Marxist Review: no. 6, c. 1974

_

(MARXIST _

| REVIEW OD

theoretical jeornal of the Revolvti onary Marxist Grovp

) ELECTIONS:

eat. A REVOLUTIONARY Sa — SS ee

eoretical journal of the revolutionsry mearxist froup irish section of the fourth international

MARXIST REVIEW NO6

ELECTIONS =

revolutionary strategy G lavery Pee.

SOLARENTTEYH

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CONDGLLY ALD THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY:

Fart Three, The Second Internationa DRO Ty saght E25 aaah aemteitieiieiebammmennatiesinsis cme icaacameaemeanamaemniezamnsammimmens nasa siz coaceadhaaeeememaneemmemmeiimiasiimianmmmammeticmet nis ck oimaea ecient eae mae MARXIST REVIEW is the theoretical jourral of the It is a discussion meazine

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and the views in it by signed authors do not necessarily represent the positions of the Group as a whole, All enguiries should be sent to: the editor: Fisugh Bock Servi Floor, 2 Mary Street, Dublin 1.

Cues ce, Top

ELECTIONS

the revolutionary tactics Elections to bourgeois aduinistrations can be important tools for the ruling flacs in reinforcing its ideoldzics} hold on the masses. Bot it is a tool which can be utilised by revolutionaries against the ruling class.

The tactics of a campaign around elections by revolution-ries must he judred, ss ell revolutionary ection mist, from an sssesrient cf the objective and subjective conditions. From this assessment tne correct method by which the only besis of revolutions fetion at elections - the propigation of the revelution=ry sropramme, the strenethenin of the mass moveirent and for the purpose of educating the more backward strate of the wording cliss.— can be implemented, For the ruline class, elections serve a numberof pursoses.

Primarily, they make up a ' part of the ideological armoury of the ruling cla: 2 oiferin, what is said to be a democratic apparatus, presented as a key of the "Gemocratico" system. In reality, while universal] suiireare is a desocratic institution whith mst be defended ageinst fasois st or bonapirtist attack, its role in re Peete!

suiirese limited to property ormmers only when the stare wis reached thet purlisvent wa: a the only institution carryinc out fpoverntent mst be recocnised. Thus toa a rlinment is: subject to the irresistaole oressure of capital, mtioml end internatior hl: and can over-vide the opinion of the tiss of the neéple either br ocharcitne the rule of “denocracy™ = perryninderins: or the reatructuring of powermment -— or by simply elsining -* tention informition", as in the case of the imitiad antry of Sriteain into the 40, desbite majority optositicn in the country, also, elections can serve specific tacticsl purposes. The sécret baljot sniits the gellective power of the workincs class. The wiitydeveloped im strugrle is broken down as individuals are isolated and ocombarded with the propepends of the state and iiss media. pula ce fev Tias; the intention is that in the electoral procedure itself frapmentation within the working clase can be encouramed.

ing the mass upeurce of May "68 | in Bettoin Iasi year in an ancy spear-headed by the This tiuctie wis em loyed with the hope ef derus by the french Governaent, and by the Tory Government atte:pt to counter the rising tempo of working closs mili miners, But while elections serve specific necds of the raling class they ean also be ntiliséd ‘by revolutionary, socialists as an suxidingy to an on-poing extra-psarlianent— ery ¢ainpeigt-of aeitetion wand propusida.

SSE U'~sSDSwCSe?E CC 3 The strengthening of the class consciousness of the working class, and not only the vangu.rd of that class, the putting forward of the revolutionary programme, and the development of the mass movement are the factora which determine “he actual methods adopted at elections - the opportunity for an extended platform for agitation on all aspects of the atruzzle.

And while the revolutionary movement Incks the strencth to do away with the existing bourgeois apparatus then revolutionaries test work within the elections: by participation, This is the case even for the most counter-revolutionary parliaments as the experience of the Bolsheviks illustrated, Lenin deemed such participation as "not only useful, but indispensible to the party of the revolutionary proletari:t, after the first bourgeois revolution in Russia (1905) so ag to pve the way for the second bourgeois revolution (Feb 1917) and for the socialist revolution ( October 1917 )"; "Left Ying Commnism - An Infantile Disorder".

The attention of the working class almost invariably cannot but be focussed on elections - and in such circumstarices revolution ries mst take idvantaze of the platform offered by the ruling class - and in general this can best be done through participation. But in certain circumstances the needs of the mass movement and the education of the masses can best be served by an active boycott of elections, This tactic can, however, only be correctly applied in certain specific circumstances ~- when the Masees are in rapid revolutionary upsurve of the ma;nitude of having broken the bounds of bourgeois legality on a miss and universal scale: in order to vrevent or weaken slgnificantly any new structures of government the bourgeoisie my attempt to introduce; and to give this upsurge, which will, almost without exception, find one form of expression in a spontaneous boycottist and nonparticipation form, a coherence and direction only the leadership of secialist revolutionaries can provide.

Anacid test of the correctness of the boycott tactic, and of all revolutionary tactics is - can it strengthen the miss movenent and the revolutionary conciousneas of the working class, and in particul.r, can an ‘active® boycott be mounted in which revolution:ries countervose to the bourgeois elections a viable radic:1 alternative which will attract the mases - whether it he hehina the slozan of calling for workers’ own organs of power, sovicts, street committera, or py more limited calls for strenztnening mass struggie behind demneratic slogans. If not, the beycott tactic is clearly incorrect, A failed ‘active' boycott tolds no advance fer the etrugele of the yorkine elnss .

nd exposes the political misjudceuent of those who mde, the Call. Similarly, a ‘passive! boycott campaign which offers no altermntive to the bourrecis structure, save possible abstract calls to strug cle with no real lesdership, exposes the political impotence of the -roups involved and will contribute to their isolation from the mse of the proletariat.

Revolutionary exverience has taught the value of boycott and participation and the methods for the implementation of these tactics in different situations and with the mss conciousness at differing levels. Eeasples to be considered were in Russie when in 1405 the Bolsheviks correctly applics a beycott but incorrectly held to the same position the following year, 2nd in Spain when in 1930 a boycott was the only reslistic tactic to be followed though only months later participation was correct.

RUSSLA 1905-07

In Rus:ia during 1905 an immense uprising found expression in the creation cf soviets It appeared that the winning of state powor by the preletarist was possible, The barriers of the old police state head been broken down, The popular masses were in what Trotsky described as a "chaotically oppositional mood" and when the pressure of militancy foreed the Tsarist government to attempt to create a new covernmertal structure, the Bolsheviks tried to give coherent revolution ry form to this moo in agitation afound an election boyeott.

The Tsarist government announced elections for a new body, the Dum. This was created 28 a manouevre to gain the support for the liberals agninst the crowing threat of revolution; its power was that its agreement was necessary for the passine ef legislstion, 50, with mss upsurge and an attempt by the ruling class to create a new structure, the classic preconditions for the application of a boyeott tactic were present.

And with the boycott the revolutionaries succeeded "In preventine a reactionary government from convening a reactionary parliament in a situstion in Woiech extraparliamentary action (strikes in particular) were developing at ereat aneed, when not a single section of the proletariat ang the peasantry could support the reactionary government in any way, and when the revolutionary proleteriat was gaining influence over the backward masses through the strike strugrle and through the agrarian movement" - Lenin (Left Wing Comminism) .

But the followin, year the Bolsheviks again applied the tactic, this time againet the Second Duma. This was incorrect and arose from a failure to grasp that the peak of the revolutiomry upsurge had passed. The masses were no longer in an Upsewing of conciousness and mobilisation, In conference in December 7905, the Eolsheviks resolved the "attempt to undermine this police Dama, rejecting all participation in it". But the time hed passed for such resolutions.

Lenin in 1907 outlined the error of the Bolsheviks: "The condition for the success of the beyeott of 1905 was = sweeping, universal, powerful and rapid upswing of the revolution, We mist now examine, in the first place, what bearing a specislly powerful upswing of the struc¢le has on the boycott, and, secondly, whot the ch racteristic and distinctive features of a especially powerful upswins are, "Dogeott... is 2 strugvle not within the framework of a given institution but against its emergence. Any ;iven institution can be derived only from the Alreany existing, i.,e., the old regime, Consequently, the boycott is a means of strugele aimed directly at overthrowity; the oid refine, or , at the Worst, i.¢., when the asscult is not strin; enouch for overthrow, at weakening it to such an extent that it would be umable to set up that institution, umuble to mke it operative, "(Reference everywhere in the text is to active boycott, that is, not gust a refusal to take part in tue institutions of the «la regime, but an attack on this regime...

the Social Democrats spoke openly at the time ( of the boycott }) about active boycott, sharply contrastin;- it to passive boycott, and even linkin it to armed struzle),

"Consequently, to be successful the boyeatt requires a direct strucyle apwinst the old repitie, an uprisine against it and miss dischedience to it in a lanes number of cases (such mass disobedience is one of the corditions for preparing an uprisings), Joyeott is a refusal to reco, nise the -14 reine, 1 refusal, of course, not in words, but in decds, 1.2,, it is somethin; that finds expression not only in cries or slo;ans of orpanieqtions, but in a definite movement of the mase of the people, who systematically set wo new institutions, which, thou, unlawful, actually exist and so on and soforth. The connection Getvesu boyeott and the broad revolutionary upswin’ is thus obvious: boycott is the mest decisive me cts of stru, le, which rejects not the form of organisation of the ,iven institution,. but its very existence. Heyeott is a declaration ef often war aminst the cold re,ime, a direct attack upon it. Barrin: a broad revolutionary upswin.:, barrin: masa-unrest which overflows, as it were, the Suunds of the old legality, there can be no question of the b yeott succeeding". (Against Boycott; 1907. Mmphasis in ori;inal) He subsequently added, "It wre an error... for the Bolsheviks to have >boyeotted the Tum: in 1906, It w.s an error, because after the Decemner defeat* it was impossible 7O expect a revolutionary attack in the near future; it was therefore senseless ta spurn to Duma's tribune for mobilising the revolutionary ranks". (Concerning the Boycott of the Third Duma However, in the situation of the Bolshevik Party in 1907 Lenin found himself alm>st elone amongst the lendership in holding this position. Mass arrests tcok place all over the country tio. year, mval mitinies ended in failure, the Dem. was prorogued and a missive wave of state. yiclence was unlenshed., In reaction t this the Bolsheviks renewed their boyeolt call with determination - but in doing eo failed to draw the guide te their action from tue opne lL ousnege of the iausea, Trotsky later deseribed this: renction and the joyeou® + lan attgamt to cover their own impotence with a radical gesture", (Stalin' - Py) ‘when the trisses are in retrest, the tactic of the boycott. loses its revolutioniry

SPATW 1950-31

The experience cf Russia 1905-07 and the lessons derived from it were reinforced in Spain with the upsurges preceding the Civil War.

The social and political crisis opened up in Spain with the depression in 1929 and this ended for a eriod the attampts of absclatism to crush all protest with military repression, In 1930 dictator Primo de Rivers was forced to resign wher he failed to giin a vote ef confidence from the garrisons of Spain, necessary in the face of rising working class militancy. King Alfonso XTIT appointed General Damisco derenguer Fustre head of a caretarer government prior to the intended formition of 2 constitutions! monarchy gut the successof this slan dépended on a mease base for the monorchist and clerical political porties - a base they did not have, *# In particul r, the smashing of the Soviet in December 1905.

his loosening of the chains of abselutiam opened the flood gates of mass militancy expressed in opposition to attempts to foist a new structure which thcugless author jtnzian did not ge far enough for the Spanish misses. This tock 2 particular Fern in a general mood of non-cooperation with the guthorities, and boycott for the elections for the new structures, the Cortes.

A miss upsurge Was in process, gheih for its development necessitate the intervention of commmnist revolutioniries - trking the {nitintive thus to @.in a lending position in the struggle.

The conditions Aeeeribed oy Lenin as opening up the possibility for the use of the boycott tactic - the "sweeping, wniversil, powerful and rapid waswing of the revolution" - were teing fulfilles in the yaAionlisation eripping the Spanish masses; working class ami peasants.

“ut the actual failure of the commmnists to take 2 clear Line wae to be criticised by Tretsiy in that year: “The communists obviously committed =m error by failing to take the initiative in the boycott. They “tone, at the hed of the revolutionary workers, eould give the yoyeott campign o hold and militant character.

“The sentiment for boycott, nevertheless, is clearly widespreat in opposition parties and is a reflection and symptom of the profound restlessness aroun the popular meses." Prior to the election Trotsky hed written of the possi bility ot its invelidstion by boycott, sust as had Deen achieved ty the “plshevits ond the other poycottists with the bums in 4905. And on February 15, following the elcetions ani the fail of the mons elist stratecy, both because of the hoyeott tut aise Age to the qwoakness of the bourgeois ond elericsl parties still blinking in the lisht ot a theizx new found tegality, he grote of the lack of confitence enzeniere’t ond exacerbated in tne ya ing clique, and its runifications: "he superatitious F spect for power in the con¢lousness of the people will be xelentlessly urdermined by all this. & weve of satisfnetion, of eorfidence, of dering will £9 through millions of hearts, worming them, inspiring then, spurring thea on". This wee the result of a yoycott of mass proportions, springing from the demands of the misses themselves, Sut the communists had not attempted 4o develop this «nd they poid the price. ‘Tnfortunetely, the commmnists were not the stare in the boycott performance. Tht is why *hey aia not achieve ny importatt yootories in the campaign of tue inst two or three months", Troteky wrote later th.t ye°r- perer ae Just 26 Trotsky. we unequivecsi on the necessity of the boycott call against the attempts %o build a new structure and to unify the misses strugiie, he had no doubt about the politicrl content that should hive characterised. thet call: thet at tht time to counterpose the erextion of soviets, of omens of dual power to the ruling clique's Cortes would ve tiete abatraction, The Goonish masses were in universal upsurge, there eoula be no dow.t of that, wut the actunl process of padicalisation to the point at which orgins of unl power gould be torown Up ia working class orfarisation, wes atill st an winuryornic stage- Thua, to have mile such a call for soviets ould nove fount ne MASS response and would neve been to contribute to the fragmentation of the masses rather than in uniting them in struggle.

q messes of the city and countryside con he united at the present time only “democratic slogans. These include the election of a constituent cortes on the sof universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage. I do not think that in the iq this sloran. Soviets are as yet nonex istant. The gat situation you can avol ish workers - not to speak of the penaants - do not know what sovietsa are: at te, not from t eir own experiences.

srtheless, the struggle around the Cortes invthe coming period will: constitute Pehole politics1 jife of the country. To counterpose the slogan of soviets, under S circumstances to the slogan of the Cortes, would be incorrect". He added that Bets could be wilt in the fubure only by mobilising the masses on the bisis of Beritic slognne ot that periot - te trsic wre to prevent the monwrchy convening Snservitive Cortes and to ensitre the convocation of % demcerstic constituent fies which could give lr d to the pecsants and which would thus necessitate the ton of soviets to fortify the position and @2ins.

