Elections - revolutionary strategy

ELECTIONS

the revolutionary tactics Elections to bourgeois aduinistrations can be important tools for the ruling flacs in reinforcing its ideoldzics} hold on the masses. Bot it is a tool which can be utilised by revolutionaries against the ruling class.

The tactics of a campaign around elections by revolution-ries must he judred, ss ell revolutionary ection mist, from an sssesrient cf the objective and subjective conditions. From this assessment tne correct method by which the only besis of revolutions fetion at elections - the propigation of the revelution=ry sropramme, the strenethenin of the mass moveirent and for the purpose of educating the more backward strate of the wording cliss.— can be implemented, For the ruline class, elections serve a numberof pursoses.

Primarily, they make up a ' part of the ideological armoury of the ruling cla: 2 oiferin, what is said to be a democratic apparatus, presented as a key of the "Gemocratico" system. In reality, while universal] suiireare is a desocratic institution whith mst be defended ageinst fasois st or bonapirtist attack, its role in re Peete!

suiirese limited to property ormmers only when the stare wis reached thet purlisvent wa: a the only institution carryinc out fpoverntent mst be recocnised. Thus toa a rlinment is: subject to the irresistaole oressure of capital, mtioml end internatior hl: and can over-vide the opinion of the tiss of the neéple either br ocharcitne the rule of “denocracy™ = perryninderins: or the reatructuring of powermment -— or by simply elsining -* tention informition", as in the case of the imitiad antry of Sriteain into the 40, desbite majority optositicn in the country, also, elections can serve specific tacticsl purposes. The sécret baljot sniits the gellective power of the workincs class. The wiitydeveloped im strugrle is broken down as individuals are isolated and ocombarded with the propepends of the state and iiss media. pula ce fev Tias; the intention is that in the electoral procedure itself frapmentation within the working clase can be encouramed.

ing the mass upeurce of May "68 | in Bettoin Iasi year in an ancy spear-headed by the This tiuctie wis em loyed with the hope ef derus by the french Governaent, and by the Tory Government atte:pt to counter the rising tempo of working closs mili miners, But while elections serve specific necds of the raling class they ean also be ntiliséd ‘by revolutionary, socialists as an suxidingy to an on-poing extra-psarlianent— ery ¢ainpeigt-of aeitetion wand propusida.

SSE U'~sSDSwCSe?E CC 3 The strengthening of the class consciousness of the working class, and not only the vangu.rd of that class, the putting forward of the revolutionary programme, and the development of the mass movement are the factora which determine “he actual methods adopted at elections - the opportunity for an extended platform for agitation on all aspects of the atruzzle.

And while the revolutionary movement Incks the strencth to do away with the existing bourgeois apparatus then revolutionaries test work within the elections: by participation, This is the case even for the most counter-revolutionary parliaments as the experience of the Bolsheviks illustrated, Lenin deemed such participation as "not only useful, but indispensible to the party of the revolutionary proletari:t, after the first bourgeois revolution in Russia (1905) so ag to pve the way for the second bourgeois revolution (Feb 1917) and for the socialist revolution ( October 1917 )"; "Left Ying Commnism - An Infantile Disorder".

The attention of the working class almost invariably cannot but be focussed on elections - and in such circumstarices revolution ries mst take idvantaze of the platform offered by the ruling class - and in general this can best be done through participation. But in certain circumstances the needs of the mass movement and the education of the masses can best be served by an active boycott of elections, This tactic can, however, only be correctly applied in certain specific circumstances ~- when the Masees are in rapid revolutionary upsurve of the ma;nitude of having broken the bounds of bourgeois legality on a miss and universal scale: in order to vrevent or weaken slgnificantly any new structures of government the bourgeoisie my attempt to introduce; and to give this upsurge, which will, almost without exception, find one form of expression in a spontaneous boycottist and nonparticipation form, a coherence and direction only the leadership of secialist revolutionaries can provide.

