H:-blockiarmagh Strategy for Victory
Socialist Republic1981Prisoners and the hunger strikesTrade unions and workers' strugglesRepublicanism and the IRALoyalism and unionismPrisoners and the hunger strikesTrade unions and workers' strugglesRepublicanism and the IRALoyalism and unionism
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Nespive every effort by the prisoners, the Bricish have insisted (on conginuing- the degradation inside H Block and Armagh. ‘The H“Bleck/Armagh Committee has begun, from the January conference in Dublin the long and patient task of remobilising and reactivating the local committees.
Just what is the motivation of British intransigence? That che H Block struggle is of central political. importance is confirmed by British actions since the beginning of the last hunger strike. ~ BRITISH OPPRESSION The prisoners, in an attempt to force the ‘implementation, of British concessions, ‘conformed’ and asked for their clothes at the weekend. The British could have provided the clothes and continued the other aspects uf their oppression when the prisoners later refused prison clothes or do prison work. This would have brought H Block into line with the practice in Armagh and made further movement possible.
The British refuse to do this. They refuse to grant the prisoners any shred of human dignity, even under conditions where they would be able to continue to punish the prisoners and deny their demands for political status.
The outcome of the last hunger strike should finally end all British claims to act as a "peace-keeping" force in the North. It shows clearly that their aim is to defend partition and crush all anti-imperialist sentiment in the Irish working class and they were prepared to use large-scale violence to achieve this.
TWO LAWS Other British activities show that a final victory over the prisoners would nét be followed by the ‘rule of law’ but by the full establishment of dual system of law -- one ldw for antiunionists and another for pro-imperialist groups. The evidence of this is overwhelming: the cover-up of UDA involvemeut in the attempted killing of Bernadette and Michael McAliskey and the refusal to ban them. The attempt to dismiss Paisley's threats and the underlining of the fact of a selective arming of Unionists by the British is further evidence.
The greatest evidence is offered by the H Block/Armagh struggle itself. All the prisoners are charged with forcefully opposing British rule. Many are held on a ‘membership’ charge which itself carries a ten year sentence. As if this were not enough further indignities are heaped on them in prison. In the meantime, the members and leaders of Loyalist gangs dedicated to the sectarian killing of Catholic civilians can operate without question by the State forces.
SETBACK When we look at the full range of British activity we can see that the only force guaranteed to push them back was a mass movement of the Irish people. The H Block/Armagh campaign united all the anti-imperialist militants and built massive demonstrations but did not build this mass movement. re was not able to force the British to implement concessions to the prisoners and has now suffered a considerable setback.
It is important to face this if we are to rebuild on a realistic basis. It is also important to understand the reason for the setback--the inability of our movement to face the British with something worse than the granting of the prisoners’ demands, and on a lesser level our inability to continue the mobilisations and continue the pressure after the ending of the hunger strike. Has the recent conference developed a plan of action that can overcome this setback and lead us to a victory?
NEW AIMS The main resolution, put forward by the National Committee, listed a whole series of strategic aims for the campaign. These include:
1) Demands on the Fianna Fail government and on nationalist groups, North and South, to withdraw from all talks with the British.
2) An end to all cross-border collaboration.
3) Calls on the Nationalist parties, churches and trade unions to condemn the assassination of H Block/Armagh militants and defend the right of the campaign to carry on political activity.
4) A threat to destabilise the six counties if the British do not give way (amended by the IRSP to include destabilisation of the 26 counties).
5) Calls for the building of the campaign in trade unions, amongst youth and in the women's Does this provide a way forward for the campaign? We believe that the general line, which reflects elements of PD proposals during the hunger strike, does do this. However, there are serious weaknesses. The resolution has ultraleft elements -- section 4 is utterly beyond the capacities of the campaign and would require its transformation into a revolutionary party, rather than a united movement for the defence of the prisoners. The resolution does not detail the methods of building the campaign in each area.
AMENDMENTS ‘ PD put two amendments to the main resolution. One called on the campaign to bend all its efforts to avoid the danger that a new hunger strike would pose for the prisoners and the movement. This was withdrawn because we mistakenly believed that a hunger strike was being called from the conference. The other amendment called for a propaganda campaign as an immediate priority to clear up the confusion following the ending of the last hunger strike.
The two amendments need to be explained in relation to one another. The purpose of the first is not to open a public debate between prisoners and the movement or to imply less than full support for the prisoners now they have gone on a new hunger strike . The prisoners can not withstand hellish conditions indefinitely. If they are forced to undertake a new hunger strike we must do all in our power to win victory for them.
The point is however that we have suffered a setback that makes remobilisation a harder task.
Qur last strategy was not sufficient so we not only have to remobilise, but we have to do so on a different basis, on the lessons of the last hunger strike. The campaign has a responsibility to recognise that ‘success or failure rests with it and not the prisoners and that the prisoners must have accurate information about the state of the campaign on which to base a decision. the fact that a new strategy is based not simply on resolutions from the leadership but on the actions and understanding of militants on the ground. They will have to be convinced of the value of a new strategy and that must be the first priority of the campaign.
DEMOCRACY PD has argued throughout the period of the hunger strike and even before for the central importance of democracy and open debate. This is not some sort of lunacy or diversion but a vital necessity. Supporters of the campaign have to agree not just on the five demands but on a plan of action to implement them that deals with a constantly shifting political background and deliberate ploys by the British to confuse and demobilise the campaign.
This need is not met just by discussion in the action committees, One of the gains of the campaign was the new areas of struggle opened up: Trade Unions, Youth, Women's Movework.
POLITICAL PARTIES There was a sharp debate at theconference about the right of anti-imperialist political campaign. PD strongly supports this right of representation. The simple fact is that unity of a united movement consists precisely of a unity of different parties and their supporters and this provides the framework for drawing the individuals into action.