~ er, the then head of Government, resigned and wis. repliced with civilian Binistration. Believing the rightist ¢roupings could not win 7 mijority tothe es, the Ming called mmicipal elections inste.d, to be held on April 12, 1931.

fijess than two months after advocating & hoycott of elections, Trotsky stated the meessity of yartici,ction. The decision showel neither inconsistency nor revision his errlier position - the two elections were of deeply differing charncter .

Bath repord to toe Jerenguer Cortes, the teetic of boycott was perfectiy correct.

wis clenr beforehsit tunt either Alfonso woull succeed for a certzin period in Sin recortin? to the road of military dictatorship or else the movement would rol ever the head of Berenguer and his Cortes. Under +hese conditions, the com unista A to take the initiative in the airugele te boyeot: the Cortes. This is precisely met we hod insisted on with the a-d of those meagre resources We had at our disposmi. Had the Syanish colmuniets come out resolutely 2ni in time for 4 hoyeott, even afonly wy Jistributing sh rt statements on the subject, their authority would have Been considersuly prester at that moment when the Jerenguer ministry ws overthrown.

Me advanced workers would have said to thamselves: "These people are eup2ple of Poresceing things". Unfortunatley the Spanish communists , ¢hrown off the treek Ty She leadersiip of the Comintern, did not unferstand the siturtion ard rade treparat- Gers to participrte in the elections, tut acain without any cm fidence. The events feclied over their heads, and the firat victory of the revolution brought the commaists almost no inerecse in influence.

Miiow the Bawera Gaverunert hos umliertaken to convene o constituent Cortes. Is there jany basis for thinking that the convoeztion of this Cortes will be interrupted by “= second revolution. To enll for boycott would tow be to call for self-isolation. It ‘is necessary te particip.te mest actively in this election. The revolution poses politicsl questions directly znd 2% the present stage fives thet 2 porliamentory for. - Mie Jo not solid.rise curselves for a momert with the illusions of the masses; Lat we wast utilise whitever ie progressive «yout these illusions to the utmost, otherwise we are not revolutionists hat conbeuptible ped=nts". (The Spanish Revolution and the Dangers threstening it, Iny 1931)

5 ju the =e of ceraguer the Cortes had to be boveatted in the veme of a revol tioenety eons.) Visit Cortes, The question of suffznes should Hive been o+ the forefront Of afitey5a - a call for increased demeracy as part of the Strugrle for soviet Workers dsnoecraey. Envineg then overthrom the old repressive refine alotge with its new structure, militent workers and Peasants wanted to porticiprte in elections ~ to strive for 2 derocr..cyy the bourgeoisie could not grant, in the demnd for & democracy the gevernmentsl structure did not actually represert or could concede, This wis the cey to the necessity of revolutioucry intervention in the elections.

ut othere implemented differing tactics. The Commmist Party ignored the elections thus playing into the lionde of the anarchists, a powerful Spanish tradition, who countezposed the slogan of aeaim: the masses to the reality of the political proce: evipping te moeses and thus contributing tc their isolation from the workers and peasants, and the isolation of the misses fron arms; Tie question of revolutian is at one time or ancther "Sefrcted through the orism of Prlinmentarianismn, The taske for >evolutionsries were to use the Cortes as 2 forum fron which the revolutionary procramme conld Le powerfully presented and as a ‘ond with the Msses that cain be develcped to eontrisute decisevi to the overthrow of the Cortes in Envour of workers! demecracy, Or the election results; Tretsiy noted there wis not one con upiet in the Cortes:, "OL course, the revoluticnizy wine is nlvwowye atroncer in netion, in the.stra =e, than in parliamentary representation. The weilmess of Spanish commmism is fully | disclosed. Undér these conditions, to speak of the overthrow of bourgecis, perlianentarisnism by the dictatorship of the vrolet-riat would simply menn to play the birt of imbeciles and bebblers. The task is to gether strencth for the pert on the basis of the parliamentary stage of the revolution and rally the misses to us. That is the only way porliamentsrianism enn be overcome, But Precisely for that purpose it is indispensable te develop a fierce a:itation under the most. Stiress demccr=tic slosans. : "what should be the eriteria for aivencing the slo-ans? 6 n the one i GQ eider the feneral direction of the revolutionary development, which t our strstecie line. On the other hand, we must tate into acesunt the tevel of conscioucness of the mesea; the conmunist who does nov take timt into consi dermticn will crest his neck". (Trotsky , July 315 1957.)

sail Trotsicy went on to stress the neccessity for the pirticipation £9 te a Pertof an ongoing, acitotion in all areas.

The weckness of the conumniate dh SSUIP, ap reyated by polities mistakes, wis to have implications tracie for tha Spanish workin: class and peassmtry, Crisis fripped the government, resi:nation and further elestions fr. Lleved with political re;roupment. The social-demecrmts were friphtenea by their new found pirlianentary power and refused to implement sceinlist policies which woul? have opened up a new stage in the revolution ry process which would have a7ent therm aside. Instead, they banded power to the bourrecisie and in doin- S80 undermined the confidence of the proletariat in itslef ond the confi jence of the petit—hourrecisie in itself. In the crisis, the conditions for the feewth of fascist reaction wee Khite wahenened _ eC rel CC

9 T+ come With the Civil var and the defect of the Spanish messes - fr the lack of Sdequ-ie political preparation.

The result of t e civil wor depenis for one fourth, not to say one tenth, upon the Jevelopuont of the civil wir jtself, its techrical means, ite surely military leadership 2nd for three fourths, if not for mine tenths, on the political preparation", Protsiy wrote in Hovember 1934, ani he wns soon +o be proved correct,

TREND 1969-74

Hespite the weeilth of revelutionsry exverience to be drum upon, the positions adopted uy Bey blieon and Socialist proups +o elections in Ireloand in recent years have consistenly missed potentially ywilustile vehicles for 9; it tion. The tactics adoptel by apti-i:perinlists in four elections should be considered: the six county gener’.1 election of February 1969, the Free State General Election of pecel ber 1972, the Morthern assembly election of July 1973 ani the aritish Genern] Election in the Worth of Irelanil, Februcry 1974- The growim, militancy - By early 1969, Stormont Prine lingster Terence O'Neill hud been coicht between the hanwer of civil rishts acitation —nd the wnvil of loyclist reaction; personified by Ian Paisley. The pressure of the Teisleyite vicht force O'Neill to make his infamous libernl eali to arms iieter at tar Crossroais" speech and to eall a Stormont Ganeral lection. sections of the civil ri, ats wovenent were seduced dy teeili's liberal rhetoric and slackened activities. Peoples Dencertey, on the other hanl, contested 11 seats with a programme ef dermnis calling for reform in a wamber of social issues and an ending of represeive lesislatics.

PD did not rench its decision to particijete on the basis of 2 revolutionary Merxist alysis - for the orcnuisstion was ot that time 2a loose though militant civil riphts croup end not 2 socizlist oxranisntion - mt they nevertheless adopted a very good position as their publications of the time explained: "In the turmeil of the election campaign it is important we do not foreat that, for the Poople’s De. .ocrscy'y firhting the eleetion is enly one of many tasks, We are contendin, seats, not to join the carvet-bapyers end place-scekers, but becouse it affers an excellent c.ance to out our ideas to the peonle and keep the femond for civil rights in the limelicht. For us, democracy is a contimous strugcle by the people, not just mking 2 mark on a ballot wper every four or five years", Thus the electoral platform was bein, used to agitate for extra-patiiamentary stru.,le. The FD agitation wis successful, its character meshins with the ¢rewin militancy of the anti-unionist people, and reflected in some hish yotin: fisures within their tctal of23,645 votes. ani following the election the PP carried out ite prowise to continue the stru- le on the streets. 4 contribution had been made to the atrugie by the election intervention and the confidence of the anti-unjonist workin: class nided.

10 Qutflanked in the 26 Counties.

iy late 1972, Jack Lynch required a new mndate to strencthen his government's position in order to ineresse repression aysinst anti-imperic ists anf tims aid iritish Imperialism in the North, He therefore called = Genexil Election for December 7- out it was the ease that the necessitics of esnitalist stability in the Free State dictated that the policies of the Gos/rive-Corish coalition would differ little from that of Fianna Fail on the Northern crisis anda anti-Republican repression, in the eluction campei;n, however, the major parties sensed the frustration and confusion of the mas of the electorate to their nolicies on the mtioml question ani switched the main thrust of their campaion to immediate social and economic issues. Thus Republicsn or Socialist intervention in the elections necessitated a ecamprign not only on social -nd economic issues, cut primrily on the question that the mejor parties avoided - the Morth ani repression: to place a revolutionary Jostion before the people on the issues that the major porties had retrented fron, sat before this opportunity, Provisional Sinn ¥ein itself retreate Hep failed to contribute to developim: conscicusnese in any meavin-ful way, and the Official Republicans missed an opportunity to put forward key questions, The Government wis attempting to draw Provisioml Sinn Fein into battle before the or-anisation was prepared. cut in recoymisin, this and refusing to ge forward in the elections, Sinn Fein actuclly exposed and exaperatel their weektess uefore the working class, An acjressive Republican campaign would not have produced massive election returns, but even a moderate poll for Sim Fein caniidates would in effect have been a defeat for the policies of the mjor pirties in that it would millify any claim they had to hnvin’ a mniate for repressim;: Repudlicens. It would have shown that their was popular opposition te this repressicn.

This wis not done, the issue of repression was side-stepped and the position of the major parties left unopwosed.

People's Democracy adopted an absetentionist policy and weote of coniattin= electoralist illusions. Dut electoral illusions will not be broken iy propacande.

This will oceur only with the conerete experience of the misses in stro: je, And participation in elections on 2 revolutionary basis will cortritete ¢o this process, Participation toes not menn solidsrisin: with these illusions tat rather to utilise elections in an appreciation of the rezlity of the mss consciousness in orier to extend agitation and te reach the mesus dill under the infigemee of bourrccis ideoloyy . Thus election a itation forms a part of the develonment of the forces which will eventually brenk dewn the electoral illusions, The RWG put forward a form of action which did offer suck a Perspective for the utilisation of the election. This was to bring the min question of the conjuncture to the fore - the anti-republican repression, the necessity for Gf to be opsosed, and support for the national stray; lc. , This was formated in an clection slofan - "Aminst Repression — Vote Republican" - and in an active campaign in eritical support of the Officicl Remablican Movement as the only ariti-inplriclist orpanisation which reco;nised the mea te present a working class altornative in these elections,

11 md ty so dcing the Wii wos in a pesition to mke more effective criticism of the c won of the Officials and to inerease the credibility of revolutionary Marxism @ccin elements of that section of the Repub!ican Movement in particular, While the Officials offered the only radical opresition to the major partics, ) the nature of thir eompeign, with its restricted revolution=ry eccontent limited ne the impact they could haye made ani meant a failure te take full advontare of cpportumity prosented, The very fact that the mijor perties had shiftea the in of the comeign. from the national question to the important hut nonetheless suliy considerations of inflation, rates and so on, placed a Hepublican ¢ampaisn pvred on the national question in a favourable position. Such a eApaion could ») forced the major parties to state their position unequivocally on this I end thus expose them and foree then into confrontation with the wortcd ae- Blsi. in the tssues they preferred to push unider the carpetbecnuse of the reaction ei. electorate to their policies; b) the arti-inmerinlist —cvenert #oull have become 2 real alternmtive 1.2 the teajor parties in the minds of a considernble section of the Werke ne si ul thus have jmined a (reater mas of support; ‘l somuztted the rirhtist natiomlists of Aont-zcht Hresn and elements of ens: Jil, The failure of the Officials ta raise the mnational question left She is open for these elements ta cupitalise and consolidate themselves. The Ofi5, -§ did not not take advontage of their remitationn in this field and tyr Smet n ting; an agressive Republican campuisn - eneompassins the economic and Sect: . ues in a rounded revolutionary campaipm - the ruc was not pulled from Emicr §..: tight nitionmalists and their positicn was strencthene’ to the cost of WEhe o1:'.-inperialists, Jy canpoipning around the immediate economic and social issues the Officials Michlichted aspects of = revolutionary peepeetive but by failing to pitce the Metionsl question at the head of their campaign they failed to place these issues fn the context of such an overall revolutionary appreach, Th:s their “witntion nid not sufficiently explain the imperialist causes of the economic and Social ilis Sn ther interrelationship with the anti-imperialist struyle. Sy this wealmess, the Officials’ eampaiyn was severely handicapoed for thus the differentiation het- Ween the anti-imperialists and the sajor parties beesnes blurred, It is not for *eveolutionaries teautemitically accept the terns of reference lnid down by the Tulin, class in its election arcitation - it mist expose these terms ond ensure that P@atters erucizl to the needs of the workin, class are raised and if possible, brourht % ve mijor axes of the election detate. This is possible with the nation=1 question an. Trelond. Unfortunately, the Officials’ concentration onthe lowest level of economic and Socizl issues te the exclusion of a full revolutionary perspective, wis not isolated a0 this election,

+2 miiast the Lesembly Ta mid-1972, with the local covemmmont on] nese sly elections, the uritish Government wos attenptin, to eresta . tow aaministrative structure witl: which to consolidate the "moderate" pro-im epinlists, toke further sections of the antiunionist worsin ¢liss irom supuort for resistance in orler to isolate the revolutiomiry movetent andl briny; stabilisation in Imperialist interests closer.