Anacid test of the correctness of the boycott tactic, and of all revolutionary tactics is - can it strengthen the miss movenent and the revolutionary conciousneas of the working class, and in particul.r, can an ‘active® boycott be mounted in which revolution:ries countervose to the bourgeois elections a viable radic:1 alternative which will attract the mases - whether it he hehina the slozan of calling for workers’ own organs of power, sovicts, street committera, or py more limited calls for strenztnening mass struggie behind demneratic slogans. If not, the beycott tactic is clearly incorrect, A failed ‘active' boycott tolds no advance fer the etrugele of the yorkine elnss .

nd exposes the political misjudceuent of those who mde, the Call. Similarly, a ‘passive! boycott campaign which offers no altermntive to the bourrecis structure, save possible abstract calls to strug cle with no real lesdership, exposes the political impotence of the -roups involved and will contribute to their isolation from the mse of the proletariat.

Revolutionary exverience has taught the value of boycott and participation and the methods for the implementation of these tactics in different situations and with the mss conciousness at differing levels. Eeasples to be considered were in Russie when in 1405 the Bolsheviks correctly applics a beycott but incorrectly held to the same position the following year, 2nd in Spain when in 1930 a boycott was the only reslistic tactic to be followed though only months later participation was correct.

RUSSLA 1905-07

In Rus:ia during 1905 an immense uprising found expression in the creation cf soviets It appeared that the winning of state powor by the preletarist was possible, The barriers of the old police state head been broken down, The popular masses were in what Trotsky described as a "chaotically oppositional mood" and when the pressure of militancy foreed the Tsarist government to attempt to create a new covernmertal structure, the Bolsheviks tried to give coherent revolution ry form to this moo in agitation afound an election boyeott.

The Tsarist government announced elections for a new body, the Dum. This was created 28 a manouevre to gain the support for the liberals agninst the crowing threat of revolution; its power was that its agreement was necessary for the passine ef legislstion, 50, with mss upsurge and an attempt by the ruling class to create a new structure, the classic preconditions for the application of a boyeott tactic were present.

And with the boycott the revolutionaries succeeded "In preventine a reactionary government from convening a reactionary parliament in a situstion in Woiech extraparliamentary action (strikes in particular) were developing at ereat aneed, when not a single section of the proletariat ang the peasantry could support the reactionary government in any way, and when the revolutionary proleteriat was gaining influence over the backward masses through the strike strugrle and through the agrarian movement" - Lenin (Left Wing Comminism) .

But the followin, year the Bolsheviks again applied the tactic, this time againet the Second Duma. This was incorrect and arose from a failure to grasp that the peak of the revolutiomry upsurge had passed. The masses were no longer in an Upsewing of conciousness and mobilisation, In conference in December 7905, the Eolsheviks resolved the "attempt to undermine this police Dama, rejecting all participation in it". But the time hed passed for such resolutions.

Lenin in 1907 outlined the error of the Bolsheviks: "The condition for the success of the beyeott of 1905 was = sweeping, universal, powerful and rapid upswing of the revolution, We mist now examine, in the first place, what bearing a specislly powerful upswing of the struc¢le has on the boycott, and, secondly, whot the ch racteristic and distinctive features of a especially powerful upswins are, "Dogeott... is 2 strugvle not within the framework of a given institution but against its emergence. Any ;iven institution can be derived only from the Alreany existing, i.,e., the old regime, Consequently, the boycott is a means of strugele aimed directly at overthrowity; the oid refine, or , at the Worst, i.¢., when the asscult is not strin; enouch for overthrow, at weakening it to such an extent that it would be umable to set up that institution, umuble to mke it operative, "(Reference everywhere in the text is to active boycott, that is, not gust a refusal to take part in tue institutions of the «la regime, but an attack on this regime...

the Social Democrats spoke openly at the time ( of the boycott }) about active boycott, sharply contrastin;- it to passive boycott, and even linkin it to armed struzle),

