The path toanew Stormont —PAISLEY and CRAIG ; DISAGREE

The recent dispute within Unionism has centred on disagreement on the tactics for restoring a loyalist controlled administration in the North, And it has highlighted once more the fact that British imperialism cannot bring about a Stable situation in the six counties based on compromise between Loyalism and the Catholic population.

“Mr. Nice Guy"?

William Craig's plan for the coming period was received with immediate enthusiasm by the press, eager to find a new “moderate” Loyalist. But reality is different. Craig himsell has been quick to point out that he in no way favours power sharing. With his plan he aimed to win support from the SOLP by giving them participation in various sectors of administration, in order to give a “democratic™ cover to progress towards Loyalist domination. He saw that such a cover would be invaluable both for making Loyalist takeover easily acceptable to the British and 26 county Governments, while also capable of undermining concerted resistance within the anti-unionist ghettoes of the North, It marked no change of heart for Craig, but a realisation that while British Imperialism is Prepared to back the Loyalists so that they may act a6 Britain's policeman in the six counties, it might not be prepared to stand back in a civil war situation as it did in the UWC strike, if its interests within the North and stability in Britain ittelf were to be threatened.

it was a plan described by the Belfast Newsletter, which swung behind Craig, as “The indispensable ‘golden key" to @ new and better Stormont parliament™. There can be litthe doubt what this hard lina Unionist paper meant by that.

The plan dows not contradict Craig's support for independence as the last resort for regal ning Orange ascendancy. It is cignificant that the naramilitary forces which share this philosophy, orimarily the UDA, have come out behind Craig. Explicitly opposed to being used by JUUC politicians as a stick with which to threaten other forces, the UDA called for the sontinuation of UWUC-SDLP discussions.

Notably the major paramilitary exception to his support was the UVF. Having escalated its murder campaign after losing ground within Loyalism, because of its adherence to integration with the UK asa-final solution, it how attempts to politically differentiate itself from the other paramilitary groups by failing in behind the UWUC majority on this issue, Loyalist manouverings Craig's plan is fora “peaceful” restoration of loyaliat power, that is, avoiding mass anti-unionist resistance, but certainly not ruling out continued loyalist assassination campaigns. Even if the overall plan failed it would, by increasing divisions within the anti-unionist population of the North and confusion within the 26 counties and Britain, place the loyalists ina favourable position for negotiated independence.

But the plan received little support within the UUUC itself, forcing Craig's resignation from its co-chairmanship. This refiects the sheer weight of opposition within the Loyalist population to any form of power sharing with Catholics. Undoubtedly Paisley took advantage of the crude beliaf among loyalists that Craig's plan wes the same as power sharing, to gain ground in the UULIC, but there appears to be deeper reasons involved. Sensing a build up to more openright wing policies from the British -Conservative Party, Enoch Powell has been active in the background of the Craig-Paisley controversy, rallying support for total intransigence. It may be assumed that the recent visit of Tory spokesman on Northern Ireland, Airey Neave, and his private discussions with the UUUC, added weight to this argument, a6 did the apparent first shots of 6 right wing offensive by Margaret Thatcher on her US visit. t is also motesie that the Conservatives are to discuss developing closer ties with the UWUC once more in the near future.

Paisley is banking on Tory policy developing in this direction to the extent of breaking the Westminster bi-partisan approach to the gix counties, and once again playing the Orange Card. It is the opportunity Powell has been waiting for ever since he came-to the six counties in order to build a base to spring back in to the mainstream of British politics. Evidently Paisley has been convinced that by appealing to the sectarian instincts of Loyalism he can strengthen his position and that of the UUUC so that it can gain from this Tory swing.

The Conservative Party may well be about to offer the British ruling class a blatantly repressive solution to the present British economic crisis, but it is by no means certain that this would be extended to the North. Nevertheless, the effect of Paistey and Powell's actions has baen to sabotage Craig's scheme. The overwhelming majority of the UULIC is against it, and even if Craig were to win increasing support to his ideas, they will be from now on so unconvincing as a genuing gesture of partnership in administration, that the SOLP could not hope to take part and retain credibility with the anti-unionist population. ei -—— OT

CRAIG & PAISLEY cont'd from previous page; -—— SDLP gets breathing space The SOLP were ready to go slong with Craig's proposal. John Hume stated that the party was seriqusly considering the suggestion of participation, and that this involved a leading role In 3 security committee. A strong section of the SOLP wes prepered to give their stamp of approval toa Loyalist take-over, in return for offices in administration, They were ready to go even further than during the life of the Executive when Austin Currie sought to increase measures against the anti-internment rent and rate Strikers, to the extent of oversaeing ‘security’ — repression of anti-unionist resistance to moves to restore loyalist domination.