The erention of the Asseably wos the keystone of Trithiin's etrate;y aroun.

which the pacification of the North wes to be achievel. It wis an election objactively quite different from orthodox dest inster of local -overnment elections.

They oauie 2s a culmination of the processes of the Wwitish policy since the imposition of dimect rule in 1972 ana as such op iosition to this stricture was the prim cay task of anti-imperiolists.

flow coull this best be curries out? Three min questiors faced revolitioniwiest 4 Tew structure was to be formed ghich suet he oj ‘oped - wis it possible to perticipeate in elections to the structure on the bisis of op .osition to ite eyistnace?

Could the more backword elements of tne corkin class, those under the influence of the reforniets, be better educotel by acitation in porticipsticn or in boycott?

Could revel tionmiry forces bé mobilised, the m.se movement stren: thonea by acitetjon in .articipction or boycott?

Thase questions are not dif fi@ilt with Marxist cnlysis. Coneiter the consciousneww of the anit-urionist workin, class - there wis no "brow, urivereal upswing”, 4netend a workin: class Inere: sin ly fra, menwet anil disorientatel since the struct le had pusse] from its peck with the Jestruction of Stornent in “ereh 1972 to ebb, and the continuin- repression accoupatiel by politival LAROUGTEELTY « The overwiclmin,; wei, ht of this actor merit that the tasks of pevyolutionarics could most menidi, fully be carried out in porticipstion in the elections. mt the precise miture of the elections aml their role in the inveriniist stretey necescitnted a hi;h ‘decree in accuracy and proeision in a itation.

For Lirxieta tuere is no eontridietion in perticipatin®= in Slactions, or even in the parliameits themselves, in ordur to ajitete for the ultimete smashin of the bourcesis institutions - it iathc basis for revolutionary Yarsist participation in all elections they ta'ze part in. Tis election was not different im This respect put ite pecilicr nature mule 2 particularly enact mode of p ticipation essential.

This mode, the only revolutiomiry Sp vorch pos ible siven the precise circumstances, wos onc clear pro ramne hen ‘ed by oprosition to the Aseeribiy = Gxplsininy its role in the imperialist plan - linked with demants for the endims of ali repression, the type of deanna essential for the mobilisation of the masses at time of ebb in siray le, and stressin, the extra-parlinment ry methots of strum te.

aut not only was this the only penninly revyolutiomiy approach pest ible = participation on any basis which did net op ose the Assenbly clearly ond unequivocally would objectively be to contribute ta the building of the Lssembly and the consolidation of imperialism. It would have been to imply acceptance of the Assembly.

Yet no Republican or Socialist croup attempted to impleme st this tactic.

43 = and because of the specific nature of the election, the norme by which small revolution.ry sYoups supszert the candidates of other groups - thoir breaking with elase collabarstion or on their class composition (see below: 1974 Gen. Elections) were not sufficiently precise, There could only be one type of intervention in the | elections which would in effect break breal with class collaboration - that outlined | above; while class com.osition in this instance did not necessarily imply the vote would be class ageinst class, workers a:minst imperialist. ipain, this wes not sufticiently exact fiven the objective nature of this election, a The REG, itself too weak to stand in the elections, wis thus forced by the jack of revolutionary participation by any proup,;, in order to five 2 revolutionary Unrxist presence in the slections to adopt a boycott position ard to attempt to inject revolution:zry content inte the boycott campaizn, People's Teronracy acknowleded the role and character of the structure ta be ereated and from its evaluntion cencluded that their opyositign could be expressed beat in boycott. tut PD did not propound an active boycott. To the: election Pi) counterposed an abstraction - calls for the struj: le to cotitinwe - when the wortcin: class required conérete suide ee Thus one of the irimiry objects of revolutionary a;itation arourd elections, the education of the more baciward elements wich cannot be so easily reached in the normed neat oan “tary course of agitation, wre negiected. Imperialism waa ennbled by thie wealmese of the stratary notonly of Fu but of the -mejor sections of the pte taper ini iat Moveneit in general to easily outmenousvre the revolutionsry vanuard an4 further isolate it by sttippiny, more of these elements from active resistance, fhis failure: to pive revolutionary form to the boycott was the almost inevitable result of the failure to ausess the conjumeture. This dictated that muy uoycott of this election hnd also to be of - precise nature to. heave revyolition— ary form. Opposition to the assembly could not be rallied to a boycott camcign because such opposition did not exist in a mss form and did net have any real presence outside the revolutionary vancuerd itsclf. The mss of the anti-unio ist w workin: cless nad not understood what the Assembly represented ex its place in the repressive structure, not becunse the propaganda of the revolutionary -roups had been inevequate; but becuase it had not learnt of its choracter throwh their actual] conorete experience. PD. he le the mistake of identifyine the consciousness ef the vanguard with that of the miss of the workin: class, a mistake, whivh, if FTepeited, could only contribute “ the further isolation of the yangierd, Provisional Sinn kein also failed to offer-a realistic alternative. to the -@lections and so no attempt was made to give a revolutionary dynamic to the boycott, The abstract slogans put forward - to contime the resistance strug, le couched in terns which did not ever ¢-neretise this to the extent of supporting moss proteat jas doomed to failure at any time but meas upsurge.

The RUG, which at that tive had itself not fully comprehended the character of (the downtuen, attempted to give the boycott some revolutionary meaning - to relete it +9 tne needs and consciousness of the mss of the working class, The only possibility for an active boyeott wis to counterpose the working class structures of organisation, such as were still in the recent memories of the anti-unionist work- )ang class; for the construction and reconstruction of strect and area committees for

ll eeSeee 44 the organiention of defence SQ2inst reartionsry Assasinetion squids and the harassment of the tritish urny and for the coordinition of the miss resistance coupsign. Thus a way forward and a method of strus le, cleorly linked to the needs of the sorkin., Glas: wis «ut for: +d.

In presentiny this boycott policy the iG strencthened its position within the revolutionary van.uard in the orth, Despite the call for non-porticipation, Imperinliam wis able to form the Assemoly., It was neither prevebted from doim: so, nor was the Assenbly significantly wealened. Neither ws The mse moverent stren-thened, rather it had been we.ke ed by the revol tiomry groups' inability to relate to the comacious needs of the workin; class. Imperinlisn we able, almost unapposed to stren,then its hola on tho more backward elements, PD and Sinn Fein could not meet the challenye they had set themselves and Were not able to promote a boycott to further the strug le, ut while the boycottists failed tc Stren then the anti-imperialist strug cle, their position wis qualitatively superior to that of anti-imperialists who took part in the election. This was solely hecause this purticipation was nt. carried out on a revolutiomery basta, The Republican Clubs did not plece opposition te the S3enky om the mor issues of repression at the hend of their campeicn, Prticipstion in eleetic is for revolutiomrics an auxilinry to the min extra-parlivsentary strucsls This participation mist be used to buila the mss movement, and in this ease to stren-then the on-oinge ainti-imserialist strug; de, Tut there wis no atte pt to do this, From the first mistake of droppin-election participation to the level of an abstraction by not Linking 14% te extra-jarlicnentery aaitation, the Republican Clubs went on to repeat their tistekes of the Free Sinte General Election by participation uolely on the terme leid down by the ruling class, Thus, at the local vivernuent elections the Remblican Clubs accepted the definition of local wovernmont Isid dow by Imperialisn, Agitation was lirtited to the dust-bin level. of the petit-bourresis local politicians and thus appeared qualitiatively little different from the policy of many other non-workins class candidates, The Republican Clivbs called for more facilities ina similis minner to the other eindidates, while mekin. oceasional reference to the Workers’ Republic - but entirely failing to relute the two and this xploin how the social and eeonomic probleme could recliy be solved.

Imperialism wis creatin, a structure of leeal government with jurisdiction over only sewerage and reerention and the Republicen Clubs did not coherently step outside this to present 2 real siternative = to call for the Penlacg— ment of this by a it re dewooratic system, by 2 syster: whieh could out increased power into the hands of the workin. «ln = be iy

15 The aasembly elections of the followin: tenth were similsrly approzched, The Rerublican Clubs did not pose a clear revolutionary alternitive to the pro-imperialists, This could hwve been achieved on the basis of opnosition to imperialésm on the issues which dominated the oprression cf the working class - the repression of the Uritish aruy and the whole mechirery of repression, internment and the political prisoners.

igain, the Republican Clibs projecendised almost solely arcund extremely limited socinl and economic deiends,. This wis the expression of the false concretisetion of the desire to relate to the consciousness of the most backward elements of the werling class. in 11 point "Programme of Action" was put forwird which covered a number of issues, housing, education, social security benefits, wage restrictions, hoalth charses, industrial training, prices, speculative investment ond nationslisation.

It was a progremme which micht have been taken directly from a socialdemocrat group in titain .or Almost any imperinlist couctry ct a time of stability - it tosk no account of the actual political situation in the Horth of Trelind, euch a programme could have been utilised to back up other demands directly related to the immediate needs aid consciousness of the werking clasa, the dominating concern of the working class - interrment, repression, ond drawing them into a camprign of opposition to the Assembly.

The SDLP wie the only credible group from the snti-unionist popul-tion which stated its opiosition to internment and British Army harcesment Wasa central plank of its cnngeien. Thus, the failure of the Republican Clubs to push these questions left them easily outflanked by the reformists. The SDLP were able to draw to their fleg all the less politically conscious layers of the working class,junchallenged by aiti-inperialists. und by the very niture- of the dew nds put formrd, the Repmblican Clubs could not relite their projramme to the actusl on-going extra-parliament= ary strug.le agninst repression -nd British Imperialism. Thus they failed te contribute to the struggle of the working eclnas or te the development of the class-consciousness of the more. bechword elements, 1974 GHA REUCTION-— the ebb deepens The British General Election of February underlined the continuing inability of the Irish revolution ry movement to cope with the cobb of stru; le or to prosp the poteiiti-l of electoral porticipotion, Clearly, for iarxists, there was no perspective for boycotting the 1974 General slection - participation to 7id the rebuilding of the mss movement wis the only conerent policy. Any :cssible basis for boycott had been broken by the continiing ebb and demobilisation of the mss movement. The boycott tactic had “lost its revolutionsry meaning".

The BMG, not fielding its own candidates, adcpted a position of support for ali anti-imperialist candidates, Thia was based. on. the principle that supsert should be determined ty the class composition of organisations standing, Thus support should be piven to eetablished tendencies within the worsing class meve ent although they roy not necessarily have broken from class collaboration - but that they nevertheless represent 2 counterposition to rulang class parties; that it would therefore he a class vote. The RWG expressed its support for all anti-imperialiet candidates; McAliskey, McManus and Republican Clubs, and mounted a campnign in support of Albert Price in West Belfast. Price was an independe™tcandidate standing on a limited canpeizn ticket - free the political hoatages, repatriate the Winchester hunger strikers, then a key agitational issue. The RIG had originally called for the anti-imperialist orgenisations to unite behind common candidates campaigning on 2 basic anti-repression platform.

With the failure of the groups to resp ond te this, support for 211 anti-imperialiats became the central thrust, with particular emphasis on Albert Price = candidate unaligned to any of the organisations but who, as father of the hunger striking Price sisters, could have been a focus of a general anti-repression canpeim around the election. Unfortunately, the failure of other anti-itmerialiat rroupes to support Price acted against this.

Again, the opportunity to strengthen the mass movement and the strug:le in ceneral Was missed in the election.

The Republican Clubs participated on a set of anti-imperialist demends against Surmingdale, against interament and British Army herrassement end calling for the withdrawal of the British troops, an ammesaty for ali political prisoners and for the "re-conquest of Ireland, the full ownership of Ireland by the people who make [reland - the Irish working clase".

But while these in themselves represented an advance from the Clubs' position in the assembly elections, limited to an economic and social prorrannre, they remained demands on election leaflets, and not on the strests. There was no perspective of linking the denanis to a mass movement on the streate and transforming them into a concrete way forward for the strugele. It is thia factor i i i i

i7 whieh determines the revolutionsry content of en election gampiion: the mobilisation of the worlcing cinss around those derands.

Sinn Fein (Kevin Street) characterised the election 2s an “irrelevint distraction" in their press statements. Sinn Fain appreciated that the election had been called by British Prire Minister Heath in an eitert ta strengtnen the Tories against the British working class. From this they ignored. the possibilities the election offered to reyolution:ries in the North of Ireland from the conclusion that it releted solely to "Enplish intersets" and thet it would rot deal with intercmert, the “Snohester huiyur esrikere of the political hostages. And rithout the participstion of anti-impericlists to bring tuese issues into the electoral arena, this was the case. The duty of revolutionaries is to use such op ortunities to bring issues of repression +o the forefront of the detcte and in deing so not only force other groups into stating their position = EMbarraes ne questions at that stage of the Lssenbly and Sumpincdale, both being in unstable eabryonic stages - but would hove goined further aunpert for the anti-iwperialists from those who enre about such issues, the antiunionist woreing clses, Thus 5 initiative would have been taven to tring disorientated elements within the worting cluss back inte the atru,cle - to educate the more bckward clenente upon which the SDLP and the imperialists have beet. able to thrive ond to attack the reformists’ hase of suport. ‘he Ginn Wein decision to ignore the elections wes iced atronely in Belfast und passed with « gm:1l mijozvity in Derry. It was not 2 clear ent decision, os the Isc« cf howopeneity within the oriisvtion dictates.