"Consequently, to be successful the boyeatt requires a direct strucyle apwinst the old repitie, an uprisine against it and miss dischedience to it in a lanes number of cases (such mass disobedience is one of the corditions for preparing an uprisings), Joyeott is a refusal to reco, nise the -14 reine, 1 refusal, of course, not in words, but in decds, 1.2,, it is somethin; that finds expression not only in cries or slo;ans of orpanieqtions, but in a definite movement of the mase of the people, who systematically set wo new institutions, which, thou, unlawful, actually exist and so on and soforth. The connection Getvesu boyeott and the broad revolutionary upswin’ is thus obvious: boycott is the mest decisive me cts of stru, le, which rejects not the form of organisation of the ,iven institution,. but its very existence. Heyeott is a declaration ef often war aminst the cold re,ime, a direct attack upon it. Barrin: a broad revolutionary upswin.:, barrin: masa-unrest which overflows, as it were, the Suunds of the old legality, there can be no question of the b yeott succeeding". (Against Boycott; 1907. Mmphasis in ori;inal) He subsequently added, "It wre an error... for the Bolsheviks to have >boyeotted the Tum: in 1906, It w.s an error, because after the Decemner defeat* it was impossible 7O expect a revolutionary attack in the near future; it was therefore senseless ta spurn to Duma's tribune for mobilising the revolutionary ranks". (Concerning the Boycott of the Third Duma However, in the situation of the Bolshevik Party in 1907 Lenin found himself alm>st elone amongst the lendership in holding this position. Mass arrests tcok place all over the country tio. year, mval mitinies ended in failure, the Dem. was prorogued and a missive wave of state. yiclence was unlenshed., In reaction t this the Bolsheviks renewed their boyeolt call with determination - but in doing eo failed to draw the guide te their action from tue opne lL ousnege of the iausea, Trotsky later deseribed this: renction and the joyeou® + lan attgamt to cover their own impotence with a radical gesture", (Stalin' - Py) ‘when the trisses are in retrest, the tactic of the boycott. loses its revolutioniry

SPATW 1950-31

The experience cf Russia 1905-07 and the lessons derived from it were reinforced in Spain with the upsurges preceding the Civil War.

The social and political crisis opened up in Spain with the depression in 1929 and this ended for a eriod the attampts of absclatism to crush all protest with military repression, In 1930 dictator Primo de Rivers was forced to resign wher he failed to giin a vote ef confidence from the garrisons of Spain, necessary in the face of rising working class militancy. King Alfonso XTIT appointed General Damisco derenguer Fustre head of a caretarer government prior to the intended formition of 2 constitutions! monarchy gut the successof this slan dépended on a mease base for the monorchist and clerical political porties - a base they did not have, *# In particul r, the smashing of the Soviet in December 1905.

his loosening of the chains of abselutiam opened the flood gates of mass militancy expressed in opposition to attempts to foist a new structure which thcugless author jtnzian did not ge far enough for the Spanish misses. This tock 2 particular Fern in a general mood of non-cooperation with the guthorities, and boycott for the elections for the new structures, the Cortes.

A miss upsurge Was in process, gheih for its development necessitate the intervention of commmnist revolutioniries - trking the {nitintive thus to @.in a lending position in the struggle.

The conditions Aeeeribed oy Lenin as opening up the possibility for the use of the boycott tactic - the "sweeping, wniversil, powerful and rapid waswing of the revolution" - were teing fulfilles in the yaAionlisation eripping the Spanish masses; working class ami peasants.

“ut the actual failure of the commmnists to take 2 clear Line wae to be criticised by Tretsiy in that year: “The communists obviously committed =m error by failing to take the initiative in the boycott. They “tone, at the hed of the revolutionary workers, eould give the yoyeott campign o hold and militant character.

