the FI, whom Lawless hed recuited, pertly to raise the level of politics in the Group.)

It ts certainly orguabte that political standards were vary low.» Tha IWG _ facluded soma individuals whose maneism would clways he doubtful. But to huild ony sort of organisation, capa’sia of taking decisive part in trish politics, it was necesscry not to saise the entrance quelification tao high.

And to reisa the consciousness of the Group, only a period of intensive political education and discussion would suffice. ‘hat happened instead wos o split. The causes for the faction fight ore disputed. Cnly a survey of all letters hetwean Lawless end iviatgemna ond of tapas of all phone calls could give .cleer idee of who started what. (4nd, evan then, one would have to be wary of forgeries.) ‘What is known is that Lawless maintained that /atgamna was ‘trying to split the Group for the purpose of building his own empire. Cn the othar hand, :viatgamna claimed to be acting in salf-defance against Lowlass' plot to expel him behind the backs ef tha other members. At all evants, ha produced tha first (and it must be said, tha first) of the intarnal bulletins thet appeared in the faction fight: Trotskyism or Charmelionisra?

Tha fight itself wos fought on three issuas:~ al 2 ft (2) The methods of building such en C-rganisation; (3) Ths personal vulnerability of the participants, with particular reference to G Lawless. This list has bean made out tn ordar of objactive importance; but to gat any idea of the faction fight, it is necessary to ramembar that the treatment of gach of these matters was produced in inverse ratio. Little was said about tha national question; rather more about party organisation and one-hall of-atot ebout Comrade Lawless (and, vice-versa, about Comrade iJatgamna), To ba fair to éatgamna, he now admits, as the one who struck the first (open) blow, that his method wes at fault. jie ascribas this to his inaxperiance.

Comrade Lawless is still mora inclined to blame2 his opponent, but it is doubtful whether he could do much oftar Trotskyism or Chamalionism . | Matgamna took his stand, with the formal correctnass, with which he had invested the Group's constitution on - the differance between the trish Yorkers’ Group and a real, established Bolshavik Party. “uite a lot of what he said was unexceptionable, but it was closely bound up with a personal attack on Comrade Lawless. AI would be well, so the argument went, if it was not for the activity of that drsedful man, 510 examples were given of attempis, made by Matgamna or others, to raise consciousnass by his oppenents. And, in fact, the need stressed by i\atgamna and his allies was not for free dis~ cussion but an utopian ideal: “Tha ‘:omogenaous Party". (This is ona mistake that he has since admitted. ) The choica of this combination of planks wes nscessary for Matgamna. Cin the issua of the national question , not only was ha vulnerable, Sut the homoganeity of his own faction was in doubt. itis own ultra-leftism on the quastion had ‘saan shown by his writing for the Irish Militant an article stating "In or Cut of tha GEC, the struggle (against the bossas) goes on". Again, quite true, but irrelevant, Cn tha other hand, amongst his supporters were Christy ‘ussey and his friends, Thair nationalism has been sc marked thet, not only did they disagree with their mentor on tha EEC, but they have since liquidated into Mevin Straet, Republicanism.

However, deliberately or not, the anti-Lewless line united behind Matgamna a considerable faction. It was composed of individuals united politically oy the ideal of the "homogeneous party" ond emctionally by hatred of Comrade Lawless. In March 1968, thay broke from the I/G and formed the League for a Workers’ Rapublic. It is not too much to say that despite the departure of all its founding members bar two, this body has never changed politically.

It has remained as it began, still a sectarian organisation with an aversion to "nationalism" = by which it meant doing anything at all about the national question, — What was left of the INC soon split again. A4 Farrell and the Belfast Sranch -- -ysed the pressures of tha .“orthem crisis of Autumn 1988, to set “2 their own "Paoples Democracy". C:f course, this was to preva: 9 mistekes P.O. hes never bean abla te rastora the 26 County links with which it broke in its foundation. At about the same a Saen } orrissay ale oroka with what remainad cf the Irish orkers' Croup to halp form a Guavarist Socialist tepublican Group. — “= and his comredes had been disillustoned with what their considered Leninist aolitics as a rasult of the Group's split.

An attempt to racrganise the unity of the non-Stalinite left in a Revolutionary Socialist Alliance was-thwartad early in 1969. This was not done by the Livk _ which was going through a bad period, but by the PP, riding nigh on the martyrdom of Burntollet. The 14/G wos wound up formally in April.

The braak of the Irish Vorkers' Group was caused in general by the problem that has navear really bean solved to the satisfaction of Irish Trotskyism: the _ problem of how fo make maximum of tha resources that the ovemant has end hew most speedily to increasa these rasources without undue dilution of the revolutionary nucleus. uring the last months of the Group, and the first of the LV/8 and of PD, attempts were made to solve this problem. The L'/2 tried -to de so by its control of the Mublin YS, but in could only comprehend the usa of such a body by the tachniques used by the Sritish SLL, through its Youth Rody. (It still doasn't comprehend the relationship of the two.) The ?2 did not accept, as yet, that any dichotomy existed. ‘/ith its base and, as yet its outlook, limited to the six counties, it found no need to distinguish between its agitational and its propagandist functions. “s yet, it was ready to ignore completely its latter duty. ‘With Scor Eira, the Leninist strategy with its differantiation batween agitation and propaganda was thrown out the window = with catastroshic results.

From Spril 1969 to Spring 1971, the two effective Trotskyist \‘ovements in Ireland were the L'/2, with its “Young Sociclists C rganisation and Pf}, with its practically six county perspective. Since the Spring of 1976, there has 3an a third beac the League for a “Yorkzers' Vanguard, with its own youth grou, the Irish Young Scciclists. This body continuas and intensifias the errors of the LWP, from which it broke. ®ut this is natural. The assumptionsof the LY/R are essentially (Gerry) | aalyite, but without it being willing to accest the interference that “iealy has always tried to exarcise over the sactions of his intamational. Cne of the points in the intemational perspective of the faction that formed the LY/R was opposition to the [-YG majority's proposals urging invastigations with a view to affiliating to the F.1, This essentially nationalist attitude has continued until today. °-ow, the LWR is, cs we prophesied it would in January, finding its only possi‘sla international contact to be the least suitable of all; Piarre Lambert's "International Committee." The break with it in 1970, was one carried out by individuals who, with all their faults were true to the Li's intarnational oratensicns and to the logic of their pclitics. Irish Troskyism had ra-entarad the intarnational organisational scana, albait through tha back door.

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+ = a At the same timo Pi wes also suffering from the interfarance of British soctal chouvinism ~ in this case, the International Socialism group. ‘<aturally, dug to the ralative phillistinism of the two groups, the ‘allianea end its divisions ware ct a considarcbly lower level. It ended with a sordid row over tha quastion of tha PD's travelling expenses to a meatigg in London, Bur by the tima of thase divisions, the situation was changing to bring the Pi> and the L'VR (though not the ultra-sectarian LV) into closer alliance, Cn the one hand, the Civil Rights struggle that hed stimulated the formation and growth of the P1) exploded into a military struggle in which PO could not play its previous influential role, To restore its prestige it was necessary that the organisation develop qualitatively and quantitatively: qualitatively by the development of the group's theory: quantitatively by « more serious move, than It had made before to influence the situation in tha twenty-six counties.

Simultaneously, in that area, the Labour Party did not do as well as it had expected in the general alection of June 1969. The LVR and its YS hed continued the policy of the [4G in maintaining their membership of the LP. They had not developed any new techniques in this strategy beyond maintaining a damend for tha formal recognition of the YS, as the LP's youth movement.

They tock as such, little port in the drafting of the party's "\.ew Republic" policies cr in sustained criticism of those solicies as passed by the Party Conference. ‘ith the loss of euphoria following its foilura, in tho election the L? began to turn to the coalition policies that it had denounced , it becaine claar that the days in the party of the Lsagua and Youth Movement were numbered. (Paredoxicelly, at that momant the Party did indaed reco.jnisa the YS as its own.) iow would they break and where would they go?

At no time was it suggested that they should antar tha Aepublican /ovament.

As will ba shown thera were good reasons why they ghould net do so, though how for these reasons really affected the practice is doubtful.

lt is obvious, too, thot tha LYYR and the YS, would not be able to stand outside either a petty bourgeois party or an alliance of the Left.

These facts led PD und the LLY and the YS to ferm the Soclfalist Lebour Alliance. This has survived, so far, on the need of the participants te heng tegether for feer lest they hang separately. The only group thot hes, until this summer, cttempted to relate seriously to the /.Hiance's role has _ been the Socialist Workers’ i Aovament, inevitably its contribution (thaoratically, a negative one) has se2n puny, dy any standard.

Within tha SLA, since its formetion, there havs ben certain devalopments.

The {S created its new Socialist ‘Yorkers’ MMevement, out of the disintegrating Labour Perty and affiliated it to the SL’.