The reforsist elemets within Sinn Fein will be supportin:, particination in future elections, b.t not on +he besie of it backing up extro-p7rlisment— ary struggle, rather that it should be 2 centre focus of Sinn Fein activity.

Me recent le:zslisin; of Sinn Fein will aid these trends.

The socialists within the rcoke of Simm Fein and those outeide atbenpting to influence sections oft the orecniesation are correctly wary of fostering the -poxrLinwentery pretunsions of these olements, bat this ust not vind earot be done by eounterposing a blarket policy of boycott.

The only couerent socizlist ompesition to this tendency can be on the sis of & principled revolutionary 2 Eroach te elections, Thus to participate on i revolutionary basis is the very oposite of compromise with refornism or opening 2a opoortunity for 455+ tendency. It is te denonstrate in action thet socinlists, and only sociulists, have © coherent strates, of strugrle and that socialists c:n utilise effectively all forms of etrugzle and ean offer « wey forward for the working clase ond evolve tactics for the current ebb of struggle - thus outflanking the reforiists on 3 nrincipled revelutionary socialist Pasis. Hevolutionzry socialists, $i guat be stated again, sarticipste in elections to abrengtuen the mse wovyeuent «nd the consciousness of the mas of the woring clases for not to do sd when there is no vinble alternative by qaich tiis cin more effectively carried out will allow anti-revohitionsry elements to eopsdlidate their position and will detract from the mas movement .and the development of the stiru:gle for freedom.

48 he = : ee " = i z = eed An Paobiseht (8/3/74) is weenie 2. wy fer fatire Sinn Fein election in every street, snd. that the polities: possililitics of the present situation be anlysed, cxplowed, debuted, understood nnd exploited so tint, if necessary, the purty may be ready ta. uit forward candi dates for the next genexal election, expected before the summer". The artic e closos, “The Tiititary vevolt ogainst Liperinlisu, of course, must cont nue unbaited".

The srticle faile to stress the importance 6f activity by bhe res of the worukng class and raises the spectre of increasing elitism by the orginisation. liass.struggle not complemented, augmented anc strnethened by the military campaign, as wae the case during the upsure + up to 1972, but replaced by the military cauprig¢n iscloted from the mss cf the working Class, .nd there is « denger that electorsl tarticioation, u-winked to MlS8 activity, will centribute to + is elitisn, The basis of purticipetion is left largely Weloeifica but for one cantenee: thst the existing notiomlist PSOunSs at westminster, Plaid (1 vu ord the Beottish iImtionalists could be pursunded through the Geltic I iseue to give a Westminster voice to the Troops Out Movement. This 7 2sition of using elections, and even participation in porliament, to st. engthen the Miss movement mist be extended to 11 possible future Sinn fain porticip lien and to give it 2 revelutionsry role, directly lirk te agitation on the streets spninst imperialisn, the Pecple's Democracy agnin called for a boyeott on the sloman "i imit - Dontt Yote, In explaniny their position, some conrused thinking wes sown: "Those who favour abstention or = vote of disappmovel are only fool ce the people. What they are doing is asking people to take tert in the imperialist political machire to nrotest at an institution imposed by thst machine. This attitude gives credibility to the whole impericlis: relationship between Ireland and Britain"s But it is ne ¢onteadiction for Marxiste to participate in elections on the bisis ef ognosition to the ruling cliss structure, Rather, when the overwhelming balk of the anti-unionist workiug class is voting in 2nd has ite attention feeusscd On elections then it is the duty of Mearyists to step inte the dzeeiisnt of the election tamp.ign and to use it. The nlternative, im ait but tines of the most dynemic unsuree when the mass of tha fartine cias= has Pejected parliamentarianism, is to geshire inpotentiy Teom the side-Hines 2ndto tise an opsortunity for reaching présier Glements oi the working ¢inas. Nand wcegardiess of any protests made by voting for crti—Somingdile cumlidates, the Assembly will still exist after the General Ptection on ¥eb 28", the article continued, But neither perticipation nor boeyestt could bring the .ssembly crashing down. as the article foes en to state, this cold only be déne throush tase mobiltsations on the streets. “o how can this mobiliaction, the "street power” be *Unfree Citizen, Vol. 3 No. 19, Feb 18, 1974 - "Fight -— Don't Vote".

19 regenexated? 1 boycott could not and did not mobilise any sections ot ‘the working class but an active eampaign behind anti-imerialist candidates coulda huve given the miss movement a boost of morale and mach necded impetus. The FL article posed the question incorrectly - neither tactic could imediately smash the Assembly, the re2l question was how the mas resistance could be vided, its rebuilding fostered.

Tha anewer was, by aidtation in all areas, includine the elections against imperialism, its repression ond explaining ite rele and how it could be overcome. Sut a confusion cs to the relitionship between these different forms of agitation was present. annlysing 3's 1969 election perticipation, the arti@le atetes, “kistory has proved us right - for the decision to field candidates in that election and the large number of yotes east for PD brought on the downfall of Stormont its@lf, ns it was desisned to do". Yet a few lines lcter it continued, "The old Stormont was not brought crashing down by hallot boxes, but by street power", Participation in slections ig a method of strugsle, of building the comtivity of the woricdin’, class in the stre:ts, te be applied when it is an effentive wey of educatiry the working classi ng5 waa the case in Horch 1974. Participation was not 2 "held atep" as the article suggested, bat an attempt ‘eanlting from an aeses— suent of the consciousness of not just the vinguard but of the breed mes of the workings ¢liass, to bring the struccle a step forward and to counter the ebb. and it- is in such a period of ebb in strug#le, when the militency of tino worxiny class has passed its peck, thet abstract slowans euch as "Picht - Don't Vote" lose any pevolutior-ry meaning with the finding of little sesponse within thy working clase, and to con'riimte to the yroces of the jsoiction of the vanguard from the working class mse.

Opposition te, perticipation in westminster elections on the principle thet "those whe call om p ople to yote in representatives to the British Parliament are “Skint people to vote for their own opnression ani for the cintinuance of British pile im Ireland" ie to dona woraliatic straight-jactet alien to Morxism, Inflexibility on such «= baaie of tactics we eyourmeterised by Lenin ve "like mking n difficult uscent of an unexplore’l and hitherto inscecessible mountain aaa refusing in sdvance ever to move in gigc-zags, ever to retrace ones steps, or ever to abandon a course once selected ant to try others", fLeft-/ing Comunism), Such inflexibility will do nothing to enhance the reputation of socinlists within the working clese.

Heins outflanked and made ir elevint throuch inflexibility will not gain credibility - this will be achievel by a readiness to utilise all srems of stryyj.le .4 te proville na coherent stratesy for the downturns: of struc le - jownturns which are the expressions of (OBS consciousness.

20 alzhenitsyn \ ( This is an extract from an article first published in Intercontinental Press in March this year.)

The London Sunday Times of March 3rd published a translation of the full text of a 15,000-word letter from Alexsandr Solzhenitsyn to the leaders of the Soviet government. Dated September 5 L973, less than two months before the publication in the West of Solhenitsyn's ' The Gulag archipelago, the letter ranges over wide areas of Soviet life and gZovernment policy, as the introductory note by the Sunday Times editors indicated: "eee Solzhenitsyn denounces the Cardinal folly of pursuing an expansionist foreign poliey when there is nothing to fear from Europe and America. He calls for an accommodation with China. He deplores the mindless policy of economic growth which has despoiled the beauty of Russia's cities and ruined the beauty of her countryside. He reiterates that the real wealth of Hyssia lies in her own soil. He pours scorn on the dead creed of Marxism. He claims that the Russians drink far too much vodka. He advocates the end of national service and Says promotion should not depend on party membership. He pleads for kindness from Russia's ruiers and peace for its citizens". Solzhenitsyn's letter does in fact range over all these areas and more. Its overall impact import however, can be summarized fairly briefly. In the letter Solzhenitsyn annopnees his rejection of Marxism and proposes to substitute for it a religious, Great Russian nationalism based on a return to 4 POGanticized vision of ninteenth century Russian peasant economy. This reactionary utopian visirn is mixed in 3 contradictory jumble with occasional proposals that in their own right are progressive and deserving of support. REDREAT INTO THE PAs? Addressing the Kremlin, Solzhenitsyn states that the purpose of his letter is " to sugsest to you what is, for the moment at least, still a timely way out of the chief dangers facing our country in the next ten to thirty years.

"These dangers are iwar with China, and our destruction together with Wes*ern civilisation in the crush and stench of a feuled earth".

27 Solzhenitsyn deseribes the Soviet bureaucrats whom he addresses as "total realists", and he therefore presents practical arguments against war with China: "Dont reckon on any triumphant blitzkrieg. You will have against you a country of almost a THOUSAND MILLION people, the like of which has never yet gone to war in the history of the world.... Its army and population will not surrender en masse with Western good sense, even when surrounded and beaten. Every soldier and every civilian will fight to the last bullet, the last breath...

You will not of course, be the the first to use nuclear weapons that would do irreparable damage to your reputation, which you cannot disregard, and anyway froma practical point of view still wouldn't bring you a quick victorye...

TA conventional war, on the other hand, would be the longest and bloodiest of all the wars mankind has ever fought, Like the Vietnam War at the very least (to which it will be similar in many ways) it will certainly last a minimum of ten to fifteen Years« ooo If Russia lost up to one and 4 half million people in. the First World War and (according to Khrushchev's figures) 20 million in the Second, then war with China is bound to cost us 60 million souls at the yery Leastsee.." (Here, and below, emphasis is in the original.)

No defender of the Soviet Union and socialism can take isste with the fact that a war between the two workers states would be a monstrous and criminal folly. It is ironic, however, that Solzhenitsyn bases his argument on “Russian national interest" when it is precisely the two bureaucracies' defense of narrowly interpreted "national interest" = identified with their own caste interests < that has brought them to their present state of mutual hostility.

Solzhenitsyn cites two factors that he considers responsible for the threat of war between the Soviet Union and China. One is the competition between the two bureaucracies to pose as the true defenders of "Marxism-Leninism", The second shows how far the novelist has gone in embracing reactionary notions; he cites " the dynamic pressure of a Chine 1,000 million strong on our as yet unexploited Siberian lands." Solzhenitsyn thus puts himself in the camp of the racists who. attempt to drum up fears of a "yellow peril".

There are elements of Solzhenitsyn's letter besides the warning to avoid a Sino-Soviet war that deserve at least a qualified endorsement. Certainly it is possible to share his disgust with destruction of the environment by carelessly planned industrial projects, even though his explanation of its causes and his proposed remedies are worse than useless.

Solzhenitsyn also calls for an end to Russian control over the workers states of Eastern Europe and over national minorities in the Soviet Union. He urges the Soviet leaders " sooner or later

22 to withdraw our protective surveillance of Hastern Surope. Nor can there be any question of any peripheral nation being foreibly kept within the bounds of our country."

(The March 3 New York Times translated what would appear to be the same passage 4s Foliows:"...our trusteeship from sastern Byrope, th Baltic Republics, Transcaucasia, Central Asia and possibly even from parts of the present Ukraineges«.") However, here too Solzhenitsyn motivates his proposal by a suppoaed Russian national interest that in this case is described as switching attention away from distant continents - and even away from Europe and the South of our country". In order to make Siberia " the centre of national activity and settlement and a focus for the aspirations of young people." Solghenitsyn's proposals are all based on a viewpoint that bears little or no relation to reality. He asserts for example, that neither European nor U.S. imperialism represent any threat to the Soviet Union. In fact, he seems to regard U.S. imperialism ( Solzhenicsyn does not call it that) as a beneficent force: He does not criticize the United States for its agsression in Indochina; but seems to dispararvs the " internal dissension and spiritual waekness" that kept it from winning the Vietnam war ! 4nd he eriticizes past Soviet leadership for having pred Mao Tse-tung in place of a peaceable neighbor such as Chiang Kai-shek".

Solzhenitsyn's proposal to isolate Russia from the rest of the world sets the stage for an impossible retreat into a romanticised past. His proposals that the Russian economy be reconstructed on a primitive acricultural basis: 'The construction of more than halt of our state in 4 fresh new place (Siberia) will enable us to avoid repeating the disastrous errors of the twentieth century ~ industry, Toads and cities for example."

Solzhenitsyn justifies his argument for a "zero growth" economy by combining 4 glorification of peasant backwardness with neo- Malthusian worries about overpopulation. ae eee v.

nS a our progressive publicists were, oth be 2 “ae pevolasucn of yidiculing those eee age were 4 in FR i 2 people wno Ce s ways 3a man of them 10 Russia }: peop+ : fe ot have pity on our past, even sen che On ee aiue forsaizen hamlet with a couple of hovels, even on Rea nn alongside the railway track; who called upon vt fa) eee La norses even after the advent of os ses ret heer ee ts and combines, = ‘ factories for enormous plan : : eo oe i 1 fertilisers, not to mass OY.

manure in favour of chemica ° Ao rotner in jlliocn i ities, not to clamber on bop e miLLLOn rey blocks. Haw they laughed, how they tormented eee eos: ee cnary Icjavophiles' eee They hounded the men wi? oe a ree perfectly feasible for 4 colossus Like Hose tes ie mr spiritual peculiarities and folk traditions; uo *

23 = nld not be that the whole of mankind should follow a single, absolutely identical pattern of development.