“The sentiment for boycott, nevertheless, is clearly widespreat in opposition parties and is a reflection and symptom of the profound restlessness aroun the popular meses." Prior to the election Trotsky hed written of the possi bility ot its invelidstion by boycott, sust as had Deen achieved ty the “plshevits ond the other poycottists with the bums in 4905. And on February 15, following the elcetions ani the fail of the mons elist stratecy, both because of the hoyeott tut aise Age to the qwoakness of the bourgeois ond elericsl parties still blinking in the lisht ot a theizx new found tegality, he grote of the lack of confitence enzeniere’t ond exacerbated in tne ya ing clique, and its runifications: "he superatitious F spect for power in the con¢lousness of the people will be xelentlessly urdermined by all this. & weve of satisfnetion, of eorfidence, of dering will £9 through millions of hearts, worming them, inspiring then, spurring thea on". This wee the result of a yoycott of mass proportions, springing from the demands of the misses themselves, Sut the communists had not attempted 4o develop this «nd they poid the price. ‘Tnfortunetely, the commmnists were not the stare in the boycott performance. Tht is why *hey aia not achieve ny importatt yootories in the campaign of tue inst two or three months", Troteky wrote later th.t ye°r- perer ae Just 26 Trotsky. we unequivecsi on the necessity of the boycott call against the attempts %o build a new structure and to unify the misses strugiie, he had no doubt about the politicrl content that should hive characterised. thet call: thet at tht time to counterpose the erextion of soviets, of omens of dual power to the ruling clique's Cortes would ve tiete abatraction, The Goonish masses were in universal upsurge, there eoula be no dow.t of that, wut the actunl process of padicalisation to the point at which orgins of unl power gould be torown Up ia working class orfarisation, wes atill st an winuryornic stage- Thua, to have mile such a call for soviets ould nove fount ne MASS response and would neve been to contribute to the fragmentation of the masses rather than in uniting them in struggle.

q messes of the city and countryside con he united at the present time only “democratic slogans. These include the election of a constituent cortes on the sof universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage. I do not think that in the iq this sloran. Soviets are as yet nonex istant. The gat situation you can avol ish workers - not to speak of the penaants - do not know what sovietsa are: at te, not from t eir own experiences.

srtheless, the struggle around the Cortes invthe coming period will: constitute Pehole politics1 jife of the country. To counterpose the slogan of soviets, under S circumstances to the slogan of the Cortes, would be incorrect". He added that Bets could be wilt in the fubure only by mobilising the masses on the bisis of Beritic slognne ot that periot - te trsic wre to prevent the monwrchy convening Snservitive Cortes and to ensitre the convocation of % demcerstic constituent fies which could give lr d to the pecsants and which would thus necessitate the ton of soviets to fortify the position and @2ins.

~ er, the then head of Government, resigned and wis. repliced with civilian Binistration. Believing the rightist ¢roupings could not win 7 mijority tothe es, the Ming called mmicipal elections inste.d, to be held on April 12, 1931.

fijess than two months after advocating & hoycott of elections, Trotsky stated the meessity of yartici,ction. The decision showel neither inconsistency nor revision his errlier position - the two elections were of deeply differing charncter .

Bath repord to toe Jerenguer Cortes, the teetic of boycott was perfectiy correct.

wis clenr beforehsit tunt either Alfonso woull succeed for a certzin period in Sin recortin? to the road of military dictatorship or else the movement would rol ever the head of Berenguer and his Cortes. Under +hese conditions, the com unista A to take the initiative in the airugele te boyeot: the Cortes. This is precisely met we hod insisted on with the a-d of those meagre resources We had at our disposmi. Had the Syanish colmuniets come out resolutely 2ni in time for 4 hoyeott, even afonly wy Jistributing sh rt statements on the subject, their authority would have Been considersuly prester at that moment when the Jerenguer ministry ws overthrown.

Me advanced workers would have said to thamselves: "These people are eup2ple of Poresceing things". Unfortunatley the Spanish communists , ¢hrown off the treek Ty She leadersiip of the Comintern, did not unferstand the siturtion ard rade treparat- Gers to participrte in the elections, tut acain without any cm fidence. The events feclied over their heads, and the firat victory of the revolution brought the commaists almost no inerecse in influence.

