ll review of Republican News series

effects. It prevents any real unified analysis of the four struggles outlined.

War is politics by other means. And politics in our epoch are essentailly international. Therefore a real informative analysis would show the growth and development of the wor!d-wide struggle against imperialism since the second world war. The rather narrow military analysis means that that the individual struggles them-— sleves are not clearly analysed and the same method of analysis leaves out very many political factors and even at points obscures the political lessons of the struggle.

CHINA The weaknesses of a military analysis are especially evident in this article. The military actions of the Red Army are seen as the decisive element and the political activity of the Communist Party as aimed mainly to maintain support for the struggle. This viewis persisted in even though it is contradicted by quotations from Mao in the article. For example:

"When the red army fights, it fights not merely for the sake of fighting but exclusively to agitate among the masses, to organise them, to arm them, and to help them establish political power. "

There is a good summing up of the military lessons of the Chinese experience --'] against 10, 10 against 1'' This sums up the common sense lesson that guerilla forces should be used to extend and disperse the enemy forces, and then concentrated at the weakest links in the chain. Good advice, but is it really "responsible for victory" as the Republican News article claims?

DISTRUST OF WORKING CLASS The one note of criticism in the article is touched on when Ciaran .O'Dowd says that a strategy of en-. circling the cities with a struggle based in the countryside "would ‘not necessarily apply to a highly urban society's In fact this strategy was based on a fundamental political weakness of Maoism-- a distrust of the working class as the central leadership of the revolution— ary movement and a willingness to make accomodations with the capitalist class -- the very weaknesses that the republican movement itself suffers from, VIETNAM The article on Vietnam begins with a factual error, It says that during World War II the French and Japanese united in a drive against the Viet Minh, In fact the French withdrew in face of the Japanese invasion and the Viet Minh built their power by inflicting defeats on the Japanese. This is worth correcting if only to draw attention to the role of Britain. The Brits occupied Vietnam after the Japanese defeat and organised the return of the French, thus ensuring all the blood and suffering that was to follow.

Ciaran O'Dowd introduces the idea of "trading space for time!! —- that by sacrificing territory the revolutionary movement may gain time for regroupment, and makes the important point that the time gained is wasted if it is not used to raise the revolutionary consciousness and will of the masses, INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY IGNORED The article is at its weakest in giving reasons for the Vietnamese victory. It gives as the main cause the flexibility of the Vietnamese forces and their ability to go from conventional battles to guerilla warfare very quickly. General Giap is quoted as saying that a drawn-out and extended war favours the popular forces against the imperialists. However the article ignores a major political factor which the Vietnamese themselves acknowledge -- the PERMANENT REVOLUTION international solidarity of the working class organisations and the mass The absence of an analysis of the mass demonstrations that brought Cuban revolution is a disappvintthe war home to the heart of Ame- ment. This revolution more thon rica. any other is a set-piece demonsira— tion of the Trotskyist theory of CUBA Permanent Revolution. The Cuban revolutionary movement had a naIn dealing with Cuba Ciaran O'Dowd tionalist leadership and was compoints out that the revolution did mitted to a programme of democranot just involve Castro's forces tic reform, yet it burst its own but a whole social and political self-imposed boundaries and estamovement -- the 26th July Move- blished a workers! state, ment. He also quotes Che to the effect that guerilla war is the con- This was only possible because the tinuation of revolutionary politics revolutionary nationalists were by armed force, absolutely determined to carry out their promises, because the work— ers and peasants were themselves organised and active in the revoluCHE GUEVARA tion and because there was a unity in action combined with an open However the article as a whole does debate between socialist and nationnot deal with the Cuban struggle, alists in the -anti-imperialist movebut with a debate about the 'foco! ment. The lessons for Ireland theory -- the idea advanced by Che should be obvious, that small armed groups could by their actions create part of the pre-— conditions for revolution. Attempts to implement this theory in Latin Given the continuing revolution in America led to a series of defeats, Nicaragua and the strategic imporCiaran O'Dowd concludes that it tance of that struggle for the world was correct to try to extend the revolution, it was to be expected Cuban revolution to the continent that the article on Nicaragua would and to try to 'take the heat off! mark the high point of the series. Vietnam, but that the failures were In fact the basic lack of political based on lack of popular support. analysis is shown most clearly here and in many ways it is the weakest This approach begs the question, of the series, Why was there so little popular support? If immediate armed action USEFUL FACTUAL INFORMATION was a strategy for defeat, was there there an alternative strategy that It does however provide a great would have made victory possible? deal of factual information. The For Marxists some level of agita— Nicaraguan movement was deeply tion among the masses is always infected by the 'foco! theory and possible. If this sort of slow pa+ led three guerilla campaigns betient work does not always offer tween 1963 and 1970. In 1974 a immediate and spectacular victories, successful hostage operation lea it has consistently laid the ground- to the freeing of political prisoners work for the mass upsurges of the but the founder of the Sandinista working class and been an essential movement, Amador, was killed by feature of all successful revolutions, the forces of the U.S, -backed dicall assumed that the military organisations would carry out the revo-— lution. In fact the masses themselves carried out and led the revolution with tne military organisations acting in support.

As Commander Humberto Ortega has said, "We had thought that the masses would support the guerillas in taking power. But that's not how it happened. Instead the guerillas ended up supporting the mass insurrection that overthrew the Somoza dictator ship...!