PNo, we had to be dragged along the whole of the Western bourgeoisindustrial and Marxist path in order to discover, at the end of the Syentieth century, and again from progressive Western scholars, what many village greyueard in the Ukraine or Russia has had understood Pom time immemorial and could have explained to the progressive sommentators ages ago, had the commentators ever found the time gn that dizzy fever of theirs to consult him: that a dozen maggots Ban't go on gnawing the same apple forever, that if the earth is a finite Gbicct, thenits expanses and resources are finite also, and the mdlass, infinite progress dinned into our heads by the dreamers > the Enlightenment cannot be accomplished on ite...”

ticular path; and that it co

BROM STALIN TO SOLZHENTITSEN, |

Solzhenitsyn's vision of a utopia of peasant hovels and mud roads is mot likely to win much of a following either inside or outside the Boviet Union. Despite the letter's protestations to the contrary, it Beems very improbable that Solzhenitsyn expected the Soviet leaders fo give his suggestions serious consideratione that although political themes are Tt needs to be kept in mind but Smportant in his novels Solzhenitsyn is not a politician Man artist. And while both the Soviet bureaucrats and the Heapitalist press, each for their own reasons, will attempt to portray "him as a representative of the Soviet dissident movement, that movement in fact encompasses a broad range of views from the reactionary nonsense of Salzhenitsyn's letter to demands for a return to the norms of Leninism, advanced by such figures as Pyotr “Grigorenko. The differing views of the various dissident currents do share 2 common origin, however. This is the reaction against the abominations of Stalinist rule. Solzhenitsyn considered himself a Marxist before he was arrested for the "crime" of criticizing Stalin ina letter. His present views were not adpoted under the influ ence of capitalist propaganda: They were taught to him by the ‘Hureaucrats who herded millions of Soviet citizens into eoncentratdon camps, who crush with arms any movment for socialist democracy in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union, who live lives of luxury rivaling that of capitalist plutocrats while mismanaging the Soviet economy. eaactLlonary positions are borrowed bureaucrats themselves. His fied with an appeal to Stalin him- 1 43 the term Solzhenitsyn Some of Solzhenitsyn's most Tr more or less directly from the Sliavophilism, for example, is justi self, as in the following nassage(" ideology uses for Marxism): Mhen war began with Hitler, Stalin, who had omitted and bumgled

24 so much in the way of military preparation, did not neglect that side, the ideological side. And although the ideological grounds fort hat war seemed more indisputable than those that face you now (the war was waged against what appeared on the surface to be a diametrically opposed ideology), from the very first days of the y Stalin refued refused to rely on the putrid, decaying prop of ideology. He wisely discarded it, all but ceased to mention it and unfurled instead the old Russian banner - sometimes indeed, the s ard of Orthodoxy - and we conquered ! ( Only towards the end of tt and after the victory was the Progressive Doctrine taken ont of its mothballs)", There is still another way in which the bureaucrats caste has contributed directly to the develepment of the sort of views expre in Solzhenitsyn's letter. Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov describ this contribution in another context, explaining why many of the dissidents seem unwilling to take stands on events outside the Soviet Union. His explanation, which was translated in the March 5 New York Times, referred to " the Western liberal intelligentsia" that expects the dissident movement to reciprocate its interest in Soviet affairs: " These people lomk to Soviet dissenters for a reciprocal, analogous international position with respect to other countries.

But there are several important circumstances they do not take int account: the lack of information; the fact that a Soviet dissen is not only unable to go to other countries, but is deprived, with his own country, of the majority of sources of information; that t historical experience of our country has weaned us away from exces 'leftism', so that we evaluate many facts differently from the'lef intelligentsia of the West; that we must avoid political pronouncements in the international arena where we are so ignorant (after all we do not engage in political activity even in our own country); that we must avoid getting into the channel of soviet epaganda, which so often deceives us."

The enforced isolation described by Sakharov does more than aaa actual and potential opponents of bureaucratic rule of reliable | information on which to base their political judgments from | being tested in practice. In this artificial atmosphere, reasonabi and irrational ideas can and do exist side by side.

If there were free public discussions of political issues in & soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn's proposals to replace motor transport with horses, andMarxism with religion, could only provoke laughter and little else. The absence of such a competition of ideas grants them a life they would not otherwise have,

25 . : ey CROLLY AND TEE RUVODITIONARY PARTY ; ITT THe SECOND INTERNATIONAL - In the first two articles of ‘the series (M.R. Nos 3 & 4), James Connolly's attitude to the concent of the revolutionary party - the Marxist system of political organisation - were considered, In the first article his final soncept of osganisation was compared with that of the Bolsheviks. In the second article the relationship of his. concepts to his practice in the Sirugeic agains, tis imperialist war was considered, Wow it is necessary to consider the circumstances in which his views developed, The relation— ship of Connolly's ideas to their time, will be discussed in this and the Mext tyvo articles. aoe SECOND INTERVATIONAT, That the objective conditions existed in 1896 for the Irish Workers!

political backwardness has been stated before now. It was a product of she overall economic backwardness in the context of an uneven world-wide spread — qualitative and quantitative - of Marxism. ‘The relations between the classes were undeveloped due to the failure of the industrial revolu— tion (outside Belfast where the same result was caused by the sectarian ‘Sivision within the labour force itself). The unskilled workers had yet #0 establish a permanent form of industrial organisation — let alone 2 Political vanguard. The skilled workers were inevitably inclined to ‘Petty bourgeois radicalism, which in the colonial conditions of Ireland, fended at its most radical to take the form of an extreme and uncomprom s— “2m¢ form of nationalism — Republicanism, Most of the larger capitalists ‘fere Unicnists - supporters of the colonial 1i with Eritain: the emalier “Omes (including the newly, anf potentially liberated peasants) supported the sompromising form of Irish Nationalism — Home Rule, When the influence of e Cathotic Church is added to all this, it is clear that the struggle the Irish Workers' Republic, seventy years azo, even more than @oday, Wes based in objective circumstances that resembled more those affecting oehe workers of the underdeveloped third of the world than those of the i but well-organised workers of Tsarist Russia, _ + Seis was the Irish situation in 1896. However it would be incorrect to Bey that it was the sole influence on the man who came in this year to “Belp found the Irish Socialist Republican Party, James Connolly sained = reputation as an organiser in this time, he would not have been chosen may the Dublin Socialist Club to organise for it, He knew already most ) of the leading figurea of the British Iabour Movement. His development “2s probably not helped by having them centred mainly on Edinburgh — a Beeity that had most of the defects of Dublin and some of Belfast, but which "ad few of the objective strengths of either, However, Edinburgh was @erely one centre for Socialist action within a broad movement — both Mmational and international, The weakness of the British Latour Movement Mas mentioned in the first article of this series, I+ is enough, here, ) te recall that it has been based on an almost opposite condition ta the Weelmers of its Irish comrades, In the latter case, the weakness came trom retarded economic development: in the cese of the British working Glass, it arose from the fact that its industrial base was the oldest in she world and provided the resources for its capitalists to buy of? large Mayers of its proletariat -— first sut of its monopoly and then out cof its moionial super—prorfites,

—S—— =. 2¢t Accordingly, its greatest theoreticians - Connolly and John Maclean — had to fight it with little support from within.

Here it may be merely noted that the debility ef both the British and the Irish working class movements was not eliminated by the International organisation to which the Parties that composed them were affiliated.

Though Connolly never attended a conference of this body, he could eventually read three languages besides his own and follew ita debates. His politics and his choices therein cannot be understood without reference to this body (though the attempt to do so has been made all too often), It is well to consider at length. For most of Connolly's political career - indeed until it broke up inte opposing national sections under pressure of the imperialist war — the bus of the working class movement was organised in the Second Interrational.

As its name implies this body was a reereation of the International Vorking Mensa' Association (the First International) that Marx, Tnzels and Balemin had dominated in the 1860's and which had Irish branches in Dublin, Selfast and Cork, The First International had lasted formally 12 years (1864-1876) though it was, in fact, wrecked well within thet time. The causes for its collapae’ © were the political division that developed within it between ths “azxists the Ultra-left (Anarchist under Bakunin) and the Iabour Opporturicts.

of the main differences was on the issue of the state. Eakunin urged workers should establish their society wherever they could regarcicss capitalist states ruling the countries concerned. On the ome hand, th strategy led to premature and isolated risings, as in Spain im 1572. On ; the other hand, it previded an excuse for a lack of organisation cr plamning of the class war beyond a very simple “cloak and dagger" practic: of secret societies and assassinations. The political strusgle was regearced as an =" irrelevant diversion as was the development of any disciplimed political force to fight that struggle. On all these matters, Bakunin foung ‘himself opposed by Marx and mgels; on his organisational and strategig - if not his basic -— assumptions he found himself in alliance with the Onperaunists, a who wanted a non-political confederated, international that would eilew them to act politically as followers of their local bourgeois politicians. In ~‘. ,”% the disputes following this the International suceumber. : Ons nat the f dhe: Fa] ba el a ef In 1889, after Marx's death, it was revived again. but based, no'v on a mumber of homogeneous Marxist groups and parties, the largest being the German Social Democratic Farty. The Anarchists were exclined from afriiiation.

The Opportunists of the style of the First International did not want to join anyway, preferring to act politically through their bouregois parties.

The new International was not quite as revolutionary as it appeared, [tf ai affiliates paid lin-service tc Marx — more or lesa yet they were all es subject to internal pressures, that wealened their sractice of what they 4 -* preached, In Britain, where even then the working class included over half. -.~ the population , the effects of industrial monopoly prevented that class + from developing a mass Marxist Party in a ratio to its size, It as then > the German Social Democratic Party that became the leading affiliate Of) .the Second International but it, too developed internal problems. §, - ="

‘Until 1890, the German Social Democrats arew in strength despite Pepressive fnti-Socialist laws, Im this year, the laws were fenealed, pertly because they weren't working, partly because the new Kaiser wanted to get cheap popularity, Tho Social Democrats were enabled to operate Ddesgeliy and they used the opportunity. By 1914 they were the largest | Simgie party in Germany, Their organisation was praised by their comrades i in other lands trying to create something similar, One such admirer was young V.i, Lenin in his pamphict, Yhat Is To Be Done, Another, despite His eventual disagreement with its form was James Connolly.

a » it is, of course, history that what Lenin created was a revolutionary | party whereas his chosen model failed the test for such a body. ‘The =) feason for this was simple, ‘The German Social Democrat that had withstood ) @epnificicntly the persecution of the 1880s were weakened from within by _ the casy successes of the later years. ‘The party developed a paid burcaw- | -@racy to run itself and its many daily papers. Members of this became / increasingly conservative, reluctant to give the order to overtum the )) State thet had, after all, allowed them to earn their money, pathetically / ready to believe that the said state could be changed peaceably.

This tendency began to appear withon one year of the repeal of the Anti- ))Secialist leavs. Im 1891, the Party branches in the less developed southern “Sietes of Germany (where the organisation was relatively weak) insisted )em voting for the provincial budgets in their parliament. Until then, “he agreed policy of the Party had been expressed in the slogan "Not a man )@or a farthing for this system". The Party could not vote to maintain the Sfinances of the capitalist state. The south Germans pleaded that they had %o do so if they were not to weaken the relatively liberal state governments pewis a vie the conservatives. Despite protests from old Frederick mmgels ) am London, the Party accepted the argument that the “special circumstances” (of the south German situation necessitated a measure of collaboration with "the bouregois state governments there, | Three years later after Ingels' death and the final acceptance of the South German political uniqueness, the practice of the latter was given be theoretical umderpimning by Engels' ex-secretary, Edward Bernstein Gad lived in Imgiand for some years, While he was there he was influenced (greatly by the British Fabian Society —- at that time a propagendist circle ie the left of the Liberal Party. His relations with this body and his ow | impressionistic view of what was happening led him to advocate a broadly Pabian position in relation to the strategy of German Social Democracy, amstead of opposing the south German's policy, he urged that it be exvended to its logical conclusion: the Social Democrats should carry on their role as just another (i.e, bourgeois) party distinguishable from @he others only because it was more radical than them. They should work /is coalitions with the capitalists to administer their common state if pteede be. | This breach in Marx's teaching on the state had to be defended by further Sttack on Marxist teaching. Bernstein found himself denouncing this in " philosophy, history and economics. Instead of the unfolding of an inevitable historical process which climaxed in the Socialist revolution and the ending of canitalism Bernstein insisted that there was mither inevitability Hor necessity in this.

28 The workers were not getting more impoverished nor were large mumbers of the petty bourgeoisie joining their ranks. Revolution was, therefore, an irrelevance and an obstacle to Social Democracy's real duty: the struggle for piecemeal improvements in existing conditions. Instead of the dialectic forcing the socialist to choose constantly between "Socialism or Barbarism" Bernstein insisted that the socialist had complete freedom to act according to his conscience to alleviate the worst defects in society. Kant replaced Hegel for him. This was 2 clear "revision" of Marx and such it became known : "Revisionism", Bernstein's theory - already because of its Anglo-German development an international foree - became a problem for the Internationnl because of its practical expression. In 1899 the French Social Democrat Alexanber Millerand, did whet Bernstein had advocated and entered an anti-clerical government to defend civil liberties in general ( and the French victims of clerical reaction in particular), Millerand's choice and the fact that even a Revisionist could not get away from the dialectic was emphasised by the fact that one of his cabinet colleagues, General Gallifet, had earned notoriety as the mass murderer wno had suppresse d the Commine, which by the way, did not embarrass the more consistent and hardened Revisionists who tended inevitably to see only the Com«unards' blunders and not their revolutionary achievement, The south German leader, Georg Von Vollmer, summarised his views thereon: "Instead of seizing estate power, they would have done better to go to sleep".

At the 1900 conference of the International at Paris, Millerand was condemned.

He left working class politics altogether and ended his eareer when he had to resign as President of France because he was too far to the right for a new radical government. Bernstein was also formally isolated, and the south Germn strategy remiined limited to south Germany. Only in wealthy Gritain did the Fabian Society continue to play a big role in the growth of the Iebour Party.

Revisionism was in quarantine.

But it was quarantined and not liquidated. The bulk of the Intermetion:l's leaders were more than willing to leave it thus. The Russian Marxist, George Plekhanov urged on his Germ=n comrades a thorough theoretical struggle azainst Revisionism, but he was ignored. When Resa Luxembourg tried later to. carry the struggle for Marxism beyond the status quo of 1900 she found herself oppossed by the leading figures among her official anti-Hevisionist allies. The Millerand affair had already been decided by a motion that condemned iillerand on the. technical point of not getting his party's permission for his act rather than on the political isme involved.