Miiow the Bawera Gaverunert hos umliertaken to convene o constituent Cortes. Is there jany basis for thinking that the convoeztion of this Cortes will be interrupted by “= second revolution. To enll for boycott would tow be to call for self-isolation. It ‘is necessary te particip.te mest actively in this election. The revolution poses politicsl questions directly znd 2% the present stage fives thet 2 porliamentory for. - Mie Jo not solid.rise curselves for a momert with the illusions of the masses; Lat we wast utilise whitever ie progressive «yout these illusions to the utmost, otherwise we are not revolutionists hat conbeuptible ped=nts". (The Spanish Revolution and the Dangers threstening it, Iny 1931)

5 ju the =e of ceraguer the Cortes had to be boveatted in the veme of a revol tioenety eons.) Visit Cortes, The question of suffznes should Hive been o+ the forefront Of afitey5a - a call for increased demeracy as part of the Strugrle for soviet Workers dsnoecraey. Envineg then overthrom the old repressive refine alotge with its new structure, militent workers and Peasants wanted to porticiprte in elections ~ to strive for 2 derocr..cyy the bourgeoisie could not grant, in the demnd for & democracy the gevernmentsl structure did not actually represert or could concede, This wis the cey to the necessity of revolutioucry intervention in the elections.

ut othere implemented differing tactics. The Commmist Party ignored the elections thus playing into the lionde of the anarchists, a powerful Spanish tradition, who countezposed the slogan of aeaim: the masses to the reality of the political proce: evipping te moeses and thus contributing tc their isolation from the workers and peasants, and the isolation of the misses fron arms; Tie question of revolutian is at one time or ancther "Sefrcted through the orism of Prlinmentarianismn, The taske for >evolutionsries were to use the Cortes as 2 forum fron which the revolutionary procramme conld Le powerfully presented and as a ‘ond with the Msses that cain be develcped to eontrisute decisevi to the overthrow of the Cortes in Envour of workers! demecracy, Or the election results; Tretsiy noted there wis not one con upiet in the Cortes:, "OL course, the revoluticnizy wine is nlvwowye atroncer in netion, in the.stra =e, than in parliamentary representation. The weilmess of Spanish commmism is fully | disclosed. Undér these conditions, to speak of the overthrow of bourgecis, perlianentarisnism by the dictatorship of the vrolet-riat would simply menn to play the birt of imbeciles and bebblers. The task is to gether strencth for the pert on the basis of the parliamentary stage of the revolution and rally the misses to us. That is the only way porliamentsrianism enn be overcome, But Precisely for that purpose it is indispensable te develop a fierce a:itation under the most. Stiress demccr=tic slosans. : "what should be the eriteria for aivencing the slo-ans? 6 n the one i GQ eider the feneral direction of the revolutionary development, which t our strstecie line. On the other hand, we must tate into acesunt the tevel of conscioucness of the mesea; the conmunist who does nov take timt into consi dermticn will crest his neck". (Trotsky , July 315 1957.)

sail Trotsicy went on to stress the neccessity for the pirticipation £9 te a Pertof an ongoing, acitotion in all areas.

The weckness of the conumniate dh SSUIP, ap reyated by polities mistakes, wis to have implications tracie for tha Spanish workin: class and peassmtry, Crisis fripped the government, resi:nation and further elestions fr. Lleved with political re;roupment. The social-demecrmts were friphtenea by their new found pirlianentary power and refused to implement sceinlist policies which woul? have opened up a new stage in the revolution ry process which would have a7ent therm aside. Instead, they banded power to the bourrecisie and in doin- S80 undermined the confidence of the proletariat in itslef ond the confi jence of the petit—hourrecisie in itself. In the crisis, the conditions for the feewth of fascist reaction wee Khite wahenened _ eC rel CC