Tha 1/2 lost members whe formed from the Dublin and Limerick branches of the YS(and various comradas in Selfast) the organisation fer which this paper is designed. The issues of the split - originally over the management of the YS = soon became ravecled.

- (I) The over-riding importance of the need ta build a saction of the F.1. in Ireland. .

(2) The importance of orianting to the Republican iovement as being the mevement most cttractive at the present time for politically conscious workers.

(3) The correct approach of the Bolshevik Party nucleus to the organisation(s) at its periphery,

: 4 This last point concemed majnly the LV/R's attitude to the YS. But the Leagua's view of that body was os confused as its ideas on the LP and on the SLA. It could sae the YSa an assentially Propagandis ondist body (all tha LWR "Consciousness" document) and deny the SLA‘s a tent tasks. In the lotter case, its attitudes have resulted in the situation, that, since its present defeate at the Alliance Conferences, it has remained in_, but not of that body.

In January 1972, we broke finally with the LWR and its YS. In February we held our founding Conference. Sinca then, we have been guided by three main lines, as defined by the faction fight, as much as anything: (1) A general agreement with Comrade Ernest Mondel's analysis of the developing crisis in world capitalism. (Though, in - detail, a disagreement with his delineation of the valitative — change from Imperialism to noe~cepitctism) and a alae support for the Fourth Intemational.

() The general view thet the mein propaganda fiald is on the national issue. (3) Affiliation to the SLA. - The — is, that except for the fl rst and Comrade # toeGregor' s blvaprint for action in « iorthern Ireland, nothing much has bean done to spell out this (in itself strrectjetrategy. : This is a parttevlarly important weakness in that Comrade iandel's analysis stipulates a situation of major opportunities for the sections of the F.1. Ve are no longer.in the position of the late 'twentias and ‘thirties where theworkers of the world (outside Russia) were defeated and demoralised. ior are we in the position of the ‘forties, ‘fifties and early ‘sixties, when capitalism could be forced to grant many reforms without harming itself too much Immediately. Today it is decreasingly cble to deliver the goods. It © cannot unite Europe (even ‘/estern Europe): it cannct unite treland. : It cannot improve the Irish workers’ standard of living. To liquidate tha contredictions produced during its years of boom, it has to liquidate the boom #Hsalf, which will mean in practice, producing even greater contradictions, But such a situation msans that is incumberent upon those who are to utilise it” thot they must be very clear how to do so. The rest of this document is aimed to show the way.

SUMMARY CF CHAPTER 1

Tha unique combination of factors that produce the objective and conditions of the Irish "problem" have meant a lower stondard of working clase coneciousness than that otaining elsewhere. In tum, this has msant that Irish communism in the fifty years after Connolly was in cold storage and that its.

qryival wes only in its debased Staltnite form. At the final point in this higforicol process Is thet real communism (that of Trotsky) has only rarely been able to get cff the ground, that its theory has been embryonic and that in the last five to seven years, when thae was a continuing Trotskyist tradition, it has been marked by such symptons of ultra-leftism as impatience and philistionism, The internationel situation means that these defects have to be recognised (os they have bean, above) and combatted (as they will be, below) in the most effective possible way by us, the Irish Trotskyist Group, by making a plan for action in the revolutionary struggle, and basing it ona cher appreciation of our strengths and weaknesses, .

CUAPTER TWO: THE REPUBLICAN ORIENTATION.

7 _ One of the most bitterly disputed issues of the faction fight in the ¥.S. was the then Left Opposition’s insistence on the nned for a sericus attithde towards Repu-~ | plicanism. This was held, by our opponents, to mean a turn away from the Irish Working class: We insisted cn the essential fact that Republicanism was, still, the dominant | political ideology of the working class itself: that, though it had begun as a normal | bourgeois liberation movement, the decline cf the Irish bourgecisie had attended an. | Fequal declassificaticn the social base of its ideology. Against this the L.W.R. could } only point tu the undoubted fact of industrual expansion in the Republic of Ireland & claim that this had produced a qualitative change in working class ccnscicusness.

| Of, course this was incorrest. By drawing cn the experience of the world working class we can see that the qualitative change in Irish society such as would change working | class conscicusness occured between the 1880s & 1910(the liquidation cf landicrdism & the crganisation of the unskilled workers). The preof cf this was provided by the 1913 lock-out & the sovietssf the early 1820s—but alsc, by the development cof the so= cial conscicusness cf Republicanism in the form of Griffith's Sinn Fein, ‘That no qualitative change has occured since the Treaty is underlined by the failure cf the C.P.I. TS DEvelop ever as much cof a mass base as the C.P.G.B., by its present cutflanicing by Sinn Fein(Gardiner Place), and by the failure cf the subjectively workerbased Irish Labour Party tc do more than bent Fianna Fail'd influence. 3 Yes, we won the argument-but, t- all intents and purpcses, we stopped.

these, Excent for the Northerh Irish comrades with their crientaticn tc the Northern - Registance Mcvement, it was assumed too readily that in practical agitational work a certain emiriscism was permiss&ble. Quite correctly, we disagred the central duty of cur work as being one of propaganda. At the same time, we had-tco apply cur analysis in ‘ther ways. As @ result in Dublin very little was done(apart from the E.2.C. campaign) and many comrades, relative tu cur whcle, began tc feel frustrated.

Sceme of these werwled , naturelly, inte an understandable cppor= tunism. If Republicanism was, as we said, the dominant hegewmic Irish working-class ideology, then what was stonping us from taking an active crienyatianttowards Republicanism by enterring the crganised movement? After all, this was where the actisn was.

Accordingly we lost two fairly active members ta Gardiner Place & 3 inactive but wore king-class members to Kevin St. But they were merely the tips cf a political iceberg.

It is necessary, therefcre, that we develo» in depth cur at analysis cf Re»ublicanism with the specific aim of using it as a basis for acticn.

Most of the background that we need has already been given in this document.

However, it is as well that two facts be re-emphasised here. In the first place, that Republicanism has the influence in the working-class that it has , specifically, the product of the backwardness of that working-class(Ireland's wirkers are not alone in their backwardness: their comrades elsewhere are handicavedd fir thher reasons).

}It does nct accent the ideclugy because it checses, but because it must. It fcllows therefore that our task is nct t~ nander to the Republicans, but, if anything just the }opposi¢e. In general, we should evpcse the limitations cf Republicanism while participating actively in anti-imerial struggles such as will attract its sunpcrters.

The seccnd pcint is that Republicanism while a relatively progressive fcrce in rld terms and cne able t: attract tc itself many useful anti-immerialist ideas and pro-working-class thecries is, in itself a lcwest:ccmmon denwminatcor. Its essential aim is that of "bredking the connecticn with England’. Since the said connection ig in itsekf counter-revoluticnary, it means that Republicanism is, in the age cf the death aginy uf capitalism, an ocutleok subversive of existing order.

However, the concent criginates in the age of bourgecis revoluticn. Its resultant va- | gueness made cnenings fcr the Republican ideal tc be stclen by thuses whose lcyalty to it is in doubt cr to be held b¥ thcse whcse early loyalty has been lcng depraved by the pressure of circumstances.In this way, the pcositicn cf leader of Irish Republieanism is still for to. many workers, Fianna Fail.

Ultimately, our task will not be to cverthrow the influence of Gardiner Place or a of Kevin St but t: cverthrow the influence cf Upper Mcreat St. This shculd be remembered) though it will probably be a matter of years before wetre in a positicn to do this. : The only other point cn this matter is that the cnly short-term ru(i.e. parliamentary) alter} native to Fianna Fail is nct cnly no gualjtative change, nor no quantitative imprcvenent) but likely to be change fcr the worse. . | There is a further, final, point to be diate, The basic petty bourgecis tenet cf | Republicanism must be develcnned inte a guide fcr, pragtical acticn. In dcing this. the | Republicans have tended, at their highest stages of isevl<gical development within. — j their limits to divide intc 2 tendencies: one roughly sccial democratic & the cther ter reristic. These twc wings have co-existed, however with the latter predcminant.

After military defeat, however the former has tended tc re~assert itself and has.; created the condit.cn for a "split. Such has cccured in the 1880s(the New Departure), the 1930s(Republican Congress) and again in 1970. Of ccurse, it will be cbjectéd that this is an oversimplification. Certainly the "sccial-demecratic"tendency does nob sacrifice armed strategy in the normal "sccoial-demvcaatic" fashion & the terrorists do nct whol+ — ly sacrifice social policy tc the gun. Ncnetheless as Republicanism is a petty bourg@ cis ideology ( and of itself can never go beyond objectively petty beurgecis nolitics) 80, it must be stressed, are its different tendencies. There is no qualitative difference Kevin St & Gardiner Place. In Northern Ireland, the former has the marginally clearer grasp cf the realities: in the Republic, the latter has. The ¥ Republican crientation will nct be activaged by siding. with either, as against the other, except on the basis cf the cbjective needs cof the situation(as we have done in Northern Ireland, with cur backing for the H.2R.M.)