SUBORDINATION TO ARMED Any review of struggles outside Ireland should lead to more than a summing-up of general military principles. It should bring to light general political processes which revolutionaries can grasp because they relate to their own struggle. This the series fails to do, not because the general political lessons do not exist but because the -Republican movement itself assigns to these processes a subordinate role to the demands of the armed struggle.

The problem for the Republican left remains, Both republican tradition and their own brand of leftism stress military action and assign a lower level of importance to the mass self-activity of the working class, but more and more in both the struggle world-wide and in Ireland itself it is these forms of struggle that are formins the central dynamic of the revolution. The republican left's solution will of course depend on practice -- on how well they are able to build and work in a unity of all anti-imperialist forces and how well they are able to intervene in and learn from the struggles of the working class, But this process is too important to both themselves and to the Irish revolution to be left to chance. A clear under standing of the lessons of the struggle world-wide will make their paths easier and their final goals clearer. there -has been much conflict within Unionism causing multiple fractures to the once solid block of the loyalist ascendancy. Nevertheless, the splintering stopped and a process The Democratic Unionist Party of consolidation has set in so that now there are two main camps. These are the Democratic Unionist Party led by lan Paisley and the Official Unionist Party led by James Mol yneaux, Since the EEC elections Paisley is clearly seen as the leader of Ulster unionism. His party the DUP has developed from being a group of with contacts and penetration all over the Six Counties. At local government level the DUP sets the pace in maintaining discrimination against Catholics and in demanding more repression for the Northern anti-unionists, Previous to this, the recognised loyalist leader ship had been the Unionist Party which was badly shaken by the anti-unionist revolt in 1969 and thoroughly demoralised after the parliament at Stormont was brought down in 1972. The party staggered on to help form the 'Power Sharing Executive! but when il collapsed in 1974 the Unionist Party shattered, One of .the main fragments titled itself the 'Official Unionist Party! and has been trying ever since to get back to power. However the resulting power vacuum from all this was quickly filled by Paisley and his DUP, They were at first dismissed as lunatic fringe elements, particularly by the popu— lation in the South, A dangerous mistake, but it was quickly recog— nised.

To under stand this division in unionism, we must look at the class characteristics of the parties to see whose precise interests they serve, The Official Unionists represent the wealthy farmers, industrialists, the professional and middle classes (doctors, teachers, etc.). This category isnot directly threatened by more equality for Catholics, are conscious of their image in Western Europe and in favour of cosmetic reforms -- reforms which nature of the state but will smooth it mobilises masses on the 'Twalf! down its rougher edges so as to and at other times, but these are exhibit a more acceptable facade. traditional occasions held annually to celebrate loyalist-patronage. and protestant domination over catholics. mostly represents the protestant The Official Unionists may hold consmall farmers and shopkeepers as siderable influence inside the leaderwell as a large proportion of the ship of the Order but it is the rank protestant working class, They are and file who matter and for the most the 'frontier elements! of unionism; part they stick with the DUP. 'Big economically vulnerable, they are lan' has made a promise; a return thus hostile to any reforms which to majority rule, back to Stormont. might tip the balance away ‘rom their favour, Politically they are suscep- By the looks of things he is going to tible to right wing even fascist views keep it. Their faith in Paisley is| and it is no coincidence that their reinforced by his notorious political associates to a political machine with religious worship, for the most part, record, They might turn out once is of a narrow fundamentalist type. or twice on a demo, so as not to let the Order down, but it will pose no In this way Paisley is the personi- threat to the DUP, fication of his base of support He is an aggressive, evangelical bigot, The real power struggle will happen and always has been; and that is the after a settlement has been reached key to his political prominence. He and is likely to be brought about by was always against reform; it was Paisley's personality. For a start the thin end of the wedge. Didn't this reactionary cleric ‘embarrasses he warn in 1962 that the republican the British. Most European polihordes were preparing to undermine ticians regard him as a madman the state and protestant religion? which would hardly be a great adverThen the Divis Street riots happened] tisement for the leader of a supAnd again in 1968 that these so- posedly democratic administration. called 'Civil Rights! marches were More importantly the Northern antipart of an 'IRA-Vatican plot', and unionist population would find it we all know what happened after repugnant to cooperate with a gothat! Big lan must have hada vernment led by Paisley. In this vision] the SDLP themselves are no prob-= Zlem. At present they are fishing Events did prove him correct, ina desperately for a legal formula to way. Nevertheless, it wouldn't get them off the hook of their comithave taken a person of terrific ments to Power Sharing without political foresight to predict that the being seen to have sold out, catholics would not accept their oppression forever, A revolt was Equally, the population of the 26 bound to occur, but !'In the land of counties are aware of Paisley's the blind, the one-eyed man is king!. inglorious past which would make Politically the Ulster loyalists are military cooperation between the very shortsighted, Northern and Southern states very unpopular, Particularly so since By contrast James Molyneaux is Fianna Fail are in power, whose something of a faceless man. Lack- main electoral appeal is their claim ing both flair and imagination his to republicanism. political backwardness is drearily mundane. His qualifications for be- Ideally, the British would prefer to coming party leader seem to be that deal with the Official Unionists, he was the best of an unusually bad. but for the moment they have to bunch, make do with the DUP. Their probZlem for the future will be how to engineer a switching of positions In personality terms, Paisley has! of the two parties, without fracturThey the mass appeal for unionist voters, ing whatever edifice they decide to build.

The Official Unionists deeply resent Paisley. Due to their economically NIALL MAC AN tSAOIR

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