9 T+ come With the Civil var and the defect of the Spanish messes - fr the lack of Sdequ-ie political preparation.

The result of t e civil wor depenis for one fourth, not to say one tenth, upon the Jevelopuont of the civil wir jtself, its techrical means, ite surely military leadership 2nd for three fourths, if not for mine tenths, on the political preparation", Protsiy wrote in Hovember 1934, ani he wns soon +o be proved correct,

TREND 1969-74

Hespite the weeilth of revelutionsry exverience to be drum upon, the positions adopted uy Bey blieon and Socialist proups +o elections in Ireloand in recent years have consistenly missed potentially ywilustile vehicles for 9; it tion. The tactics adoptel by apti-i:perinlists in four elections should be considered: the six county gener’.1 election of February 1969, the Free State General Election of pecel ber 1972, the Morthern assembly election of July 1973 ani the aritish Genern] Election in the Worth of Irelanil, Februcry 1974- The growim, militancy - By early 1969, Stormont Prine lingster Terence O'Neill hud been coicht between the hanwer of civil rishts acitation —nd the wnvil of loyclist reaction; personified by Ian Paisley. The pressure of the Teisleyite vicht force O'Neill to make his infamous libernl eali to arms iieter at tar Crossroais" speech and to eall a Stormont Ganeral lection. sections of the civil ri, ats wovenent were seduced dy teeili's liberal rhetoric and slackened activities. Peoples Dencertey, on the other hanl, contested 11 seats with a programme ef dermnis calling for reform in a wamber of social issues and an ending of represeive lesislatics.

PD did not rench its decision to particijete on the basis of 2 revolutionary Merxist alysis - for the orcnuisstion was ot that time 2a loose though militant civil riphts croup end not 2 socizlist oxranisntion - mt they nevertheless adopted a very good position as their publications of the time explained: "In the turmeil of the election campaign it is important we do not foreat that, for the Poople’s De. .ocrscy'y firhting the eleetion is enly one of many tasks, We are contendin, seats, not to join the carvet-bapyers end place-scekers, but becouse it affers an excellent c.ance to out our ideas to the peonle and keep the femond for civil rights in the limelicht. For us, democracy is a contimous strugcle by the people, not just mking 2 mark on a ballot wper every four or five years", Thus the electoral platform was bein, used to agitate for extra-patiiamentary stru.,le. The FD agitation wis successful, its character meshins with the ¢rewin militancy of the anti-unionist people, and reflected in some hish yotin: fisures within their tctal of23,645 votes. ani following the election the PP carried out ite prowise to continue the stru- le on the streets. 4 contribution had been made to the atrugie by the election intervention and the confidence of the anti-unjonist workin: class nided.

10 Qutflanked in the 26 Counties.

iy late 1972, Jack Lynch required a new mndate to strencthen his government's position in order to ineresse repression aysinst anti-imperic ists anf tims aid iritish Imperialism in the North, He therefore called = Genexil Election for December 7- out it was the ease that the necessitics of esnitalist stability in the Free State dictated that the policies of the Gos/rive-Corish coalition would differ little from that of Fianna Fail on the Northern crisis anda anti-Republican repression, in the eluction campei;n, however, the major parties sensed the frustration and confusion of the mas of the electorate to their nolicies on the mtioml question ani switched the main thrust of their campaion to immediate social and economic issues. Thus Republicsn or Socialist intervention in the elections necessitated a ecamprign not only on social -nd economic issues, cut primrily on the question that the mejor parties avoided - the Morth ani repression: to place a revolutionary Jostion before the people on the issues that the major porties had retrented fron, sat before this opportunity, Provisional Sinn ¥ein itself retreate Hep failed to contribute to developim: conscicusnese in any meavin-ful way, and the Official Republicans missed an opportunity to put forward key questions, The Government wis attempting to draw Provisioml Sinn Fein into battle before the or-anisation was prepared. cut in recoymisin, this and refusing to ge forward in the elections, Sinn Fein actuclly exposed and exaperatel their weektess uefore the working class, An acjressive Republican campaign would not have produced massive election returns, but even a moderate poll for Sim Fein caniidates would in effect have been a defeat for the policies of the mjor pirties in that it would millify any claim they had to hnvin’ a mniate for repressim;: Repudlicens. It would have shown that their was popular opposition te this repressicn.

