Result Shows Unity Essential

of accepting imperialist domination. In a situation of international political tension and economic crisis this beginning to see. And the more they see it the less they like it. The result supposed to be the most serious in the history of the state. The media first time ever the electorate would Swings were mainly on a local basis and tended to cancel each other out.

issues but on local ones.

But behind the peculiarities of each result there was one clear message: popular confidence in the ability of considerably down.

Some of the local swings however could have a national importance in Both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael of the February 18th election. It was and the politicians agreed that for the vote for policies and not personalities.

In the event the opposite happened. No clear national voting pattern emerged.

People did not vote on central policy the major parties to solve fundamental political and economic problems was alternative for workers.

the long run. Tnis is particularly true of the outcome in Dublin for example.

up. on this suggestion. We feel that because of the depth of the combined political, question of who forms the government same time they are increasingly alienated lumpen proletariat. disputed leader. unionist party. increased their share of the poll in this area but in radically different ways. Fianna Fail gained significant extra support in working class districts while Fine Gael pulled in the middle class vote. Even more interestingly it was the traditionally “liberal” sections of the middle class (which supported left independents such as Noel Brown and John O’Connell) which gave Fine Gael its biggest boost. What this reflects is an initial class polarisation. The middle class opted for the workers. most conscious and consistent policy of repression and austerity while workers rejected it. But this is only a tentative development since, while Fine Gael consciously speaks for the middle class, Fianna Fail in no way represents an Despite the depth of political and economic Crisis in Ireland it is clear that workers saw no national alternative to the existing party set-up. This Paisley Loses Clout ONE OF the side-effects of the Kincora corruption scandal was the implication of the DUP leader, lan Paisley, in the allegations of a cover\t is ironic that a man who has spent his entire career in whipping up hatred against catholics and, not satisfied with that, was attempting to mobilise fundamentalist loyalism against gays in his “Save Ulster from Sodomy”’ campaign, should now himself come under threat from his even more fundamentalist followers.

However the temporary embarrassment that Paisley faces over this issue masks a turning point in the fortunes of the DUP and a questionmark over the future development of loyalism. Ulster unionism has always had a substantial loyalist rump. As an armed force it provided the backbone for the frequent anti-catholic pogroms. As a political force it organised the petty-bourgeoisie and In the disintegration of the unionist monolith that began with the present troubles, Paisley made sure that he held this section, and that after the fall of the power-sharing assembly that he was its sole and unPaistey had nothing to do with the organising of the 1974 loyalist stoppage, but he wasn’t slow to step into the leadership and he attempted to repeat the exercise and force the return of Stormont in 1977. He wasn’t successful, but in the local government elections of that year he got over 30% of the unionist vote and the DUP became the second largest The DUP kept up the pressure: the “Save Ulster from Sodomy” campaign disruption of cross-border meetings and attacks on Dublin councillors, a Campaign against religious ecumenism, the Carson Trail, and most recently the ‘Day of Action’, the disruption of Council meetings and the attempt to unseat the RUC chief.

Y The policy of activism paid off. Yhe DUP traditionaliy a party of tine rural poor and lower middle class, made inroads into the protestarit working class with the election @f McQuaid poor. Yet at a time when these people were looking for someone to defend them they did not seriously believe that the anti-imperialist movement could play such 2 role.

There are a number of lessons in all this. Firstly, the economic and sdcial implications of imperialist domination have to be systematically integrated into the overall programme of anti-imperialism. Anti-imperialists must be able to give detailed answers to the multitude of everyday problems which afflict working people. Secondly, it is not enough to have a programme it is also necessary to be able to fight for it. This means winning the confidence of workers by consistent work in their areas and their organisations (trade unions etc). Without building support in this way it will be impossible to gain real credibility among Thirdly, the anti-imperialist movement must be able to present itself as a united national alternative to the established parties. Political organisations such as Sinn Fein, Peoples Democracy and the IRSP have a responsibility to come together and develop a national alliance which will be active in every nook and cranny of the country. and Robinson in Belfast in the last British general election. The local elections of last May saw them emerge as the major unionist party with a slightly larger share of the overall vote than the Official Unionists.

Onc point should be made however. The various paisleyite campaigns, while they have attracted support to the DUP, have failed in their object. Stormont has not been restored. Cross-border contacts have not been ended, ‘Ulster’ has not been rendered ungovernable and the mass of protestants have not joined in an armed insurrection.

Recent history in the north since 1974 shows that while unionism may be able to veto imperialism’s plans it is not able to advance and force the adoption of its own programme. In fact even this veto may be wearing thin as the British find a receptive audience in the Irish nationalist bourgeoisie for a restructuring of partition.

The less radical tone of official unionism reflects a more realistic assessment of their dependence on Britain. Their most recent conference led to a partial split when they ' dumped the call for a return to Stormont. This realism has not reached the mass of unionist voters and this partially accounts for the growth of the DUP, but in fact they have no alternative programme. On the “Carson Trail” Paisley threatened armed conflict with the British forces. This was hardly meant seriously — the threat has been used frequently to pressure the British, but the important fact is that issuing the threat led to bitter disagreements with other sectors of loyalist opinion. Without a credible threat Paisley finds himself without any real lever to pressure the British. He has plenty of votes— but in reality the majority of unionists are confused and demoralised and unwilling to take to the streets.

This doesn’t meanithat the DUP don’t represent a. anger. They are a powerful force of the most bigoted and ~-counter—revolutionary elements in the North, Pressure from.them acts to bring more and more British and RUC repression in the ghettoes. They are able to hold armed demonstrations and organise openly while the RUC and UDR fraternise with them.