The strategy of crientaticn( propagandistic exposure allied to agitaticnal work in weary ise anti-imperialist issues) applies tc the militant Republican movement an whole: there can be neo question of an "Official™ cr a "Provotorientaticn.

So far, perhaps, there has been slightly tcc much emphasis on expesure cf Gardiner ) Place in the pages cf sur paper. But this is being remedied.

As part of cur crientation we must alse try tc anticipate what is going to happen to the twc main claimants to the title of the Republican Mcvement-one & undivided.At the present moment, there is far tce little to gc on fcr any firm diagnosis to be made.

Ncnetheless hynttheses can & must be put forward if nly tc be disproved by supericr analyses based cn mcre abenipas ke iodi- One thing that is ey is that, since the split, Beastie Plate has beeri(and is, .

still) going through a change cf crientaticn. Tn -what* night well be turned the Johnston: pericd, the strategy was simple: the Republican mcvemsnt was to be educated to mobilise the men not of no property but cf small property tc lead the first stage of the two ~ (forNurthern Ireland, three) stage revolution. This meant fcr Republicang an cri¢ntatits towards specifically petty-beurgecis issues(ground rents & fisheries, etc.), tewerds — geveral abuses, with the C.P.I. (as with housing) and towarta specifically working-class issues in a netty~-buurgecis fashicn. Organisaticnally, it meant continuing the normal © traditicns cf Republicanism: ccmcentraticn on the Army, rather than the Party as the élite bedy & a resulting pclitical lccseness in the latter. The general perspective was centred cn a National Liberation Front (or "Mcvement'?) with the C.P.I. & other "yrcgres sive"! bodies (including the Labour Party, whose only recognised wealmess fur Gardiner ) Place cnly at this time, was its refusal tc join such a front). This was aimed t. achie ve "national liberayicn" after which the C.?.I. & other "sccialist asians cou would ge on to achieve Sccialism. — This strategy was a self-evident failure. Tailing behind the C.P.I. ‘meant trustin in practice, to peaceful means t gain ends of liberation. The provf that this cculdntt work came after August 1096S. Reaction te it Ted to the split with the Kevin St terroris tic tendency. The majority who remained, hcwever, reacted differently. The product of their development is new. acne ta: be ‘Seen. It. ae appear that the Jehnsten era 12 a ee. ae ee oe ee | Se S mw Et Mm ty

(13) has been replaced definitely by that cf which the most representative figure is Sean Garland. What the new "Garland epoch" is going tc mean is uncertain, as yet.

We shculd endeavour tc get the man's recent address on building the Marxist Party to complete cur knouwledge. Nonetheless from his published articles in Teoric & his speech at Bedenstown this year, it is clear that what has changed is essentially his moverent's attitude tc the C.P.I. Basically, there is still an emphasis on stages, still a confusion as tc the methcd of achieving state power(see first article in Teoric), still( as made exnlicitly at Bodenstcwn), a lcyalty tu the Bill cf Rights ‘for Northern Ireland". What is different is that his will be done by the Republican Movement(Gardiner Place) alone. At Bodenstewn the left-wing rempant in the Labour .

Party was called cn to enter the Mcvement and there was no mention of an N.L.F., an a | N.L.M. or a Glun na Saoirse.But it isy be dcubted wether matters can stup here. é ne § Garland has himself placed much emphasis on the need fur a vanguard party. If serious 3 € this will mean a tightening cf political of political discipline(as uppesed tc the se 8 existing militancy) over Sinn Fein and a dewn-grading cf the role cf thelI.R.A. with - “§ its rele as enfcrced cf discinline. (Of course it is possible that Garland, like Ca- 24s} | thal Goulding, thinks of the I.R.A. as the nucleus cf the coming Bolshevism) ». @ But in avhieving such a clarification of the Republican Movement in the direction of the fsrm «f Bolshevism cr nseudc-Bélshebism, there will be necessary facticnal strug gles and prunings cf thcse in disagreement with the prevailing crthcdcxy. In turn, * § this is itself likely t: ccntinue leftwards: Gardiner Place won't be able tc maintain _ § its remaining links with the urban petty bourgecisie if it a sericus abcut maintainth § ing & concentrating itself cn its base in the working class. (Alsendy, with Juhnstcn, B® = such “progressive b.urgecist’ as Michael O'Lvineigh are leaving). Nonetheless there k @ is nce reascn to exneut that the new mvement will cf itself go beycnd thirs pericd Stalinism. While much cf the hcstilify t: Trcetskyism in Gardiner Place is the preduct of ignorance, it is clear that Carland's cwn dislike(gyeent fur visiting fishuen from America) is better infcrmed. He has alreday made it clear that Gardiner Place on is t Irish Trotskyist prcpaganda whilst C.?.1. & Sccial Demicratic lite-.

ae | rature is cn disnlay. The Republican Mvement (Gardiner Place) will unly change intc } , & genuine fully-nledged Eclshevik Patty by means &f a qualitative change fur which, ©- @ as yet, there are n¢ instruments. ’ ot It is true, tcc, phat in the near future, despite the major defeats that the movement has suffered, it is ut likely ty feel the need for a new denarture If the new cease-fire in Northern Treland(in effect “poace with nt victoty") revives qo again(® it may) it will give the cppcrtunity tc forget its failure in Gardiner Place ontfe this sphre and tc domand its "Bill of Rights with new fervour. It may even get a se Bill of Rights, abut as this would nct be rearly as far-reaching as Coughlan or G*ifui ~$@M 0 oorchi would want; however, it would take the wind out of republican sails. On the dodBe Uther hand, the cease-fire continues briken, Gardiner Place is able tc neneinie its prwsent excuses. There is, too, a danger that it may use us or cur friends further for their inccnipetence. On the cther hand it may benefit fren the turnss . away cf left-centre elements from an Inter-Party Government, if i | - Z Such is made a f | «This may porve, however, a doubtful advantage: such recruits are likely tx be ia ash much trouble as they are worth fcr an intending B.lshevik Party. They are likely tc 23. dilute the reveluticnary potential of a movement, whose vc. tential in Northern a tang is already wubeerang dilution, (as in the outsyanding case of Malachy Tval), ‘ ture respectable that than Kevin St, with its ;: i ij i lance ie | vith the tdangerenet Pp, ’ 8 physical force & its alliance | Thus, eventually, the Belshevising of Gardiner Place is like: g : . 2 2 * 2 2 s - likel ingy lead tc divisicns in its ranks. This will develop either from guenuinely Bolshevik tte - elements whom the necessary training programme will have develuned beyond the li- : mitations cf the present strat ret " Johani r ; : ci is | , I egy cr Ircm “Jchanies Cume lately tc the revclucicna > FO works. But neither cf these divisicns is likely tu ccme in the near future. The most for which we can hene is that intensive ie ltati one is that in propaganda & agitational work wi a few cf the better Republican tc us by cnes & twos. ° werk walt wean

2) KEVIN STREET.

The recent truce in Nerthern Ireland exemplified the strength & weakness of Kevin St's strategy. It cculd destroy Storment by force cf ple el though it armed war fare eculd not have succeeded without the original work done by the civil rights Nae teatint petusel ty ot een poral iam in Nurthern Ireland. Even less, to cverthrcw inperialism in that = eae Regett, bast at aap: aide

(4) The limited neture of the achievement of the mititary campaign is likely to.

become more obvious if the truce revives. As has been pointed out it seems likely thet inthe first instances,- Gardiner Place is likely to gain politically. .

from ths cessation of hostilities. The political bonkruptcy of Kevin St., then _ may ba erupting in a naw and futile military fight which os it can see, has achieved something. 3ut it also may yet repeat the re-thinking process of the whole Republican *ovemant in the 1960's. Either is likely to halp a split.

All one can say is that the Republican Movement (Kevin St.) is likely in tha near fyture to give us better opportunities for recruitment than its rival. (This may _ Rot ba true in all areas, it will probably be generally trua. Much more. attention ‘could profitably be applied to it both in analysis cnd in propaganda, {:onetheless, hers egain it would | ba wrong tc look for mass cenversions. : What remains hen, is to ask | how tha revolution and ourselves are to take advantage of the presant situation in the overall “epublican Movemant. Entry work into either Gardiner Placa or “evin Street is clearly out of the question.

In the first place, entry to aither would need tighter, mora conscious and more disciplined cadres than these we have at present. Secondly, the arovabilities: in each case: thet of growing bureaucratic centralisction, under a Stalinite leadership in Gardiner Place and that of greater fragmentation (with som2 ‘Fascist eapearanceas) in Kevin Street maans that antry to either will involve 0 putting our political(and perhaps, even, our physical) heads on the block.