Opponents of this view argue that they are not trying to exclude parties -- just to ensure that they work through the action committees. Parties provide not just individual militants but an organised machine that carries out publicity and organisational tasks and argues political positions around which debate can take place. Moralising about campaign work discriminates against members of parties -- who have a double burden of campaign work and more general party work to carry out. It also tends to narrow the campaign to the most active and exclude new layers we might be able to persuade into action. We have already been through the consequences of this type of thinking in the RACs and there is no point in repeating that process on a national level.
A final point -- the history of the past ten years shows that unity depends on the active support of the Republican groups and especially of Sinn Fein. Any ‘non-political’ approach The British betrayal of the prisoners is the cause for the serious situation in H-Block and Armagh. All the resources of our organisation will be used over the coming weeks to ensure the prisoners’ lives will not be lost.
Our target last time round was £700. We raised over half that figure. For a start we want to complete the £700 target and push towards £1000. We appeal to all our sympathisers and all who are in political support of PD todig deep in their pockets. The stakes are high, the tasks huge. John North, Connolly Bookshop, The other PD amendment recognises silence.
MILITARISM ment and International solidarity parties to be represented in the DEFENCE public.
ment. lies with the state demonstrations.
WINNING THE MASSES belief.
Avoca Park, Andersonstown, Belfast . disguises this central fact and makes unity more difficult to achieve. In fact the most worrying aspect of the conference was the virtual abstention of Sinn Fein and the IRSP in the debate. The campaign needs their enthusiastic participation and their supporters should question their This silence can be linked to a change of strategy within the Republican movement. During the hunger strike the majority of anti-imperialists were united not just on the 5 demands but on the method of mass action. Now the Republican movement is committing more resources to military actions. For 5 years military actions have failed to win the battle for political status In the recent campaign military actions did not advance the struggle and in some instances actually held it back. United mass action did force the British to make concessions even if we were not able to follow up on these. Yet many militants cling to the militarist conception of mass action as subordinate to military action, rather than the other way around Getting rid of this oonfusion is of major importance for the future advance of the campaign.
sions.
How can the campaign help resolve this confusion? Its first task is of course to build mass mobilisations that will unify all the anti-imperialist militants and political parties. To do this successfully it must take steps in its own defence that involve appeals to the mass of the Irish people. The conference has already agreed to call on political parties, trade union and other organisations to condemn the campaign of assassination aimed at it.
It must go on to ensure that the attacks are investigated and the level of British collusion determined and made It must establish government complicity in Garda harassEach demonstration and march must be filed for in order to establish that the political whole. responsibility for any violence Open and democratic stewarding bodies need to be established, and clear guidelines laid down for the defence of marches and The aim of each march and the tactics being adopted need to be explained before each demonstration rather than being applied in a heavy-handed manner.
If there is one single reason why we were unable to resolve the situation in the prisons during the last hunger strike it is because we were not able to break the faith of the mass of the Irish people in the bourgeois nationalist parties. Their sympathy with the hunger strikers was linked to the belief that Haughey, Hume and company were willing and able to intervene. Unfortunately the campaign did not devote major resources to breaking that The main resolution at conference changed that. Putting pressure on these parties was posed as a central strategy.
’ The conference upreed to call An end to talks with the British, Withdrawal of anti-unionist councillors from councils in the An end to cross-border collaboration.
PD agrees with these but sees them as general aims rather than as guides to immediate action. We weren't able to achieve them at the height of the hunger strike and we are unlikely to achieve them in the short term.
Our short term aims must be more immediate; work in the areas to demand that councillors and TDs support. the five demands; to involve themselves in the campaign and fight openly in their parties in defence of the prisoners. In the North it might be possible to build an open conference of councillors to discuss action.
Anti-imperialists need to understand the nature of the bourgeois nationalist parties. They are pro-imperialist . They want to see the stabilising of imperialist rule and the defeat of all the anti-imperialist forces. Any apparent contradiction of this in their words or actions arises from their need to appease the massively anti-imperialist sentiment of the mass of the people. We can use this contradiction as a lever to bring the masses into action and thus force both the British and their local supporters to retreat. This needs a fine sense of balance. If we ignore them they retain popular support and we remain relatively isolated. If we simply appeal to them we will simply reinforce popular iJluBROAD CAMPAIGN For reasons of space we are not able to deal in detail with the other areas of struggle outlined by the conference: trade unions, youth students and women, We will return to these in the next issues of Socialist Republic We would however point to one simple fact: in none of these areas is there already in existence an organised anti-imperialist current. This means that all the forces of the campaign will have to intervene in these areas. It cannot simply be left to small sub-committees. The sub-committees will have the role of co-ordinating, providing information, and drawing together all the people that are eventually mobilised. Their success will depend on the support of the whole campaign and on its success in pressuring the political parties in the country as a British savagery against the prisoners and conciliation to Loyalism should convince everyone of the central importance of the H Block/Armagh struggle. In the hunger strike campaign this realisation united all the anti-imperialist militants. But we did not organise the mass of the Irish people and because of this we were not able to consolidate the concessions that we did force from the British and the movement has now suffered a setback.
The chief need now is that we remobélise and learn the lessons of the hunger strike in formlating a new policy. The full attendance at the conference shows that we can remobilise and the main resolution shows that at least the outlines of.a strategy are available. We have made a start but now serious discussion is needed at all levels to change rather vague and rhetorical aims into a campaign of action. We need to defend ourselves and we need to expose the bourgeois allies of imperialism above all we need to prove the method of mass action as the crucial weapon for the prisoners and for the anti-imperialist cause,
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