It was in this way rather than in open acceptance of Revisionism that the short term practice of developing Social Demecratic Party bureaucracies wis expressed. In the long term, they would end openly in the Revisionist camp.

However, for the time being, they hoped that the revisionist case would, as it were, prove itself and prevent too decisive a breach with their parties’ left wings, such as those headed by Luxembourg ( in Germany and Poland ) and Jules Guese ( in France ), The bureaucrats' strategy was encapsulated by the advice that Bernstein claimed he was given by Igraz Aver, the Secretary of the German Social Democratic Party :

EY Tar C_ ses 26 "yy dear Ede, one does not formally make a decision to do the things you “sugfest, one doesn't say, such things, one simply does them".

This "Centrism" — so eslied as it took a position in the centre between Merxism and Revisionism — is more difficult to describe that either, precisely teceause it is an attempt to compromise between the two. The important points to remember are, firstly that it is a recurring political phenomenon im the international workine—class movement, and secondly, that is is essentially & tendency towards unprincipled compan ge between the two main competers, (MOne does not say, one simply does") Centrism under pretence of avoiding q sectarian approach towards "good people amongst the Revisionists surrenders to both the good amd the bad in those ianks far more than is consistent wit & principled position, in the Second International, the issue which first caused the Hevisionists 7o renege and on which the Centrists surrenderedttheir positions was that of the Marxist theory of the state. On the eve of the October Revolution of 1917, Vi benin distinguished the three trends in his State and Revolution.

"According to Marx, the state is an organ of class rule, an organ for the eppression of one class by another, it is the creation of ‘order’ which degalises and strengthens this oppression by moderating the conflict betyeen the classes. In the opinion of the petty—bourgeois politicians (including the Revisionists, D.R. O'C.L. ) order, means precisely the reconciliation of classes, and not the oppression of one class by another.; to moderate the conflict means reconciling classes and not depriving the oppressed classes of definite means and methods of struggte to overthrow the oppressors ...- "On the other hand, the 'Kautskyite’ (Centrist, D.R. O'C L see below) distortion of Marxism is far more subtle. ‘'Theoretically' it is not denied that the state is an organ of class rule, or that class antagoniszs are irreconcihable. Bot what is lost sight of or glossed over is that: if the state is the product of the irreconcilasility of class antagonisms, if 7+ is a power standing above society and increasingly alientating itself from it, then it is obvious that the liberetion of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power which- was created by the ruling class and which is the embodiment of this 'aliena&tion’ ... Marx very definitely drew this theoretically self-evident conclusion as a result of & concrete historical analysis of the tasks of the revolution, And .... it is precisely this conclusion which Zautsky ... has 'forgotten' and 'distorted!

V.I. Lenin, State and Revolution from The Essential Works of Marxisn, Hartam Books, New York 1965 pp 105-106, ‘ Karl Kautsky whose teaching Lenin denounced above, was the chief theoretician of the Centrism to which he supplied a left cover in his acknowledged capacity - after Friedrich Engels death as "Pope of Marxism" (Even the title betrays a cartain degeneration from Marxist principles. ) Of recent months there has been a certain new interest in Kautsky in some Irish left-wing circles and, with it, a certain feeling that his reputation has been unduly diminished as compared with that of his Russian contemporary, Elekhanov.

Certainly Kautsky, if not a revolutionary, did write useful works (most notably his Foundations of Christianity) during his "Papal" reign up to 1914.

However, after making ali allowances he is still a lesser figure that Plekhano in his prime. The Russian educated the vanguard of his country's working class laying the foundations for the achievements of Lenin, Trotsky, the Bolshevik Party: after this he lapsed into open revisionism - but his historic task was completed. Kautsxy could not claim such a result as Plekhanov's even if Plekhanov eventually disowned his child, Despite his undoubted intelli-' gence, there was always in Kautsky limitations which made it inevitable that he would lead the centrists rather than the revolutionaries. Engels summarised it well in a letter which is the more devasting for expressing the opinion of a personal friend and political ally:— "You have exactly hit off Kautsky's decisive wealmess. His youthful inclinaation towards hasty judeement has been still more intensified by the wretched method of teaching history in the wiversities especially the fustrian ones.

The students there are systematically taught to do historical work with materials, which they imow to be inadequate, but which they are supposed to treat as adequate that is to write things which they themselves must know to be false but which they are supposed to consider correct. That has naturally made Kautsky cocky, Then the literary life writing for pay and writing a lot so that he has absolutely no idea of whet really scientific work means, ‘There he has thoroughly burnt his fingers @ few times, with his bistory of population and later with the articles om marriage in primitive times. In all friendship I rubbed that well into him too, and spared him nothing in this respect: on this aide I criticise all his things mercilessly Fortunately,however, I can comfort “im with the fact that I did exactly the same in my impudent youth, and only first learnt the wey ome has got to work from Marx, It helps quite considerably, too — “Letter to 4ugust Libel, London, 29th July 1885(Present author's emphasis. ) Despite Engel's assistance Kautsky was never able to get beyomi a formal theo— retical correctness which was used only too easily to cower for the actual practice. ("One simply does them") of the Social Democratic bureaucracy.

An early glimpse of what centrisim was to mean in the Geman Social Democratic Party's Effort programme of 1891. This was the highest theoretical point reahed by the German Marxists during their E-cial Democratic period. It was regarded as the model programme for all affiliates of the Second International.

However, even in its time, it overlooked certain vital aspects. Im particular 41d Friedrich Engels remarked in his Critique of it, it glossed over the fact that Germany was a monarchy and a federation of monarchies — many of which were far from being restricted by their parliaments, Im short, the question of state power was ignored, as the R,visionists were beginning to distort it openly. Engels ascribed this vagueness to the fact that the Farty bureaueracy — newly liberated from the Anti Socialist laws — were enjoying their new freedom and its prospects too much to risk these perks by attacks on the German states, If this was the case (as seems probable), the bureaucrats were moved by their fear rather than by Engels analysis. The German Social Democratic Party remained vague on the question of the monarchy. This confusion was encouraged — and, in itself helped - the Revisionists to move to clarify it in the direction of acceptance of the bourgeois state.

Kauteky's peculiar qualities — his brilliant sloppiness — were such as to enable him to oppose the outright Hevisionists - but as defender and sustainer of the existing confusion: not of Marxism, He allowed Hernstein to write his articles in the main Farty daily, only attacking him when such youngsters as linemburg and Parvas had already moved, a NN EE EE es —-™ —_—_—_—— a a

3h He drafted the motion at the Paris Conference of the Second International by which Millerand was condemned for breach of discipline rather than for his political treachery, Perhaps least forgiveable was his attitude towards his patrons, Marx and Engels. Undoubtedly, it was difficult to publish everything that they had written. Nonetheless, Bernstein was given an immediate platform whereas such articles of immediate importance by the founder of Scientific Socialism, as Engels Critique of the Export Programme were kept suppressed for ten years. Other writings in a similar vein were left to the Third International to make available.

With Kautsky as its"Pope" it was inevitable that the Second International should have fallen into a schism along national lines on the outbreak of the First Yorld War. No doubt, his elevation to his exalted position could not have been achieved without objective factors working for him; the point is that these factors were much less than the needs cf the working class either in Germany or in the world at large. In the end, his dominance — despite all his works - was one that merely heightened the confusion. Ite real struggle for Marxist clarity was fought by Plekhanov at first and laxemburg and, jater by Frang Mehring, Lenin and Trotsky, So, in 1896, when Connolly began his Irish career, there were four tendencies or embryo tendencies in the Labour Movement of the world. Outside, the international there were the 4marchists with their strength centred mainly emong the workers of the less developed industrial countries (such as Spain, Italy and Switzerland), In the International were the Marxists on the one fend, the Revisionists on the other and, in between them, the shadowy Sentrists. In each case, the basic difference between the currents was that of their respective views towards the state. The Anarchists regarded the Bite 45 an ultimate source of oppression, perhaps, even exploitation, They ) urged, accordingly, that political action (that is theoretically action affecting directly the distribution of state power, though, in practice, tis definition remained remarkably difficult to operate) be renounced, fee opposed Marxiem from the Ultra—Left.

"The other Anti-Marxist currents developed within the reconstituted International | Within sections where there were large bureaucracies. These vested interested feared to risk their immediate needs by too resolute opposition to the central ‘Soercive organisation, and hoped toe gaon their ends by peaceful (and piecemeal ) feform without making trouble for themselves. To justify their needs for a | Gcapromise with the capitalist state they backed demands to drop Marxieam as being "obsolete" and “unjustified by results" (the Rorisichiste) or, more Weubtiy, paid lip service to it while ignoring it in practice (the Centrists).

- doubt, there were possibilities of Merxist theory being degenerated from | Sther incorrect conceptions. Anarchism had always ineluded many such (as on ) religion) at the same time as its politicio phobia. But the question of | te state drew its significance from the objective need of the Social | Bezocretic bureaucracies (or, particulary in Britein, the trade union | Baresucrscies ani labour aristorracy's) to conform to a system that did — @tisty enough of their needs to raise the odds against the profitability o risking its overthrow, | 1

32 Whether he liked it or not.Connolly was, in fact, bound to develop his strategy in relation to the divisions of the working class movement of his time. History has placed him in the revolutionary -— the Marxist camp -, However, his final failvre shows that his Marxism was considerably less advanced than that of his successful contemporary, V I Lenin, In Germany a Third Revolutionary Marxist, Rosa Luxemburg came te gricf - and with her went the hopes of prolitearian revolution in that country, for many years to come. In her case, the decisive failure was her inability to break in time with the Centrist RevEsionist majority of the Social Democratic Farty.

No dowbt, her error here was linked to her ultre leftiem on the national issue, and her mistakes on the question of Imperisliss, Nonetheless, it was specifically as an organiser that she fell.

CONNOLLY AND CENTRISM

James Connolly failed for the same cause, Fer less then Iuxemburg (who kmew the Bolshevik leader) was he able to benefit from ibe development and clarifications that Lenin and his party were malcing in Marxian, On many issues such as the nature of the state, of the nation, on the Merxist'’s attitude to religion and, above all, on the que::tion of political arganisation, Comolly's position owed more to the formal]i=m of Kautsky than to Lenin's revoluticnary perspective and iniistence on clarity of formulation.

It's worthwhile considering Connolly's wealmesses. wo of them -— his positi on religion and on the nation — have bcen escribed to his serrender to that truly esoteric phenomenon "Catholic Nationalism” — er. gore accurately, Irish Nationalism. In fact, though the objective conditions of Irish life were not ones from which there could easily develop a more sclentifie approach to these matters, Connolly's position on each of then was in tyme with most of the best thinking available to him witiin the Secoml International.

in his Critique of the Erfurt Frogremre in 1891, Beiedrich Engels made specifi insistence in favour of the demand for:-- "Complete seperation of church and state. All religious groups without | exception to be treated by the state as private sssociations, They are to lo all support from public funds and all influence on publie schools. (One cannt after all forbid them from founding their ovm schools out of their om resources and teaching their nonsense in them,)" Frie@rich Engels, Critique of the Erfurt Programme, British and Irish Commmist Organisation, Belfast This view was encapsulaled by the Social Democrats in their statement that "Religion is = private matter": that the state should not persecute religiou belie? but that it should not give it any aid at ali in the expansion thereof, let alone maintaining in existence laws against blasphemy, atheism, or antielerical propaganda, Since the German Social Democratic Party was a recognis Marxist organisation in 1891, it was assumed that anyone who joined it would be Marxist, i.e. a Dialectical Materialist, and, hence, an Atheist. It was then, not considered necessary to immediately urge a struggle against religion within the party itselr,

i of Lill \intek, coi i i ee ee See a —— 3% The immediate opposition to the H-rxi d irom positions even more obviously an r ous than that of Envels. The attitudes of =e msTk pense bs ai f the eetrly Revisionists on religion provite one wore es resting exemple of horultra leftism end reformism teud te find thetselves on the same side.

e to relicsion wes he .nerchist nosition wes Jeseribed oy Harz (letter to F Bolte, 23rd November 1871) 55 being ‘Atheism as a dogms dictated to members", This annarent likeness to the nosii ion 2s develoned by Lenin wes, in fect, very daflerent, since the Anarchists were not interested in organising = prover political party. (In practice whet it mesut was 2 egppe ea ur. anti-clerical propaganda Bnd, or occesions, “practical seitati n* such es the burning of ch urches. hough the Revisionist position wes not precticsally as Lerroristic as thet of the Anerchists, tt hed one decisive point in erreenent with theirs, Hoth canitulated shepreticaily to the anti-clerical propagenda distributed by one section of the contemporary Suronesn bourgecisie, The excnse used by Vollmar and the ssnth Geran Revisionists in 1699, by MSlierend, dean Jaevres end the Geltium Emile Vauderville in 1899-1900 for their co-operstion in bouryeois governments woe tie gute Ine ch cease: the nead to: supnert one section of the bourvecisie (the enti cl eet liberals) Pad mainst the other: the tectic of the “Zesier evil". (Lecter Con -oilyts osvuonent Jilliom cslker was 2 Bsamiiar teaticien,) Im fest of course, eventuelly the clericals did teke oower eve: without the sup ort of the Mevisioniste, the Litter's world G1 not cuvae to ‘an end, and eventucsliy, they ond their eirs would find ree, ons to werk wit the specter evil to oppose which had been the excuse for the original departure from Marxism.

is Connolly wes to discover in Americs, these two views on religion the ‘narchist end the Revisionist - were to merfe in views reanart an his origincl choice SF Sarty there - the Scctelist iabeur Porty Brod in the theory of its. ~ odins ié@eologist Uaniel be eons Connolly wee to lead the onnos sie on to this confusion.