Finally, each organisction has extra disadvantages peculiar to itself, In the cose of Gardiner Place, its traditional activism harnessad to the policies of of its leadership means that real entry work will entoil activity, not alone time wasting, but of an actively counter-revolutionary nature. Trotskyist entrists will have to agitate for a "ysorthern Irish Bill of Rights" and to sell the United Irishman with its libellous attacks on our politics. (This is more than was expacted of Trotskyists in the Labour Party.) In the cose of Kevin Street, there is olways the pitfall of its undoubtedly Fascist (Fennell) wing and that it will distort the course of the struggle, Gatdiner Place's sneer _ obout the "Provisional Alliance" has about it en elament of “not calling the kettle black". It is true enough that Kevin Street is, in itself, a Popular Front such es siarxists must baware.

Than, for the forassecble future, our most effective work will be done os outsiders. As entrists, we moy make certain appcrent gains but, probably, too | much identification, ct this stage, with two objectively futile political laedar- a ¢ ships can only harm us in the long run, From outside, then, we must prosagandise tc expose the limitations of Sspublicanism and to agitate to outflank (and to ba seen to outflank) Republicanism on its left, Something of whet this is likely te mean will be skatchad in the naxt ‘two chapters.

CHAPTER IIL = AFFILIATION TC_THE SOCIALIST LABCUR ALLIANCE

Tha progressive reason for Republican support is anti~impertalism and the only way that we can win the rank and file to us is by showing that our methods are more effectively anti-imperialist then are Reparoliean ones.

Tha way to achieve this is, as political work has been recognised as being since before V | Lenin, the combination of "Propaganda" and "Agitation".

So much nonsense has been spoken and written about these two concepts usually, as Lenin himself noted, in the nama of “randering them more profound", that we should bear in mind just what thay are. To recapitulate - "Propaganda means explaining many ideas to a few people. | Agitatten means explaining a few ideas to many people." ro more, no less. Attempts to: expand this generally run into troubls, partly because of too impressionistic a glance at the actual forms the "propaganda" and "Agitation" must take.

Thus agitation as its very nome implies means in practice more oftan than not, activism: a t2aching “by deed" rather than “by word", Propaganda is rarely carried out thus. Sut this differaoge arisas out of the raclities described above.

To explain "a few things too many" can often be dona most effectively by mass demonstrations, confrontations and othar such activities, though it may also be don by simplified forms of the traditional methods of propaganda (leoflets, simple naws sheets, comic strips, for example). C-n the other hand, as a means to explain "many things tc a few" a mass demo of up to 10,000. (V.S. C, London Cctober 1968) or 35,000 (The Communs Centenary, Paris) obviously doasn't make sense. i onethelass, propeganda is important not least as the mesons by which to educate cadres so thay may know for what, how and when to egitate.

In short agitation is the more activist side of the work of the revolutionary but _ Is no more activist in aim than his propaganda work: both ara designed for a single action: the smashing of the capitalist state.

Ths. above set of truisms has been inserted as a necassary besis for understanding our tasks and our organisational role. \e are a small group of up to. 30 members, centred in thrae Irish cities. Thanks to the history listad in Chapter 1, we have lost a great deal of time in building our strength to an effective level, for influancing the developing Irish revolution. In the immediate future, for us te "go it alone" would be a racipa‘for diaster, We ore unlikely to be able to mount any sort of effective agitation by ourselves, without buggering curselvas good and proper in cther spheres agitational and propagandistic.

There are further considerations to be taken inte account. Cur assets are not really thoss of a valid agitational force. Except, to a cartain extant, in the ‘educational sphers (and poteritially omong women) we have no definite cbjective bass from which to expand. Thus, our participation in the economic activitiés.

of the workers ara, excapt in very rare casas, likely to a from outside: i.e.

we go to the workers, we don't get called to them. Cn the other hand, we have two major strangths than can only have short-term affect propagandistically (that is to that small circle of people whe are ready to listen to many ideas.) Thes2 assets are:~ (1) Cur association with the Fourth International and (2) Cur undoubted collective theoretical supericrity vis-a-vis all other Irish groups. They will ba examined in the next chapter.

What ramains true is that, Fer cur agitational tasks to have any effect, wa must carry them out through a larger organisation or coalition of organisations. Chly if such a larger body does not exist will we have to consider "going it alone",

(16) The real possibilities for such participation today are, the Republican Movements and the Socialist Labour Alliance. There are other alternatives. But the Labour Party is too counter-revolutionary and the CPI, both Stalinite and somewhat too small to be considered as cantres from which agitation can be launched.

In our second chapter ws cons¥dered the reasons for and against entry work in aither of the Republican Movements. We decided that the pressures on us at our present stage of growth were too great for such activity and that such pressures were unlikely to develop decreasingly to our development. Thus, while we were oriented towards the Republicans, wa were nat to orient within them. This decision must be reinforced by the existence of an crganisational alternative to Republicanism in the shape of the Socialist Labour Alliance. This undoubtedly ramshackle structure (out can we really sneer?) is the remnant of ambitious schemes of a‘nited Front.to outflank the Labour Party on the Left. This was to include both Republican AYovemants and the Communist Party. At first sight, the only thing that can ba said for it is that it has survived as an entity. All Gardlnat Place's (equally ambitious) plens for a "ational Liberation ovement" have remained plans. At the same time, the SLA is still smaller than either Republican }4ovement, though it appears to be bigger than the CPI (excluding the CY ‘4 - which has tendencies as much towards _ Gardiner Place as towards Parnell Lane). ’ : Jonetholom, the SLA. does have real advantages for this articular nucleus of a Bolshevik Party that wishes to act ct offactivaly to develop the Irish revolution.

In the first place, it does have cartain objective bases from which to ope erate.

They are among the nationalist minority of } :orthern Ireland (P&) and among the workers of Sublin (SY) (We can probably ignore that body's claims for working-class. support in the country). These ar2 not of importance only | quontitatively, but also qualitatively: i... they are where most of the action is likely to bite : Sacondly, the group in the SLA have all, rajected Stalinism and Social . .

Democracy, subjectively at least. To this extent, there is a graater potential for propagandist work tn tha Alliance than thare would be in larger organisations.

To this extent, tco, agitation following from our analysis is mora possible to direct than it is elsewhere. This virtue may be enhanced by the fact of the | extremely loose structure of the Alliance, which gives us the maximum freedom to propagandise if we use it, though it elso gives us and our colleagues the effective power te ignore decisions if it goes against us.

Thirdly, the SLA properly used, can give us links that we can axploit in all the . .

major coastal towns of the Rapublic, save Cork (and this is*changing) and erry. In siesrk, tha SLA is not the nuclsus of a "Socialist Labour Party" in which we ware ones, invited to believe. ior is it the "SULF Sociclist style" that was, n effect, offered tha Republican “/ovemants at the opening Congress. It is, and can best operate as, an agitational movement in which it is up te us to sea that it acts fer the correct causes.

However, before we can describe what ara the. corract causas, we should look a bit closer that we have done at:the present composition of the SLA. We can |.

ignore the geographical branches (most especially ~ and now: perhaps alone ~ _ Peg Popplewall's Bray SLA) precisaly because of their smallness and inevitable opportunism. We will ccencaritrate on-the officially national organisations in more detail than is to ba found In © Bird's Dictionary. Da }

\Efa ir people 3 Democracy: This is probably tha largest single affiliate of the SLA, as befits an organisation bom and reared on the most active front of the currant Irish revolution. At the same time, tts historical advantage has.

baen accompanied by a complementary disadvantage. It has nevar really been able to expand from its base in the nationalist areas of iorthern Ireland.

Initially it considered its revolutionary task as being so obviously one of agitation that it did not have to learn too much theory. This gave an artifically powerful role to its.-taading founders, Michael Farrell and Cyril Toman. ‘iowever, the steady, slow pace of the struggle hes dispelled the euphoria, Tha PD is trying to educote itself, Sutin this task, it is finding a certain opposition from, amongst others, Farrell (for obvious reasons), Ruddy and the Anarchists in its ranks. . Its theoretical: standards are still very low and likely to remain so for soma tima to come. Finally, in its ronks there ts a slight Maoite-Bakuninite current, nieinly among those most closaly influenced “jonetheless, with its resources (and possibly halped by the vestige of the Trotskyism learnt by its leaders in ths trish Workers’ Group), it has been abla to carry out.¢ general revolutionary policy in ‘ortharn Ireland. And its policy there is far superior to that of any other organisation.

Furtharmore, its experiences in :erthem Iraland, and its belated recognition of the nzed for theory makes it naturally ally with us against the - 2, The Socialist Vforkers' /iovament: This was in its nucleus o braakaway from:the PD when the British "Intsmational Socialism group found that it could not manipulate that body as it wished.

Accordingly, it is, practicelly as much « transplant of tha parent British Social Chauvinist organisation as it the LWV-IYS, Pradictably enough, quite « faw of its members were once in the latter body, but could not stand the pace, It has grown. quickly into the sacond-largest affiliate of the SLA by the simple technique of “economism":. i.a. simply repeating in a beirut fess the awful facts about the hardness of the Irish workers’ lot. As with the P™, tha success _ of its mathod has lad to compensating disadvantages in tha SW.4's case, the.

