Mass Action Method Proven Essential

Perhaps no struggle of the past ten years has produced more contradictory verdicts or general confusion ion than the ending of the hunger strike. Was it a defeat? A total victory? Stalemate? Thereisa limited test that we can apply. We can compare what the British are offering now with their position before the hunger strike was announced and with the five demands of the prisoners. If we apply this test, we can see that the British have made concessions but that the concessions do not amount to a full granting of the five demands or to full political status, People's Democracy sees the British concessions as a limited victory because changes in the prison regime that they were willing to concede in the face of mass protests were not available in the previous four years of the campaign. We can only conclude that these concessions are a result of the mass pressure of the campaign. Thisis all the more remarkable when we consider the mass demonstrations of thirty and fifty thousand «hat were built in a short period of time, Also that concessions by Britain to the anti-imperialist movement have been few and far between in the period since 1973, when the last mass Campaign was waged by the Political Hostages Release Committee.

However the victory is limited, Concessions made on prison clothing and association appear to fall short of the demands and it is not yet clear if they are enough to enable the prisoners to end the blanket and dirty protests. Also the British are able to deny that political status has been granted and are able to continue their attempts to convert the political problem of the North into a police operation to be solved by the RUC and UDR.

The struggle continues, The defence of the prisoners and of political status remains our task. We must regroup and consolidate on the gains we have made, We must examine the struggle and learn its lessons and by democratic debate develop a clearstrategy for further united action that will lead to final victory.

What are the lessons of the hunger strike campaign? First, we should look at the positive achievements of the campaign and of the work done by the Smash H-Block/Armagh Committee before the hunger strike began. The building of the National Committee ended the isolation of the campaign. It was isolated in the North and in the republican vanguard around the RAC!s, The National Committee built the campaign in the 32 counties, won sympathy from the mass of the Irish people and mobilised support in the Trade Unions, Student and Youth movements, Women's movement, cultural and sporting groups and built a high level of international solidarity with the struggle.

It has built a broad-based unity that extends well beyond the mainly republican milieu that supported the RAC'!s and has begun the sort of delegate structure that would enable a genuine political debate to build a strategy for victory.

The campaign's strategy of organ ising local action around the focus of major demonstrations has built the most massive demonstrations since Bloody Sunday and introduced a whole new generation to the techniques and the power of united mass But there are also lessons which show the weakness of the campaign. One lesson is the limits of the efforts of the prisoners themselves to win this struggle. Their heroic defiance is a necessary component of the campaign, but at the end of the day it is those outside the pris-— on who have the power to win a victory. The hunger strike put an immense pressure on those active in the campaign. It helped cut away some of the old deadwood of polit— ical sectarianism and allowed the political groups to co-operate more freely and to integrate the struc-— tures of the Northern Relatives Action Committees into a national structure, It also brought to a fine focus the general public sympathy for the prisoners, What it could not do is shake the belief of the mass of the Irish people in their traditional leadership or provide a strategy for militants to achieve this, At the founding conference of the national campaign, People's Democracy put forward what we believe is such a strategy. Acentral point was a continuing pressure on Fianna Fail and the SOLP to expose their inaction and betrayal of the pris— oners, At the beginning of the hunger strike we proposed the slogan 'No talks with British torturers!, Many of our ideas were accepted as immediate tactics but they were never developed as a long term strategy. We were represented at every level in the campaign but found that the lack of formal delegate structures inhibited the politic— al debate that would have clarified this.

The clearest example of this is the series of attacks that Gerry Fitt launched on the prisoners, Later Michael Alison, British Minister in charge of the North's prisons, cited this as the most important element in their resistance to political status, It gave courage to a thousand Gerry Fitts in Fianna Fail and the SOLP and enabled Haughey and Hume to provide a cover for British intransigence by a continuing facade of negotiation, Yet the H-Block/Armagh campaign largely ignored Fitt!s attacks and when PD launched a 'Dump Fitt! petition in Belfast it was supported _ 3 Pp :

-UNCON@UERED A, ee Backs THE pRisoNeRs? » SOME WEAKNESSES her into one campaign. only by individual militants and was labelled a 'diversion! by Sinn Fein, Now the task of unseating Fitt has become more urgent than ever and we hope that the end of the hunger strike will enable the campaign to swing its weight behind the petition, The same weaknesses apply to other areas of the campaign. The trade union day of action showed that a substantial minority of workers were willing to take industrial action even in the face of intimidation by management and domination by back, union leaders, Yet the work of building in this central area was left to the trade union subcommittees and the tasks of organising and lobbying workplaces was not taken up by the general campaign. The crucial tasks of organising a specifically working class element of the campaign and challenging the pro-imperialist union leadership, In the other areas of struggle, students and youth, women, the cultural movement and organising international support the same pat— tern developed. New movements and new areas of struggle developed, Militants who became involved showed great activity and enthusiasm. But the central overall strategy for an all-out victory was not developed nor, as a result, were all these areas welded togetIn the last days of the hunger strike one central question came to dominate the campaign — the question of force, It became evident to many anti-imperialists during the course of the campaign that no military solution to the question of political Status existed. Military actions that were undertaken either did not affect the overall development of the campaign or, in some cases, actually damagedit. This in itself will generate considerable debate in the anti-imperialist move— ment. But it does not mean that British imperialism can be swayed from its path by peaceful per suasion. How then can a movement like the H-Block/Armagh campaign develop such force, MASS SELF DEF ENCE We in PD see the answer in build-— ing among the mass of the people in the six counties a willingness to engage in their own defence against imperialist attacks, Its not enough to bring militants onto the streets or to win mass sympathy. The sympathy and support must be hardened out. This is done by a vehement defence of what rights already exist - the right to demonstrate, to march to the doors of the British embassy and to demonstrate in the town and city centres of the North and by driving the lesson home when our rights are denied e,g. prominent individuals insisting on their arrest at police barricades, To do this effectively we need to neutralise forces like the SDLP and Fianna Fail who attempt to confuse and demoralise the masses and we need to build an industrial army throughout the country that can hold the threat of massive industrial action over the heads of the British, In the North, we should aim for an increased harassment of British and RUC patrols in ghettoes with the eventual aim of re-building the '!nogo! areas and forcing the British In the last issue of Socialist Republic, which came out during the hunger strike, we listed such a strategy. These proposals were not idle sugg— estions. In our view, they were preconditions for a full victory, based on our understanding of the battle for political status as having an overwhelming importance for the whole future development of the Irish revolution.

The British picked this arena of struggle. They have invested four years of intense effort in it and res— isted a great deal of pressure, both in Ireland and internationally, Their whole system of repression in the North is based upon defining anti-imperialist militants as criminals, To believe that they will give it up without facing the greater threat of amass opposition from the Irish people is foolish, We have defined the outcome of the hunger strike as a limited victory. The British concessions do exist but they fall short of the five demands and of political status, Our immediate task is to expand those gains so that the prisoners will be able to end the blanket and dirty protests and begin to organise within the prisons, If we do not succeed in doing this then limited victory will be transformed into defeat, The immediate ending of protest