bs & vonoliy's mistake then, was that of tie sainstre:m of what wes tuought to be warxism durin, the originel Second Interna) onal... Le hitself Wes, on his own sdoiasion to his friend M.theson (30th January 1908) en etheist. He never wavered from the Mrfurt position on seculor educstion, Inthe oriminel vroproemie of Ais Irish secielist Republican Porty, the teapnd for t is was the eighto of its 10 points, Twenty yeers leter, ne wes rees erting it in his Reconquest of Ireland, his was @ bosic stand in opposition to the thorght prevailing: in Irish Wetienelist cireles in his lifetime. (It should not be necesirry to os ert, et this soint, thet, though iilisn Connolly bore ter husband eight ciildren during their aerrissge, there is no evidence for saying thot he ee todoy be a supporter of the clerical refusal to #Llow ¢ontroeceptives to anyole, or even, fret he would ac eat the ridiculous Epes Sropose les En nreference to the Hobinson Bill.

of Christianity, but, or more precisely, the Party Secret- ries, Aver Connolly's overall politicsl1 view on religion was sunmitarised early in his career in his erticle "Socialism and Religion - the Rnown and the Unknowable", which appesred in his 1901 pamphlet, The New Evangel. hile he later developed his thesis - snd developed it brilliently -— he never deported quelitetively from the »osition eiven below:- "The Socialist Party of Ireland prohibits the discussion of theolofical or anti-theolozicel questions at its teetings, public or privete, This in in conformity with the vrectice of the chief Socialist parties of the world, which hsve frequentiy, in Germany for exemple, declared religion to be a »rivate Satter, end os it is held and worled for by sn increasing number of enthusinstic adherents | throughout the civilised world, pee en essentiaily meteriel, asterof-fact foundstion, We do not mean that itssupperters are necessaril motverialistic in the vulgar, sue merely enti-theoelo-icel sense ef the teru, but taoet they do not base their socisiaem toon 2:7 interpretation of the lanjuaze or mesning of Jerigture, mer upon ve real or supposed intentions of = beneficient Deity. Tay as @ party neither offirm or deny these things, But Peave it ." the dadiviaued conscience of each member to determine whet belicts on such questions they shall hold. As e politiesi perty t cy wisely prefer to teke their stand upon the sctusi phenomen: of social life as they can be observed in operation encougst us Eotey ae as they can be treced in the recorded fects cf histery". 7 niet iiope = The End and the leans and the New Dvangel, New Park Public. ie Ong, Dublin, 1966, te “Ded Such s policy in the politically under-developed Irish worting cless movement woes not precticaliy caleulsted to build 9 larxist Tenguerd therein, But there is « further point. Connolly wes onl; steting what beceme in fact the policy of the Germgn Socisl Denocvetic rerty leadership. Relizion becene a “private matter” for members of what Was supposed to be the leading Merxist orgonisetion in the world.

Ksuteky contented himself with writing an exposure of fhe foundations end Friedrick Ebert, allowed into the Party many who bed on oltogethe differznt view on the subject, witout eny attempt being mede to explain matters, to them. In Germany t is wes Gersly pert of the overall dezeuerstion of Socisl Dewocrecy. In Ireland, it wos of initial importance in the aborting of a strong Merxist tredition.

It wes left to Russia where there wes o strong petive ond conscious industrial working class to provide the environment in whisk in 1909 Lenin could develop primer bosis for lerxist thinkin on the relizious question. (Five years before, the American, Frank Janke had decisred o similar poet ton in the original Connolly-D: icon polemic - but he was just e member of a smell Farty stout to decline. |] “Sociel Democrets_regerd religion as a private met"“er in relation to the state, but not in relation to themselves, not in re.7bion to Marxism, ond not in relation to the workers’ Ferty? - ‘he attitudt of Workers' Party Towords Religion" — Mors—uasels -Morxiqm pp2734286.

: 35 ) By the time Lenin wrote this Conmolly's position on religion hed | developed for the better; he was using the materialist method | Cobservetion of the'sctusl phenomens of every dsy life") to explein end thus expose religion. However, insteed of developing his anprosch 40 the Perty in the same menner, he had sllowed it to deckine. By f 7909 he tad adopted the Anarchistic organisationel form of Syndicalisn, gliied to his oversil Harxist aperogsch, This resulted in his continu anz to evoid posing the religious question amongst even the Gsdres of his orgenisetions. ‘This was just enother vert of his failure to @evelop sn Irish Bolshevism. Hnt it wes ean importent part.

Connolly's epprosch te réligion hes been oscribed to a surrender by 3m to the forces of Irish Neticnalism, In fect, the link between mis errors on religion and nationalieam was less Ai perky both were the Heturel results of dependence for theory on the current couscicusness Gn the Second International.

i t E dust 2s the current (Second Internstions1) licrxist position on rélircion Biscted o vitel clerification by V I senin, so did ite position on SBetionslism - slthough here, for once, J V Stalin wes to play a pro= Beressive role. The Internstieonzi wes orgenised on the support of the Sworking classes of the metropoliten countries. (It wes to be the Meomintern that was to teke seriously the oroblems of the workers and Hpeesonts in the colonies.) Becsuse of this, its sections were under ressure from the tourreocisies of their countries to accent their Pexnensicnist 2ims end their exploitation of other nations. In many Pceses this pressure wes successful; in Dritein, the leading harxist at the time HM Flyndman, gave full support to the imperialist povern- Ment of his country in its imperislist plens. Rerisionism in such Mcountries as Eritein, France end Germany necessitated the seceptonce Sef the sims cf the bourgeoisies of these countries - es reserds neation- Selisem os well as other things.

)Tais position was opposed first f Ultra-Left. The Anorcuists Bimply denied any relevence to Seti ticas and "political" matters included Sinevitebly n2tioneal questions, A precticolly similar position was teken Pup by the Polish Nerxist Rose imxenburg. She reaerked on the economic S development that had token place since the pertition of her country, )pointed out the fect that the main forces demanding independence were She snoll business end professionel people, end Tevred the effect of their propagenda on the young Polish prolevarist tuet she wes trying Go win to Gocielism. Her cuswer to the Netionalists wee teteal opposition ~ even to the soint of ignoring the rerl srievences created by forcign oppression. Fr UJ ue} o =) si Pineliy, these lines were complimented by 5s Gentrist tendency bosed on the Austrien Social Democratic Party which offered cult eet a not | politicsl self-deteraination to onmressed notions, 4s against 211 these, Lenin ond the Bolsheviks were once again to do the work of clarification. Their analysis hos been chronicled in Morxist Review No.1 and in the Pivst Appendix of Comrede Hebert Dora's pemphliet, Irish Nationslism end Sritish Tmperielisn.

Here it is neceasory to recoll only two coin points. Firstly, beni declared hie rizht to neliticeli soli-deterwin ~tiun hed to be recophised for every mation, except where it definitely retarded develepment towerds Jocislism - simply tecouse its denial created hostility on the subjective pert of the workers cf the oppressed netion against their oppressors (including the workersof smons the latter). Netionelism sprung from circumstances tniat hod so Life ef their own over end above their originel economic base. For the jocizlist, there could be no ending of nationalist divisions evcest by solving them by the fairest possible means. ‘4s @ senerel rule: supoort for the national clsims of the oppressed azsinst those of tie oporesdor.

4. conerete exemple of Lenin's enalysis wes Norwey. In i974, he replied to Iwecouburge whe hed dencunced Norway's secession from Sweden:- "In the question of the self-deterainstion of notions, es in every otter question, we are interestcd first end foremost on the self- ‘eteruination of the proletearist within = given mation. Ross Luxemburg modestly evaded this question too, for sae reslised tist analysis of it on the basis of the exauple of Norwey, which she herself hed chosen, would be disasterous to her theory.

what position “id the Norweigian end Swedish proleterict take, and indeed t d to teke, in the conflict over seccession? de do not hnow whether the Norweician socislist vrosremme mede it ebligetory for Nerweigien Social Democrats to hold perticuler views om the ouestion of seccession. We will assume thet it did not, and that the MNorweision sociolists left it en ocnen question es to wuct extent the ocutonony of Norway gave sufficient scope to ware the class strugsle freely, or to whet extent the eternsl friction end conflicts with the Swedish eristocr-cy hindered freedom of economic Life. But it ceansot be disputed thet the Norweigien proletorist hed te Gppose “this < pistocr cy ond support } Norweigian pes. ner soat: it deuocrecy (with 211 its philistine Famieaticns)., he Richt of Netions to 3elf-Deterainetion' from Suestions of N-iisnsl Policy ond “preletrricn Internationslisa, ¥rogress fublishers, Moscow, 1957, pn 77-78 (Present outhor's emshesis) ~geinst Luxemburg, slso, uinin quoted aporovingly Esrl iorx's insistent thot the British workers! scigure of state poser would only be tuos«ible with the ersnting of self-daterminotion for Ireiend. In beth coses, he was correct. The only major difference between Norway and Irelend during the period sefore 1914 (eport from the complicstiens crested by the Ulstar Protestants) wos the f-ct thet the liberstion of the Lorweigien peasont from bis Londlerd h:d been achieved in Norwey for nesrly = century, wieress, in Ireland it wes not to be ended rs source of discontent until the 1930s.

So Connolly wee not nrecticing en a4irescth to the metionel struggle qualitetively different fo thet of lenin when He worked to place, in turn, the Irish Secislist Republican Party, the Irish fronsvoert and Generel Workers’ Union «nd the Irish Citizen .rmy at the heod of the Irish notionel struecle for self-dcetermin: tion.

a Bel ee ll ee eee

37 Mny successful scizure of power by the workers of the British Isles or Say ocrt thereof would hove invelwed recognition of Irelond's right te Belf-determinction - just as the ~elievement of stote power by the WRussicn workers wos to involve the iiberotion from their srison house Bf tie ve rious anticas of Tserist Russie.

Gonnolly exoressed this truth in BMewde Gonne's LtIrionde .iere in 1097:- MHon~politic=1 co-operstion effort must infsliibly succomb in frce of = onnosition of the privileged Clesse= interested behind the reap rts Sof lsnw ond mononoly. his is way, even wien he is from the oconomic Soint of view intensely conservative, the Irish hoticnalist, even Beith his folse res-oning, ic *m Betiwvwe ecent in socicl resenercticn, sofer -s he secks to invest wath 2a@fl power over its own destinies @ vecple sctuslly governed in the Gmtercsts of + foudol sristocrocy" — etn Socielism ond Hetionsliem ; saree Cenodles Press, Dublin fespite the form] error of fst (@yem in 1997, Irelend wos not Sverned ‘tin the interests of 2 femal eristocrocy*, but rother sore Sf British finence crpits1, tiomgaeme femtet eristocrets still foain ted the colonic] regiae), Eee @eoresses the rezlity of the Suction. it is when Connolly Grae te develop his position beyond hi- thet there arserrs 2 reste 'o Cepttulcie ts the politicel Blusicns of W:tion-lism, Thus, ® poper, the Workers! Renuolic of 4th foveaber 1899, he sume "Piggies position so os to reveel its feekness rcther thon its strengt fe woiicy on the cless atrugmle of fe SGeli—interest of the workers L & Sey sometimes te bose does rot fect the correctness of our pebaeeem. The were fact tot the in- Srited (ond often unrecsening) "mea—sritish sentiment of > chouvinist Sish potriot impels him to the sume conclusion 5 we srrived et os the Bsult of our economic studies @ mot Gouse us to siirink from ecleimins our position. It reiGgr deods us to rejoice thet our proieends in tus mode cll the e-sier By this acne too common identity aim est2blished -s > consequeme@ of wart we esteem the strong ond Sereconcilsble hostility between Eeglish impericlism ond socizlism" from Lobour ond Wcater deek, 3 CemM@les Press, Dublin 1956 Be 26 w socizlists we bose our poliem Re worlers, becouse we know 0°98) des cur woy. Thet the self int Gm this, the error lies p rtly im Connolly's (typicel) confusion of the bjective needs of the situction wath the subjective oppro ch to it the individuel (in this cose the nmoticnolist but more often, os wilt Ge shown, below, ts worker.) Taere is no reslicetion thet the Sunressoning snti-British sentimemt of «= chouvinist trish ee tricot" micht, by its very lock of revsemy prevent thet potriot from sking Hue finel transference of cllegicace irom Coitlin Ni Moulihon to Thternstion-). Socin-lism. Undoubtedly, Connolly's f-ilure to understand this lost several potenticl ESRP recruits to the Fenion Movement.

——E——Ee— —— a ————— - — _ $3 The other pert of the weskness in this possage crises from s theoretical failing thot will be considered in a future article. Jlere it con be seid, briefly, thst he did net, so much coepitulste to Irish noticonelism a6 underestimete it beth for the renson given sbove snd becsuse his whole approcch to the concept of the "Notion" (and hence indeed, of 'stionalism') wes on historical end static. (Undoubtedly, = visible expression of this wos his idecllised view of Celtic society).

But over and ebove Connolly's errors on religion ond the notion (though closely intertwined with them, es hea been shown) were his sttitudes to the n-ture of the State ond of the Gocial Democretic Porty thet would lecd the workers in smoshing it. As Hos slresdy been stated, in this erticle, the essence of the Morxzist view is that the State is the orgenised noliticsl exoression cof the power of the ruling ¢loss the Revisionist view is that it is somehow “sbove' clesses cnd os force for reconciling differences snd the Keutskyist Centrist view is thet it is "formally" the first but thet it cen, in practice be crptured peacefully ~- police, ormy ond 211 by the exploited individurls, Where did Connolly stond in -1l this? In 1916 he wos to plrce himself with the Revolutionrries. iven in 1900 delerates from his ISRP voted in the Second Internstionsl sgoinst Keutsky's compromise on Millerend.