‘degeneracy of its papar, the Worker, which is now a contender for the title of the dreariest rag on the English-speaking Left. This fact is also helped by the obvious lack of theoretical development in its mambers who dafend this lack determinedly, It would b2 wrong, however, to write off tha SWi4. The rajection of the national wage agreement has opened a period of industrial struggle in which it has already a base that it can use with advantag2, however opportunistically.

Similarly, its vary philistinism is part ond pereal of the cult of stupidity that has continued in the frish revolutionary tradition, Wherzas PD is generally a fairly friendly rival, the SY/M is @ conscious opponent not only organisationally, but politically .as well.

This fact is emphasised by the very real political tendencies thet may lead the SW fo an new rapport with the Rapublican ‘ovement (Gardiner Place) fn their mutual philistinism - their emphasis on the deed rather than the word in their hostility to Bolshavism (denounced by both as elitism - whataver that is) and in their actual bureacratic control, thay have much in common, All that is separating them is Gardinsr Place! Populism as opposed to Strandville Avanue's Workerism, and, if the formar's "Iafrward" trend is continued that division is likely to narrow. (Cn the other hand, S\¥/i4's new appeals to Paul Gillespie to return. to their ranks may prevent this.)

a Tha League for o Workars' Republic : This group has only just made up its mind to cappiliate, In practice it is likaly to play a similar role to the SW! “A to. that which w: tend to play to PD.

of SE within tha SLA,. - It is in our interests and in the interests of the coming Irish .* tavolution, if possible 2, to help devalop SE's: ‘politics i in conjunction with our own thet i is to say, that whereas tha SWMi is honestly philisting . the LWR is conscious enough to be hypocritical about it.

Ths one thing that divides th. ‘fs their international offilictions. (The SW? is "Stata Lip", the LWR "Lambertist) 3ut in naither casa ts there qn actual claimant to full international status involved. Thus both ar2 able to maka new friends.

" Also it is possible to envisage a rapport between Cliff and Lambert; in the last tesort the vexed question of the defence of Russia may prova a small obstacle to the common union of vulgar matarialists.

Cn the other hand, thare are personal ’ differences between tha LW2 and SWAMI "which overshadow all the others.

4, Saor Eirs Action Group: It of, of course, doubtful whether this body fs still in the SLA, as it has yet to pay its offiliation fae. {iowever, it must be stressed that this may not be for political, but for simple financial reasons, i.e. that thay just can't offord to spare even £5. Aftar the recent trials, thay ara in dir2 straits. sonatheless we should datarmmine to encourage S.E, to affiliate to tha SLA, The SLA provides the organisation with an extra link with potential Republican alameants. Politically it is traditionally and actually tending to. accept our greater political sophistication, And its members have skills such as ara likely to fit in very, wall with the plans for the SLA, Tha trouble with SE i is that its foquista-style organisation makes it difficult for it to co-operate openly with... - other political group. Tied to its belief in “urban guerilla work", it fears to expose the identity of its members by sending any of them to reprasent it in connaction with less secretive bodies. . : The above is, however, ‘the one major political stumbling block in n the development ~_ and as part of this to encourage SE to participate ‘in the SLA and in the. *-orthem Resistance By ovement. : Tha above givas us some idea of the disadvantages and camposition of the SLA.

Thus we have the data from which we can construct a strategy to maximise our influence on the SLA., and. ferns it, on the trish revolution..

As will be clear, wa see the chief role of the Allianes ds atl one of agitation.

Its nature does not enable it to put forward more than a few agreed ideas.

Nowaver, thare is one and possibly. two; | akéapttons to this fact.

1, | In areas such ¢ as Publin; . aml perhaps Belfast, whera there are. branches | of several affiliate groups, regular joint SLA meetings should be hald This would ba batter for us to.propagandise emong our rovals' rank and file (and, also emong those future SLA members who are not immediately members of any group.) Cf coursa, this will apply at a national level, to the “uartarly Conferances.

2. The plan for an SLA, "Thooratical Journal" long mooted, may now be at last getting off the ground. Chbviously, this is a topsy-turvy sort of situation. F r the logic of our strategy we should be producing a theoretical magazine and subscribing for a joint agitational papar, rather on the lines of the British section and the Black Dwarf, in the former's early days.

AST

' However, the axistenca of Free Citizen, Workers’ Rapublic and The Workers mean that this is no longer Feasible, any more th at it is immadiatcly reasonable for us, alone to produca a theoratical journal. Accordingly, we should support and encourage this joint propagandist venture with the aim of a i.ew. Laft Raview (i.e. a forum of non-Stalinite opinion) rathar than of International or (Gawd ‘alp us all, this is certainly something to be avoided) international ‘Socialism. Apart from anything else, we are most likely to be able to take © it over for ourselves. ° Sut these matters apart, the real policy of the SLA must be ona of agitation.

The quastion before us is in’ what it should agitate. Cbviously, choice of issues is an axtremaly important matter in its own right. The SLA hes a greater ability to agitate successfully than has the 2:’G, but this dozs not say vary much. It still does not have the numbers to carry cut campaigns on the multitude of issues that naed exposing, V/hat is mora, in Dublin, our combined strangths ara reduced by the refusal of the SW 4 to abate its own private mini-campatgns one jot, ‘in favour of a more affective plan of joint action. (The LWR is too tiny to make much differance either way). This fact makes it the more necassary to distribute our camncigns so that they make the most effect, mobilise the largest number of people, most effectively weakan the establishment and win us the most recnsits. Cur general enalysis must be brought into play. \/3 sea the major and most critical contradictions in Irish society cs being, still those caused by "the connection with England" = and with England's fellow imperialists. At the momant this outstanding product (outstending in its threat to the stability of the state powers, north end south) is partition. Cn top of this, thare is the reprassion in tha Republic thot the vartition crisis has stimulated, There is also the basis for nation-wide agitation in the feraign expbitation of Irish people and resources. Indirectly, there ara the proslems caused by imperialism that ars common to the workers of all couniries but which Irish economic weakness magnifies: the difficulties of low wages, of small expenditure on social services (especially housing). And, finally there ara the cultural aspects in this contra~ diction, centred mainly in the dominance of the Church, such as would be impossible in a country of greater and more permansnt industrial development.

Thare are onough matters here to keep busy a much largar organisation than the SLA. With the latter, it is necassary to pick end choose. Bearing in mind our analysis we insist in putting ot the top of the list:- Ts The Struggle for tsaticnal Unification: This is already covered, up to a point, both by tha SLA. ond tha 221G, in their offiliation to the ~ ortharn ‘Rasistance Movement, The trouble is that, aftar this start, it hes bean difficult te know how to procsed heyond it.

There hes b2en a general proposal made hy cartain comradas - both from foersign sections and in the Group - that we should spearhead a solidarity compaign fer the fighters in the Morth-Eost. ‘ow far this can be davalonzd without the aid of either Republican /ovement is uncertain, The active participation of Saor Eira, as well as of P®, would probably be necassary to give it cradivility.

*onatheless, the ideo has a certain merit, if only os a move to try to prevent the onti =climax that follewed the burming of the British Embassy last February. Since the threat to the nationalist no-go arses in : .orthern Ireland is increasingly real, moves should be mada to prepare for a reaction to an attoch therecn.

At the same time, the grenders of both [2A's to the forces of compromise has evealed how important was the motion of the Mublin YS passed at the € ctober SLA Conferences, to set up an altarnative to both of them. Already both PS and cursalves have suffered for our pacifist image.

Cf course, thera ora practical reasons for our avoidance of the gun, ©: onathelass in the long run, we must prass for tha establishment of an trish Citizen Army, (or _ -at-lgast-with our numbers, on Irish Citizen Guard). Saor Eira con ba useful hare.

2.. ° The Struggle Against Judicial Repression: This struggle certainly should be maintained if ft can ba - though at the present tima, developmant of a military wing is probably mere impertant, and should have priority, avan at the expense - of the Civil Libartias' struggle. The foct is that there is a tandancy to faal that because thé fight for Civil Liberties in /Jortham Ireland has been affective (and is likaly to prove suecessful), a similar fight should’have the same result in the Republics a glance at the objective reoclities (the three-way division in *:orthem Ireland batween Loyalists, >sationalists and the Impsrial sower - with no aquivalant diviston in the Pepublic) should disprove this.

3. Tha Industrial Struggle: Tue to our.analysis (end portly in reaction to ‘the blatant economic determinism cf the LY'/t), ws hava tendad to play down this fight. This tendancy has bsen helped by ¢ general ralative quiescence in Irish industry since we breke with the YS and by the fact alraady noted, that our industrial strangth is somewhat dispersed and isclatad.