The Loyalist rejection of Craig's plan has, for the moment, meant that the divisions Inside the SDLP are not likely to turn to splits. The Party has been sable to run for cover under a “principled” position, of returning to demands for power-sharing, But once again it has bean shown that the “principles” of the SDLP amount to little more than words. In action.the Party stands for conciliation and emllaboration with the enemies of the working class of the oppressed minority. After nine months it has become clear that for British Imperialism the truce with the Provisional [RA has failed to reap the benefits hoped for.

Far from opening up a period in which the SDLP could agree to a government structure which would peacefully herald a new loyalist policed North, Imperialism faces a Catholic working class militant in reaction to loyalist aggression, and loyalist forces determined to enforce their demand for a protestant ascendancy.

Why Britain couldn't gain from truce From lest year’s LIWC strike, the British Government has had to come to terms with the loyalist demands. Unwilling to face a head on clash with loyalism yet equally anxious to avoid an open hand over of administration (because of the resistance it would invoke within the catholic population) its policy has rested on attempts to draw up agreement between the SDLP and the UUUC. This would allow the drawing up of an administration giving central local power to the loyalists but with nominal SDLP participation to buy off the catholic population. This has been the aim of the convention.

Two major factors have stood in the way of this plan, First, the catholic working class has not been demoralised to a degree that it will not oppose moves towards a hand over to Loyalism. Resistance to the re-introduction of the RUC to catholic areas has borne witness to this. Secondly, the dynamic of loyalism has been towards the smashing of catholic opposition, leading to demands for an end to the truce and increased British Army activity, and an undiluted restoration of loyalist ascendancy. It has been in this context that William Craig, whose latest scheme falls more within the framework of British policy, has found himself temporarily isolated within the UUUC.

British imperialism hoped that by gaining a ceasefire from the Provisionals a process would open up to alter both these the next fey months, factors. It was hoped tha return for an agreement harassment in-anti-union the release of internees v policeman of the ghettoe on mass militancy. This, beHeved, would in turn zi increased room for mano accomadation to the UU moderate unionists to re Again, this hope was unfd in the nature of loyalism a way.

Loyalism is not a reac] antitunionist violence, b aimed at restoring Protes in the North and a defend advantages. Thus the ces result in an erosion of the intransigents, but resulted consolidation and unanin around calls for an end off for offensive action again catholic community.

How the truce could h The truce period has been imperialism and has been anti-imperialist movemen’ that the murderous intent has been fully exposed b anti-unionist population loyalism's own offensive retaliation for Republican From this, the reasoning q justifying collaboration has been weakened and w credibility of the party ay leadership. The ceasefire } consolidation of the anti movement. The tendency military campaign to isol of its supporters from the disorientated mass of the class has been countered, say that the opportunitie: during the truce have bee Tt must be acknowledgi question of an anti-impe going into a period of trus negotiating with the impe With the intransigent cheracter of Loyalism once more stated by the UUIUC, British imperialism and northern middle class interests ote floundering in search of new methods for pulling 8greement between Loyalist and Catholic politicians out of thin air. Suggestions of referendums or further elections have been mooted, and Fees now talks in terms of extending the life of the Convention following the submission of its report to Westminster. But Imperialism has failed to alter the basic social forces within the North over the past six years, and it will not achieve this in manouvers over

ice not a moral question, but is purely a rovos, i ee Bo matter of what advantages can be won from ¢ and for wuch a situation to further the cba anti-imperialist struggle. vie negotiations with Imperialism were the A successful example of the use of . SDLP Paris negotiations between representatives aosil allover of the Provisional Revolutionary — take place, Government of Vietnam and the US twat government. These culminated in the dallow the signing of an agreement by which the PRG ct in such areas under the Thieu regime and direct imperialist intervention, the US forces, 5 would be withdrawn.

rea The period was used by the PRG for lid mot the consolidation of the liberated zones, ist now freed from continual US bombardments and a process commenced c ‘boyalism which was to see the recomposition of uct and urban opposition to the puppet Thiew regime which led to the administrations disorganization and collapse, The Paris accords were used to gain certain advantages from Imperialism een used while reorganising opposition. It was clearly not in any way an attempt to ure for reach an agreed settlement with either fantage to the J§ Imperialism or the Thieu regime, as meant but a3 2 tactical manovevre, e loyalists he Proves waver SDLP in the Provisionals and the British « Levalints government and loyalist organisations, the ignoring the realities of the social forces itical at work in the North, has ruled out . such a clear cut policy by the Provisionals alist in the truce period. ewes Asa result the Provos have appeared ities ee to waver between the needs of some - within the organisation's leadership who A centres, whether aspects of collaboratio with the British Government, or : organs of working class organisation; it the and the Provos attitude to them is rganisation — indicative of this. In the early days of the Of truce, Seamus Loughran, Sinn Fein power is Northern Organiser, announced that The refusal of the anti-unionist working class he six counties to submit ta s Stormont-type me and the pressure of the Loyalist ulation for an open restoration of the Orange ndancy remain incompatible, The tradiction will not be solved in the lamentary arena, as the Loyalists showed they arstood in last year's UWC strike.