But, - end coming first from the home of Revisionism, it is not surprising - he only developed his fins] position gr-duclly nad with meay l-pses. In his dsys in the ISRP he showed distinct tendencies towcrds s Revisionist ides of the seigure of stote power, His View con be comsees with Koutsky's; theoreticelly Koutsky upheld the .orxist concept of the state but denied in prectice thet it sonlied 2ny ony moment in which he found himself, Connolly tended formeliy st this eric’ te sc¢cent the Revisionist ides thot stzte power could Se 7ciieved by the workers through porlismentery tiesns; he wes coreful to rule out Irelond from this perspective. His senerel statement on ends cnd eons is well known:= "The whele of Irelond for the people of Irelend — their public property to be owned ond operated os o nations] heritage, by the labour of free wen ino free country. Thot in ous ideal, end when you @¢sk whet ore our methods, we reply: ‘Those which lie nesrest our hoads'™, Jorkers' Republic, Sth August 1698 - from Socislism pnd Netions Op Gk pee. % a _ism Four years leter in Americas, he stated, mere certainly: "YT believe firmly that the revolution ry Socialist movement will clweys be numerically weak until the hour of revolution srrives, ond then it will be an enay to get aherents by the thousends as it is naw to get single individuols" - Weekly People, 10th toveuber 1902.

And it wos at this time too thst he wrote in on orticle, leter to be incorporsted in the first pert of Socielism iiade Besy:- ‘Revolution is never precticol + umtil the hour of the Tevolution strikes. ‘THEI it alone is precticol, end 711 the efforts of the conserv-tives ond compromises become the most futile end visionary of human beings", Socialisn lade Easy, Plough Book Service, Dublin, 1971, p28

34 then, but not till tuen, the perty which represents the ruvolution:ry ides is justified in tcking steps to cssume the powers of government and in using the weopons of force to dislodge the usurping closs or sovernment in possession and tresting ite uembers ond supporters 3s usurpers end rebels agoinst the constituted suthorities heve clwoys been trested. In other words, Socislists believe thot the question of force is «f-very minor importonee; the reolly inpertent question is of the principles upon which is Scsed the movement thet usy or may not need the use of force to reslise its object weecans “The bollot-box wes civen us by our asster use it for our own. <b. Us denonustrote 2+ stroneth and intelligence of tae revelutio; hustings ¢ restrua frou which to promulcst = ror their ee let us hat betiet-box th ory ideo: Tetcis sei tae ur principles; Let us arosp the public powers in the interest of tie disi uherited class: let us enulete our fathers ond, like the ‘true wen. of 496" ' ploce ourselves im Line! with the gest cironced bicates of our ofe ond arowing inspiretion cond hepe from the svectecle presented by the world-wide revolt of the workers, »repcre for i coming of the day when the Socialist working=civss of drelond will, through its elected representotives, present ifs dearrd for freedom froa the yoke ors TOVeErning moster cless OF metion = the doy on which the question of merel or physicoel force sholi Be fincliy decided." Ibid, P:P.55-57.

Cf course Connolly wee mot te foresee the dresdful results thot would s¢erueé Dis cless ae tic0se tee fraquent occasions when it did weit — it ted “exssusted 211 the pesceful icons ot its disposcl for the purpése cf demomstreting to the peonle ond their eneuivs thet the now revolutiensry idess do possess the suffroze of the wojority."

The poiut is, however, Gast his opprorch coss show s certrin empericisa stout tie etete which does not inevitobly link his views thereon with the Horxist position ond which, es o matter of foct, were to be supersedaéd for hin by the Anercho-Syndicolist position thst workers! control of ths economy could force the casitslist stete's liquidation. In ether words, for Connolly, the workers could tee over the copiteabist coercive mschinery. the Nerxiat formule wes sud is thet, os em entity, it would heve to be siteshed.

In the iriené Libre orticle slready quoted he duscribeud the state power (“he politics1 power of Government”) as Doing Bitply, "The orgonised forces of the amtion." |o recofnisud, Later in the srticle, thet: the “roupoerte of low end saononoly" nroviced strongholds for the propertied clogses. But he remorked on this only to contest ormunmonts en beholf of “non-nolitics1 co-overstive effort" (es through the co-cnerstive of Sir dorace Plunkiit) es 2 mense towords ochicving Socialist. Connolly wos not ean Anerchiet; his position derived fron the Horxist one - but it was frow the debosed liorxism domihant in the Second International.

ind, of course, just »s this debosement offected the whole onprosech of the mejority of secticns of the fourth Internstionol tow rds their Se ene aS: so @td at sfifect Connolly's oresnuissticnal concept from the berinning. Conditions of bourgsis democrecy poth crested the circumstences for the esteblishment of (ot first, smell) Vested interests in the Socicl Denocrsetic Perty uschines, ond for excuses for loosening Morxist stendords (os on relimion) to expond recruitment quontitctively.

eee Ss. ... ae rane words, yet even with them, it is clear what Connolly means by ‘revyolution", There are quototions in his writings st this time thet fill the fap, In the Manifesto of the ISRP, it is declsred:- "That the conquest by the Socisl Democracy of political power in Parliament, ond on o11 public bedies in Ireland, is the readiest ond most effective meons whereby the revolutionery forces may be orgenised end disciplined to ottein thet end" - Socicliam aud Nationslism, Op Cit.

pelo6. find in the Belfast Shan Van Vocht, of August 1897, be steted:- "In an independent country the election of s gajority of Sociszlist representatives tc the legisloture mesns the conguast of political power by the revolutionery party, and, conmsequentig, the mestery of the military end police forces of the State, which wonid then become the elly of revolution, instesd of its enemyfess "Irelend not being an independent country, the election of a me jority of Socialist Republicans would not, unfortumeteig, plece the fruits of our toil so readily within our gresp. But it would h-ve enother perhaps no less importent effect. lt would seam Ghat for the first time in Irish history a clear m-jority of the respomeibie electorste ef the Irish nation -— men cepeble of beeriig sras = Red registered et the ballot bexes their desire for seperation fram the British Empire. Such ‘a verdict arrived ot not in the tumuitdons =nd, too often fickle enthusiessm of monster meetings, but im fhe sober stmosphere and judicisl calmmess of the polling bocth, would rimg Tike 9 trumpet c71l in the eors alike of our rulers end every enemy of the British imperiel systen. nat would not long survive such » ¢coppum@metson, Ite enemies would read in the verdict thus delivered st the Boliost box 9 pessionste appeal for help ageinst the oppressor, the morei Gmsurrection of the Irish people, which = small expeditionsry force gud wer moeterial might convert into such = militery insurrection ts woald exaeust the power of the empire et home ond render its possessions em @esy prey cbrood.

How Long would such an appeal be disregarded?" — Thad, 5.30 And, in his own party's Workers' Republic of 22nd duly 7899, he stcted, more fully then he hod done before, his verepectivwe for the workers’ seizure of power:- “It may be interesting thon, to plece before our readers the Sociclist Republicon conception of the functions ond usea of physicel force in a populer movement, We neither exelt it into = principle mor repudisete it @s something not to be thought of. Our position towerts it is thot the-use or non-use of force for the renlisotion of the-ideas of progress flwoys hes been and alweys will be determined by the sttitude, not of the perty of progress, but of the soverning cless opposed to thot purty.

If the time should @rrive when the norty of progress finds its way te frecdom barred by the stubborn greed of s possessing closs entrenched vYelind the berries of law snd order; if the perty of progress hos indectrinzted the people -t lerge with the new revolutionsry conception of society snd is there representative of the will of 2 majority of the notion; if it hes exhousted ©11 the tecceful meons ot ites dispossl for the purpose of domonstrsoting to the people ond its enemies thet the new revolutionsry idess do possess the suffrege majority;

& | Th turn this dilution improved conditions for the bureaucrats who encouraged further dilution and so on, ad infinitum. But, ofter Bll, the porties were working in conditions of coi colpe ppecet ive, freedon.

There wes no obvious reason for developing revolutionary consciousness onongst their geadbers. Beth victim end executor of this process. He had lisetionsl] theories in Britsoin where organisotionsl 25 sdvonced os gnywhere. In his first peupblet @ 2nd snd the Means, he gave his views th ‘ ip of the "revolutionary" ce cicess of Irelend, therefore, devolves the task of aticol representetion for their closs os the prelisinery jae conquest of nolitical power. This task can only be fed upon by wen end women who recognise that the first revolutionery army must hornonise in principle with those Be its lost, end thet, therefore, no revolutioniste con Fite the co-operrtion of men or classes whose ideals Beirs, end wion, therefore, they zy be compelled to fight Suture initiel stage of the journey to freedom. To this Belongs cvery section of the properticd closs, end every fa@@et of those classes wico believes in the righteousness of his : = The freedom of the working cless must be the work of £a@ working cless." - Erin's hope, The fnad snd the Mesns/ _ Phe Tew Evongel, op cit. YP. 235-24 These views were deve ~ oped in 1896 to form Connoily's nearest opproxinstien Ko o> Leninist position: NVe ore trode een but we ere wore than trade unioniste.

The trode unionist who is only = trade unionist is to the socislist wheat the believer in constitutioncl monorchy is to > republican. The constitutionel monarchist wishes to Linit the power of the Aing, but still wishes te hove o King; the republicen wishes to sbolish Kinzship and ~uts his trust in the people; the trade unionist wishes to Linit the power of the moester but still wishes to heve tosters: the socinlist es: to hove done with mosters ond pins his frith to the colluctive elligence of s deaocrotic community." - (Workers' Republic) August, 1698 in Yorkers' Republic Turee . Candles Press, n, 1951, PSG, en erticle republished in The New ivengel he exnosed the gZons of his opnrecch:- &isbour uprising st the Irish hocol Governucnt elections a uD spontineously without @ lesder, ond despite the P Berties; wien the .en wie supported it Acve renlised the Stryane to effsuct eny erect imorovetent in their condition igs the Sct dam ef focol bodies, they will seek for 2 peliticol porty which 8m @xaress their cless interests upon 2 rotionel besis ond seeking it find the Soecizlist Porty, resay ond equipped fer the tosk.

rae By our action todey we sre urepering the ground for uore ageressive revolutionory ection when the working cless of Irelend ot lest recognise (sic) in our principles the embodi- .

ment of their hopes; firnly grounded upon our knowledge of the economic besis of sll political action, we confidently await the day when the ever incressing pressure of capitalist society shall brin; the workers inte our ranks - end the destinies of the nation inte our hends". ine New Evenrel 1901 Opt cit p.37 Tt is clear thet what Connolly did wes adapt his larxist enalysis to pit his orgenisctionsl nerenective - elthough there is no reason to presume thet he did so consciously. .lthough Connolly dnoisted that the members of the ISRPF were tore tuan just trede unionists its overage level of consciousness wes not qualitetively superior to that of the trade unionists of the time. The Ferty wee, as indeed, its none implies, not seonsciously llerxist body, but rather s formally Merxist body including sone genuine Marxists.

When it split in 1903 4ts politicel divisions were overleid by rersonelis. as the lsst guote expresses Connolly expected that the workers as 9 whole would develop steadily to becone Socialists becouse of their objective situction (just as he expected the some to heppen to even “unressoning® Irish Yetionslists). thot he did not anticipete wos that the Socialist Parties theuselves might go the other way - which was in fect, wast commonly heppened.

Helped in this motter by the facts of o developed industriol proleterist ond of undemocratic conditions Lenin prepered an orgen-— 4eation thet would be @ horxist bedy in fora :nd in substance and that would mointein a deteruined internel strugsle to keep itself so. His works on porty-building - hot Is fo Be Done ond One step Towoerds, two steps beck - heve been quoted by the present author Sn his introduction to Connolly's Socizlism Hode wasy. (See Op Cit p.i2). Here it is necessery only to quote from them one pessege which stends in stork relief egeinst Connolly's somewhet fotelistic thecretical optinisim:— ‘where follows ¢ reference to the concrete Hussien conditions which fatelisiticelly impel the working cless movenent on to the revclutionory peth. But ... the revolutionery path of the working cless might not be a Sociol Democretic p th. qnen absolution reigned, the Sniire (est Surovecn bourgecisie ‘impelled! deLliberstely impelled, the workers on to the peth ef revolution. fe Sociol Democrsts, however, connot be aetisfied with thot - whet Is To Be Done, Progress Publishers, lloscow 1969, pp 94-95 (Present author's italics.) As en excression of the relevence of ‘Kerxist anolyeis to conditions outside the enclysts immediate idea, tnis can seorcely be bettered.

Tn Irelond, "the Revolutionary path" wes only morched by the workers, as far os a (26 county) bourgeois republic. lo working class lesdership epresred to cerry over the werlers' strugcle into the nehievement of o workers' Republic. Indeed i¢ could not heve appecred, os it wos not crested.

a a i a —~ 4) Connolly was to discover the weaknesses in his parties in Ireland , Britain and America, But by training and environment, it was impossible for him to discover the cure developed by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, His own disgnosis would be in keeping with his original dependence on objective facts (the class nature of individual party members ) as opposed to Lenin's recognition of the value of the subjective element ( Marxist training and education), Instead of working to improve the quality of the cadres in his group, he would rely more than ever on the spontaneous ( trade union ) wisdom of the worker: workers, The only vanguard parties of which he had knowledge were not abie to make revolutions -— even parliamentary "revolutions", He concluded that the concept of the Social Temocratic Party as a revolutionary force was in itself wrong, How he reached this position will be examined more closely in the next article of the series,

CONCLUSION

James Connolly came to the Irish working class as one of the most advanced political cadres of its British opposite numbers. He was, indeed, a cadre of the Second International. But for the International or, more precisely, the Marxist method that powered its theoretical life, he would not have been able to advance as far as he did Irish working clasa consciousness, However, that quality was insufficient for the theoretical needa of his time and place. Connolly's centres of activity -— Edinburgh, Dublin, the urban areas of the USA, Belfast -— could not provide the environmental conditions for @ spontaneous development of his thought further into Bolshevism than it went. Accordingly, Commnolly by himself is an inadequate guide to the Irish wor’ ers. He points towards the October Revolution, but the path he shows has remained for too many as dark and hazardous, without the the extra light provided from the teachings of Lenin, Trotsky and their Internationale,

(NEM? INSTALMENT: AMERTCA)

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