‘iowaver, thera Is avery reason to baliava that, with the dafeat of the new “Wage Agrssment", tha industrial front is going to come alive. To this end it peys us to have a bit mora attention fo it than we heve done practically, so far, Curselves and P% should maintain at least, token raprasentetion in the TURC and, Indesd try to oriant the SL’. as a whole to offiliation theraunte, with a view to active participation in the worker's struggles against the bosses. At the same time, our raprasentative(s) should endeavour to put forward Marxist politics over end achove the industrial struggle to educate and perhaps recuit tha naw industrial militants who could be attracted. Cf course, it may prove, in practice, that tha TURC Is new too lack-lustra en organisation tc do anything affective. In this casa, the SLA should heva its own industrial committes.

This is quite important. {+ will not help us to allow industrial militants to be gapped up the S/™4 (or the LYV/R) ond thus led affectivaly to raformism.

or have we tha time (es hed the 1°1C) to build up a strong declassed petty bourgeois cadre before we gen anter tha working closs.

tn the pest, most industrial attantion of groups is tha SLA (to no good effact) has been on tha issue of redundancies. It is unlikely from the experience of the orld Labour i.iovament, (including the Trotskyists) thet enything can be dona, or should be attempted on this maiter, beyond a possible “Cleimants' \'nion" approach, which would ba a doubtful field of work with our overdrawn resources.

Redundent workers are, by definition, isolated workers, and ara as such, tess easily organised; the fight for jobs intensifies their isolation. ur main concem with them must be to get them not te oreck with their Trade Unions, 4, C ther Economic Strugglass- This perticularly includes the struggles for houses, for lowar rants, etc. vhile such struggles are velid, it is difficult to see how the SLA. or its offiliates con moximise their influence in thase.

In perticular, the EEC is likely to solve the housing problem ralotively eesily: whan thera ts no one in the country needing c house, thera is no housing shortage.

(This was actuelly what wes hoppening ot the and cf the 1950's). - The most promising struggle in this sphere is, ot the momant, of course, the 6 /.TC rant strike. ‘Yfhile individuel memars should tal:e advantage of their positions to porticipate in such a struggle, it is too big for Trotskyists' influance to be felt, it is too likely te bs compromised (andaccantobly for its mambers) and should not be operated so that othar agitations might 2 wealenad by the absence of the comrades concerned. —

Above all, these struggles ore likely, for comrodes to be diversions from the real economic struggle in the years cheacy that on the shop floor.

5. The Struggle Against Foraign Exploitation: In the mining industry, the SLA is beginning what might 22 quite ¢ useful campaign, and on an issue that con be easily presented agitctionally.

It has additional merits. It gives us openings to the mine-workers. And it is admirably suited (unlike many of tha xossible and potential campaigns listed above) to be carfied out by a relatively smell group of people. Finally, it is an issue of which the news value has seen given an Impatus by the vesearches Study Greup's pamphlets. For the reasons, end although it might not be quite within o strategy that would have been put forward had not the mines campaign bean started, it is necessary that the 2).4G throws its waight behind the SLA's campeign on mines. (This is the more likaly to be beneficiol in thot it is the whele SLA 's campaign: after initial doubts the S$‘? has rolled in behind it and should be encouraged by the campaign's process to use as much of its time os possidle on this as against its specific plans; ) & = The Cultural Strugoles: The strength of the 2546 is emeng the students (particularly secondary~schoel students) end (cis provertionately for on Irish grous) among women, The significance of this lies in one fact. In the “spubdlic, more thon anywhare alse in the EEC, these groupings ore up ageinst the culturol exploitation exercised by the imperialism's traditional ally: the 2omen Cathelic Church.

This means that there is scone for campaigns emong studants ond women per sc.

Indsed, such campaigns hove olraady been talsing place, and ore likely to continue.

Cur strength in such campcigns is likely to 52 fnfinitely greater than would oe our strength in most strikes. Accordingly, it might ba in our interest to turn the SLA’s attention ~ and even to on axtent detrimantal to other eotnpalgis - towards the possibilities of campaigning in these fields.

iow far we should, or could, 30 in these retters, it is difficult to judge. lewever, the present author faels thet auch activity should not be allowed fo interfere with © presence in the industrial struggle or with the SL“'s mining compaign.

“towever, more reasearch is clearly going to be naeded. And, certainly, even if the three matters listed ore of greater importance than the culturel struggles, the fight of women cnd students ara probably, at the oresent stegs, of greater real value than any others. This is, at laast, becouse they oppese the relinious and sexual tavoas that the trish bourgeoisiz hove usad vary effectively in ths pest to reinfores (because reinforced by) the cbjective cenditions leading to the backwardness of the Irish workers. Cne must add too in the sphera of the woman's struggle, the English section's experienca leads us to expect an cpaning for women workers in industry, 7. The Struggle Against Imperialisn C-utside Irealand:- | !ar2 again. it is merely necessary to point out one fact. fer more effectively then ourselves. the SLA can give solidarity ond erganisa actions therein, with forsign onti-imperialist struggles - in varticular, that in Indochina. : It should se encouraged to do so.

Undoubtedly, thare will 5e critical discussion of the arasent author's choice of issues for the agitational role of the SLA. This is as it should be. ut it is to be hoped that those who criticisa will defend their erguments in florist terms and enable all comrades to participate.

(22) A. final point on the SLA ts that if should be greater than the sum of its parts.

Comrades from outside all groups should be ancouraged to set themsalvas up to play o distinct patt in ft as thay hove not until now (outsida Bray). This will benefit the Irish revolution, it will cartainly only panelit us.

Sub adherence to and participation in the SLA as on essentially agitottonal bedy is only one part of the proposad revolutionary strategy for the RMG.

The othar part concems the organisation and strotegy of the group Itsalf.

Caly if we are doing all our work correctly will tha, SLA function as we would want it fo. ADDENDUM +: iNotes on Agitation amie tae NRE EO Magy AEMNRCIND t r OD BG TOD Roth te thd GU ta Coys cans Ned AD OO OD I a While it is neeessary for us to porticlnate in most agitation as port of the SLA, this does not exempt us from the task of considaring how we should cerry out this tesk. Tha chove analysis has concentrated necessarily on the issu of on what agitetions we should be cencantrating. It must be stressed that if our choice of agitation is to be vindieated we must poy more attention to our rola within it. : Cur agitational traditions are thosa of the YS and of the Irish Left os a wholas i.a. an anjoyeble disorganised, unplannad perede, possibly if we're “lucky” evolving inte a punch-up with the sigs. jot least of the tasks with which we're jumberad, due to our theoretical pre-eminence is in moking our role within the SLA's common ~3it-ticns the most effeetiva ona.

The prospect is daunting, of coursa, te impressionists who ramember that we are .

competing with PD. !owever, os with all other feelings of inferiority (save on.

the score of our numsers) thet are held by 2..\G comrades, it is based on illusion — rather than raclity. Pf's early success was based on a combination of two main types of factor the chjective odjective situation in orthern Ireland (which | comnet be copied down hare) and the dadication and datermination of its members (which we can and should try to cosy en ef! agitations). Scientific analysis has not really influenced P's develoomant of its agitetional strategy, As when it was the South Balfast Young Socialist Alliance, it still desands on the some slogans, on the incompetance of its opponents and cn the shear weight of its numbers to overcome its lack of thought on how te eet. But such is tha penalty of success. We cannot raly on such factors. Cur numbers are spars and in tha Republic (and now, with Whitelaw, probably In (.orthem Irealond toc) the authorities act with some subtlety. The obvious nervousness of the ‘ational Army et the Curragh on Saturday, July Ist, should not blind us to the fact that, in general, ever the last few yeors (since, in 1962, they attacked a psacaful march on tha Cuban crisis) the Garde Siochona has shown itsalf able tc choosa whan to act to kaso demonstrations in chack. The only. time it failed wes on 2nd February (when the British Embassy wes umt) and this wos probably « shrawd move itself, Tha buming usad up a great deal of adrenalin in on agitation thet could only hova bean contained immediotaly ot the risk of tuming it to actions more hastila to.

Ireland's rulers. Cnce the Embessy had gone, the cops were able to prevent ony further action es was shown ot the Passport C ffice tha following night. The shrawd leadership of the Gardai may be getting frayac at the edges but it can probably withstand ony treditionc] pressure placed on if.

Thus, the Curragh demo' (and writing on 9th July, the adbeaquant Prove damo' there) may not have baan on cn issue thet could shake tha faith of the mass of. | the people in the Cesgemnatt,

(23) Its most significant effect and ona which repaat performances may help crystallise - will probably be on the morela of the iational Army. Significantly enly @ faw people (and not the Pf) leadership) understood this fully. A few appeals to the troops to “consider their position" (not, of course, to mutiny!)

were made ~ but most attention was applied by the leaders of the demonstration to stir up their (already enthustastic) supporters. .