The need remains paramount for the imperiatist organisations to unite to rebuild reorganise opposition to the hand over to ilism in the North, and against repression and iboration with British Imperialism and the loyalist, in the South. streets, they would cooperate with plain clothes RUC detectives and allow them in to the ghetto areas to investigage serious crime. This appeared to fall directly in to the trap set by British Imperialism to allow a restoration of the RUC in such districts. Pressure from within the ghettoes forced the statement to be retracted almost immediately and within days the Belfast Command of the Provisional IRA stated the RUC would never be allowed to return to the ghettoes and that local defence vigilantes would be organised to operate from the incident centres.

In line with this, Peter Arntis, writing in “Republican News’ on August 2, stated: “The transformation of the Truce Incident Centres into organisational centres for minority political expression has destroyed the constituency control of local SDLP politicians. Ignoring these boundaries the truce incident centres have political leadership to any developing crisis on the streets": It is an exaggeration of the actual nature of the centres, They have a role as advice centres and have strengthened the political credibility of local Provisional Sinn Fein work in some instances. But there has been no real attempt to fulfill the potential of the centres by using them as organising centres of resistance now. They are giving no positive lead to the struggle on the The following week, Maire Drumm, speaking at Sinn Fein's major Belfast anti-internment rally, appealed for confidence in the leadership of the Provisionals: “The Republican Movement is now negotiating with the British. They are carrying out these negotiations honourably, We ask you to trust the leadership of the Republican Movement. They will not sell you out, they will not barter you for British gold,” She accompanied this with a restatement of the demands for an end te internment, and freedom for political prisoners.

Later in the month, Republican News reported on the breakdown of talks between the SDLP and UUUC with the headline ak Initiative passes to the people”. On One hand the people are asked to fully support the secret negotiations of the Provisional leadership and on the other that the initiative has passed to themselves. The contradiction iustrates the failure to take full advantage of the opportunity to Teorganise opposition to imperialism as the organisations responsiveness to the needs of the catholic working class is distorted by Eire Nua and elements of the organisations leadership.

Once again, united action is the answer The failure of the Provisional Republican Movement to unite in protest with other groups falls in with this distortion. United action can play a major role in Teotganising and strengthening opposition to imperialism and in limiting the SDLP's room for manouevre further. In action, with the loyalist attacks on Divis Flats on the weekend of August 9, the Proves along with: other anti-imperialist military groups showed their willingness to work together in defence of the catholic working class.

And in ‘Faoi Glas’, paper of Provisional sentenced prisoners the following call was made: “At this crucial stage of our Nation's history, a mobilisation of all anti-imperialist forces, who, of course, still maintain their own identities, would soon achieve the centuries old dream. The reason [ have underlined anti-imperialist is because | mean precisely that — that is the only common denominator required. It would not include those who recognise Britain's right in lreland. Plainly and simply, anti-imperialist". Included in an article entitled “War ef Words” this statement is a call for an anti-imperialist front of organisations. Yet the Provisional leadership has stood against taking these words into action, as their refusal to unite with other forces in demonstrations over the | internment anniversary period illustrated.

The Provos remain the dominant antiimperialist group in the North, but with united action on the streets with other organisations a force can be created which draws into action greater numbers than the individual organisations can mobilise independently. This is a primary reason | for the need for unity, and why it is so important for the reorganisation of opposition to imperialism and the loyalist take over.

The Provisionals must play their part in this, but they can only do so with a clarification of the aims of the truce and the tactics by which Imperialism can be |, overthrown in Ireland.

G. LAVERY BELFAST R.M.G.

manoeuvres But this policy was far from successful. On the one hand, as we have already seen, a huge debt has accumulated. On the other hand although the rising trend of wages has been

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This did not happens Mo thought that the ceasefi

port. ‘ would respect the existing borders i it is not between territory under their control and

~~ The shackles of the Eire Nua policy, ary actions. involving concepts of agreement between

ined r seek compromise and agreement with tis is sip . imperialism, and the demands of the pe a working class in the northern anti-unionist og Z ghettoes. The nature of the incident ail

| — While Britains plans fail, chances Open for anti-imperialists;