In general, then, the Curragh-Pertlacise demonstration showed the traditional faults of Irish agitation (ond, -again we ore back with the traditional stunidity cult of the Irish Left). Agitation fs too eftan treated as a gam3, cn excuse to get some frash oir. It aims (that is, the aims of the sxscific damo' concerned) are impossible ones and ones that can be s2en te be impossible with clear thinking. (At the Curragh, again, it was obviously ridiculous for us to pratand that we could get into the camp with our numbers - yet the pretence was kent up). Such myths may be useful for getting cutsiders involved ~ but this is offsat provably, by a somewhat damaging affect on the morale of the conscious comanstrator, a steady series of failures does not help anyone's political development. Thus, in preparing for each demonstration we must be clear why we are marching, who is gcing (this part was quite successfully done on Ist July) and of those who are going, who is going to do what: who is going to steward (and what he or she is going to do as such) who is going to carry our banner (we know from bitter experiance that it is difficult for the some couple to carry it for mora than half an hour ot a stretch - mors or less, according to the wind); who will sell our paper at the demc' (very badly naglacted on Ist July) who will soeak at the meeting (if there is one). The last point is particularly important since the deffaction of our leading vocalist to a gilded cage in Gardiner Place. ‘fe don't have any good speakers - except perhaps Comrede C:'Conner, and wa can't kaap bringing him from Limeric!: to Dublin where so many public meatings are held.

The Cublin and Belfast comrades must rectify these faults, however embarrassing it may be, at first. The are just general notes, albeit important. . owaver, the general lesson is clear.

Bolshaviles must use their brains in praparing agitations as in everything else.

heir opponents don't naglect to think when considering how to crush them.

(24)

CUUPTER 4 + CURSELVES ALC: -E

Ae ae coe bens aah nero we ME NSD com one i TN OS ne SOD a 8 SD AN OD aS ng a tage aw Cf course, the title of this chapter does not refer to the political wing of the Republican Movement with which we dedlt in Chaptar Il. Rather it refer to ourselves ~ the Revolutionary ianist Group - and the sudject concerns our _ particular role in the immediate future of the Irish revolution. | In the previous Cheptars, we exoloined the weakness of the Irish /lorxist tradition: its natural boss - the working class - being both smal! and ctomised.

‘Ala decided that this situcition meant the survival of kenublicanism = in its various forms = as the dominant ideology in the trish working class. This fact mecns that any strategy that the revolutionary movement is to put forward with any hops of success must expose the limitations of Republicanism : not only its socially bourgeois essence, but also the fact, arising out of this, that hecouse of its nature, it cannot achieve evan the aims it sat itself. As the world capitalist crisis deepens, more opportunities for this will apsear. To carty out cur task, we must work as a revolutionary party must work, agitation=ally and propagendistically. As we are o smell unit, we must work agitationally within the SLA, pressing for national unification, the abolition of repression orth and South, an end to foraign economic exaloitation of mining and agitation for womens’ end students’ rights. In this sohere, too wa must maintain a link with the industrial struggle. Such are our perspectives for action, but we cannot stop hare. The RMG is to oe somathing mors than © pressure group within the SL’; it cannot liquidate therein; the dispersal of forces within tha Alliance ara such than in indenandent organisation alianad to ths Fourth International must be mainiained against its opponents.

And this fact emphasises the imacssibility of using the SLA, as an whole, for propaganda work, over and above the reasons given in the previous chapter.

Certainly, we can and should use that body for outting our gropaganda to members of rival groups and of none within the SLA. We can use the forum offered by the Adlionce in its possible theoratical magazine. Sut we do this es ao propagandist group in our own right and distinct from oll others.

Thera is o further reason for this stond, of caurss. The fact is that such influence that has been achieved by Irish Trotskyism is general and by members of this Group in particular heve been achieved in the realm of propaganda. Cur naper, when oublished, is better than any cthars. PD has to look to the Fl te help educate its members. Cur writings cn Irish history ore generally acclaimed, and mere significantly plagiarised. Perhaps the highest praise yat given us wos made by $san Garland's action in refusing our publications salz in Gardiner Placa, and in Padraic Yeets' purchase of Comrade Lysaght's Making of “:orthern trelend directly under his commander's nose. The BICC does not answer our analysis.

¥ée have achieved this over some six yaars, despite the leases into philistinism of many of our comrades, despite a completsly unplanned, ond diserganisad strctegy. ‘Ye are read and we cannot be ignored. If we olan chead, wa hava a good chance of smashing the conspiracy of silence in a shorter tima than it has taken us to establish ourselves, In this matter, then, we must pay attention to six aspects thereof:- 1. The Book Service; 4, The “iscussion Groups; 2. Interne. Education; 5. Pamphlets, etc.

3. The Paper & Public /4estings - cur own and other aeoples*.

(25), These six points, howaver, have to be centrad on our onalysis. In our propaganda we must operate (and ba seen to oparota) the Method cf Diolectical Matertalism, explaining its Prectical foression - the Pamonant Revolution ~ ond the Cr rgoni~ sation necemary to implement If - the Fourth Intemational." ae For the raosons axploined already, upholding these thras will be a full-tims job.

The Irish Leftwing scana is crowded with our opponents. Cn the one hand, there are the militant Republicans, with their hankering after a two, or (in i<orthem Ireland) o three stage strategy of action. Cn tha other side, are the Economists of LWR ond SW/M, with perspectives of « “one stage strategy" such as is limited, in practica to "giving the economic struggle o political form”. At the for end of this wing are the BICC: and its "Workers Association" which represents the development of Economism into direct and conscious support for impericlism, end which cannot be opposad affectively with Republican wecpons. At the end of the other wing are the tendencies tn militant Republicenisia towards the SOL?, Aontacht Eireann and Fionna Fail. And, as Chenter 1, emphesised, these divisions crise Out of on under-developed industrial working-class open to division and delusion by the forces of religious superstition.

jut this situation has compensctions, The very fact that the power of imeerictism and its native associates is based on under-devalopment gives us mammeth opportunities. As we have sean, the Irish bourgeoisia has neither been able nor has had to hide behind tha daveloped scalbberies of the British LP, or of the Communist Parties of France end Itely. Despite the great mess of the lost four years, the Irish working class is still opan to Mamism, insofar cs it is open. te knowledge. If objectively there is much to be done, subjectively the oppositicn is puny. Cf course, our task won't ba done ovemight or even ina yeer, Tc imaging that it can be is one pit-fall to evold. Another is to take the more immediately rawarding but, ultimately sterile, path of the BICC : to sea the workers calling for theoretical braad and give them « nourishing diet. of the bast granite chips, becouse we can't be bothered (ere are scared) to dco batter. In taking cur opportunities, we must display the responsibility of a true Revolutionary Marxist Group. . Such such is our task (nothing more or lass than to apoly basic Scientific Sociclism te eliminate the ignorance of centurias) than its sheer broadness of scope gives an axtra oroblem to thet which nomolly Sasets the prescration of « progrcmme cf propaganda. This latter difficulty is inherent in the natura of propaganda cs being "tha ‘axplanation of many things". Far more thon with agitation, there is ths vossidility that eny toc careful programme of propaganda will be thrown cut of joint by the appeerances of new “things to explain". li our cass, the problem is increased even further by limited rasources.

Accordingly, in the scheme of our propagands tasks cver the naxt year, the manner of puolication looms almost as importantly as the choice of subject. Such choices have to bs made.and discussed accordingly to. the media (x0sh word!) wa control.

1. | The Plough Book Service: This one of our oreaaganilist tasks is: put first for two reasons. It is the most developed of tham end it sarforms the most basic function in propagenda: a wide supply of literature for the pearitfieat ly conscious.

It is symptomatic that the book service enly really sagan to deadlon its potential with the emergence of the "Left Cppesition" in the Young Socialists and with that body's breach with the YS te form the UG. Since then, however in just over eighteen months, demand has risen until it is new impossible to supply cll books demanded and cll ngsds that crise without a massive injection of capital (£100: the second in a year) This is wholly to be walcomed = if we can supply the money (ond we may be cble to do so).

wud in these circumstences, branches must begin (if they heve not dona so, already) to put book sales high on their priorities for propaganidst action. Cublin, in particular, may be able to open a full-scale book shop next year. _ However, the overwhelming need for such an enterprise is not in Cublin, but in Belfast, as in the latter city, the forces of the petty bourgeois opposition té /arxism are far better organised. © ‘ot cnly is there the davilitating religious division but (as o result, partly of this) thare are, foo, the divistons between, on the one hand, the mindless, militant 22pudlicans and the "Twe «ations Gorillas’ (the former will becoma much more formidable sven than the letter when D C'agen leaves Long Kash in his crown of thoms). Selfast neads Marxism then as few other creas go. The “whlin branch can probably go chead, for the time baing, with c mail order service and c stall at the GPC. “iowevar, Belfast must have a bookshop. If it’ becomes necessary to choose, the Selfast Bookshop must have priority over Cublin, If tha Selfast comrades can't set up such on enterprise alons, thay should do se in alliance with P. In Limarick and Cork, the need does not seam to be os great as in either capitals.

But what ara the shops/stalls 3cing to s2ll? Chbviously, the Bocksarvice's present stock provides the nuclsus of what is needed. Sut it does no mere than thot.

‘He will have to start planning on whot we must place tha main emphesis in cur ammessing of future stocks .

Aso matter of fact, it is clear from study of the situation in Ireland, that tha two most pressing needs of the Irish Lefi is for study in Irish (listory and Dialectical Materiolism. The 31CC: has mede its reputation on carefully doctored versions of the formey on the latter (apart from reprinting Stalin's “‘istorical and Dialectical Meterialism) it has, wisely, remained silent. ‘’/2 can afford net to do so: contrariwise, w2 cannot afford to keep our peace. figainst the crude methodologies of both wings of tha Irish Left, as ogeinst economism, idealism and mstaphysics, the axplanation of “ialectical } ‘aterialism i is of vital importance. ot the some time knowledge of Irish history should be encouraged as part of the education of the Left and is the row material - which the dialectic must enlighten.

It will be objected that the study of erxist Economics is as important as that of the method thersof. This is true, where all other matters are eauel. -cow-=ver, in Ireland, things ore not aqual. In fact, tha basis of /‘arxist economics is understood anerally by all conscious seciors of the Irish working closs. It is the ralaiion of the economic facts within tha volitical situation that hos clways eluded its vaderstanding. And this is haloed, of course, canin by bourgaois productive relations and by religious methodology crising therefrom. ‘ence, method rether than aconomics is of the assance of our tréining, lt is true, however, that there is a need for more sale of Laninist (rather than early Marxist) economic studias. This is in order to counter the illusions of the various Stalinites with their emphasis on Imperialism as the ighest form ( rather than, correctly the “ighest (Tempore! Stoge) of Capitalism.

Finally, and to repeat the amphases given above should not, in any way, be allowed to detract from the continuing tasks of the 3ookservica. This is to maintain sales of the basic works of Marxism as against Anarchism, Social Seraocracy, Stelinism, Fascisra and other manifastetions of pstty bourgeois confusion, 2. Internal Education: Cbviously, the’ Group cannot meks effactive propaganda if it is not itself devadbosing in its thaoratical understendin Se .

Cf course, all its lessons will not ‘se tought it by formal educational classes: some will 2 tought os tha result of experience in agitation: soma will be taught from other groups’ attemnts af sropagenda. (Sse below for iors details).

rtonetheless, the development of understanding must 52 carried cut inside the Group and by the conscious affort of the Group itsel?.

It is tere tht we recognise one of the rerl odvent< .ea of) membership of (or casocivticn with) the Fourth Intern: tionel.

Not lesat of our needs is to lecrm fron the: collective experience of the workin’ eleas of the world.

18} COUR, tiis can be done by on dndevends.t veuo sivviag in Iiecnmd ‘nd recciag f.reign dveiclist | sera, ic ever, tis is unlive.y t. ve dune very @c5dly cibsut the Cowcpers toa .f Ctuer fY UPB She htt Lar rustion eu~ordtin: ted ope. the intern cica + castrve. fe poed to strensthen cur inks oad ta ‘~ eb euicr get o ~ Eger saccly .f tie unguish Leagusve Seiad 8s ud the 2atern ol fei. iieusents so iii t ore oan be elre 2. ted ve csiftiy throushewe tre uiele yrone. Ais wii sels cour. Cen .f at. @h.go .ubolce 2 bLin te be told in tiue af t ‘exe ds ou intern. tioacl event tht they ibs.t cish to -ttead.

she ote 08 : a oa bide acheve dao: togr comer: by the sully of. 25.6 S3e° ers ond saebomeys to becch ws st vescend sen. Ils (: ad te ve cs .um te Godin vs reatisze ~t ~ubide sectinegs.; it is a.woys tea. oting te ualdeve ue i “a o8r yo it s.one. In £oct, ad though e've -eteery then 2uyone in Irelond, our level is still low by internetionol stusdords. Cver the next yoor, ve're .oins to necd messive sid from the *.i.'s thecry bouk: prob - Bly =t the rote of one week-end school ver querter. ‘Ve shovld not hesitate to deursnd this.

Beside the Internetionsl weekend schools, we sould “eve our ows weekend scheols (Yerhepe two ta the uext yeor.) Mot all of these weskenc schools should, of cours@, be held in the same plees. Finelly, of course, o11 these gust be linked with » aontinuous agogremng of educstion. A difficulty in this lest poiat is thet our distvibption thapughout the country will make it difficult either to run a netion:] plen of internol educetiog or, ss is more norm] for netional groups, to run 2 seheme of locel educotion courses.

All thet we cen say, here, ia thet there is 2 need for a general plen of education on three fyonts. We should lesrn the Morxist Method (including the errors of Religious BipeEshdan | - North and Joutn), the Sconomics of Capitalism in its death = (including! the role of the clogs thet will give it ite eon de grace) snd the History of Irelend in velstion to thot of the world in generel” “‘Tittre BRould be groupe Speciclising in each of these: nobody will be expected to do wore then one, though there moy be an overlay when each group holda its weekend schools, which wembersg of the others will attend.

The above wik} be the responsibility moinly of the Dublin Broneh; branches outside Dublin sey respond in different ways, They mey wish to divide up between the courses each of them arrenging with the Dublin groups how they will contribute to ezch course. The Breach wembers may collectively join one portieuler course. Or they moy decide to stay outside 911 of them ond operate their own a¢cheme of educetion, corresponding with gech course, equelly.

Such things connot be planned adequately.

However, all plens for courses must awit the pending production of on Comrades Kelly's, Speed's, Smith's papers (on Relixion The Workers’ State ond the nature of the Bolshevik Perty, oud their final publication ond distribution dmong the group. Without these, our basic edugation is ineonplete.

5 Zhe Paper: There is very little to be said shout The Plough.

It ig undo edly the best Marxist poper in Ireland and it will be kept that wey. The sgtuel prodlem chout it is one of regularity bosed on 2 foilure of martetting.

(Limerick hes beam efficient in this: this problem is that -of the other branches). All that one ean say is thet the psperd business monagement will have to be put on a more business-like footing.

A leaf will probebly have to be-taken from the old IVG which with all its faults, did know bow to sell pepers. Everyone will hove to sell a certain quota, the areas will have to be divided beforehand: 8 ehert of sales will have to be prepared. We must aim to bring out a nonthly instead el what is now, in fact, a bi-monthly peper. a All thet having been said, it reusins true thet. The Plough is probably the only revolutionery Socislist paper in Irelend that could be sold 9s successfully as it is two months after WublAeebrony ¢@ 4, The Discussion Groups: Besides atu poper, the Discussion Gyoups ere our mein recruiting 38 well as wore generally propagendist forces. Since the foundetion cf the group, it is true to say thet their potential as such has not been genorelly reslised.

This is understendable: we ere entering @ period as e new group but with © lot of the unfinished business (‘whe History of the Irish Republicenism ") of the old. Ags with the internal educotion tere are stilt o few pspers to be delivered end a few wore to be printed end distributed. This should be done dmedistaly, so thet the ground has been ¢lesred for. new action. .

It is suggested, here, that the runuing of the Discussion Groups r be the joint responsibility of the lesders. of the internal study groups (perheps under the advice of on PO Educetion CPficer)}, end thot they fulfill a role of, in effect, the centre of publication for each group's publisheble "discoveries", es well es a centre to try out these discoveries ond subject them to test. Thus ot MDG Meetings, not only, internsl educational group members,: but” indevendent members should be encoursged to submit pepers.~ “Neturally this may not be easy to fit in with the verious brenches, but it can probebly be ironed out, in pre-Conference discussions or on he probeble PC after the donference.

this, of course, will produce sowe criticism from those whe fee] thet the 1DG's should be ‘geored to specific issues (such os the good old “Two Notions" folkmyth).. But, in fact, it does not preclude thet a certain amount cf tine "will be token up by such issues. All it does do is set such issues firmly in en overall context. The BICO can afford not to do this: to deal with its ‘Netions" in isolation from everything else - but we are Merxists, All Thot is needed is that each grovp prepare e dual agends for & its members ond for its +-shore of the mae et ss of the discussion Group(s). It is important thet such plens be wade beforehand soe that the apecific MDG Meetings can be odvertised in the relevent issu of The Plough (another orgument for regular publication).

Probebly, the bald. edvertising of Discussion Groups - with no mention of the subjects to be discussed = did not encourage attendance thereat. The weekend Schools will, of course, be generally, appendeges gf the Discussion Groups rether thancof the Internel Aducetion Groups, i.e. they will be edvertised end non-members will be able and encouraged to attend.

5. Pamphlets, atc.: Up to now, the list of propegendist tasks for us hos been given on © deliberately non-polewical basis.

Our wsk ia not just to fight against the Two Vrtions myth, agoinst religious superstitution or ogpinat the two-stage concept of soticl revolution. It is to provide an alternative method to the ones thet created those illusions in enough people to form a neturel centre of theoretical and propegondist opposition to the soid.

illusions and to others thet may appecr. Apart from The Plough all the medias listed above are mibied primerily to this” tesk.