This wis not done, the issue of repression was side-stepped and the position of the major parties left unopwosed.

People's Democracy adopted an absetentionist policy and weote of coniattin= electoralist illusions. Dut electoral illusions will not be broken iy propacande.

This will oceur only with the conerete experience of the misses in stro: je, And participation in elections on 2 revolutionary basis will cortritete ¢o this process, Participation toes not menn solidsrisin: with these illusions tat rather to utilise elections in an appreciation of the rezlity of the mss consciousness in orier to extend agitation and te reach the mesus dill under the infigemee of bourrccis ideoloyy . Thus election a itation forms a part of the develonment of the forces which will eventually brenk dewn the electoral illusions, The RWG put forward a form of action which did offer suck a Perspective for the utilisation of the election. This was to bring the min question of the conjuncture to the fore - the anti-republican repression, the necessity for Gf to be opsosed, and support for the national stray; lc. , This was formated in an clection slofan - "Aminst Repression — Vote Republican" - and in an active campaign in eritical support of the Officicl Remablican Movement as the only ariti-inplriclist orpanisation which reco;nised the mea te present a working class altornative in these elections,

11 md ty so dcing the Wii wos in a pesition to mke more effective criticism of the c won of the Officials and to inerease the credibility of revolutionary Marxism @ccin elements of that section of the Repub!ican Movement in particular, While the Officials offered the only radical opresition to the major partics, ) the nature of thir eompeign, with its restricted revolution=ry eccontent limited ne the impact they could haye made ani meant a failure te take full advontare of cpportumity prosented, The very fact that the mijor perties had shiftea the in of the comeign. from the national question to the important hut nonetheless suliy considerations of inflation, rates and so on, placed a Hepublican ¢ampaisn pvred on the national question in a favourable position. Such a eApaion could ») forced the major parties to state their position unequivocally on this I end thus expose them and foree then into confrontation with the wortcd ae- Blsi. in the tssues they preferred to push unider the carpetbecnuse of the reaction ei. electorate to their policies; b) the arti-inmerinlist —cvenert #oull have become 2 real alternmtive 1.2 the teajor parties in the minds of a considernble section of the Werke ne si ul thus have jmined a (reater mas of support; ‘l somuztted the rirhtist natiomlists of Aont-zcht Hresn and elements of ens: Jil, The failure of the Officials ta raise the mnational question left She is open for these elements ta cupitalise and consolidate themselves. The Ofi5, -§ did not not take advontage of their remitationn in this field and tyr Smet n ting; an agressive Republican campuisn - eneompassins the economic and Sect: . ues in a rounded revolutionary campaipm - the ruc was not pulled from Emicr §..: tight nitionmalists and their positicn was strencthene’ to the cost of WEhe o1:'.-inperialists, Jy canpoipning around the immediate economic and social issues the Officials Michlichted aspects of = revolutionary peepeetive but by failing to pitce the Metionsl question at the head of their campaign they failed to place these issues fn the context of such an overall revolutionary appreach, Th:s their “witntion nid not sufficiently explain the imperialist causes of the economic and Social ilis Sn ther interrelationship with the anti-imperialist struyle. Sy this wealmess, the Officials’ eampaiyn was severely handicapoed for thus the differentiation het- Ween the anti-imperialists and the sajor parties beesnes blurred, It is not for *eveolutionaries teautemitically accept the terns of reference lnid down by the Tulin, class in its election arcitation - it mist expose these terms ond ensure that P@atters erucizl to the needs of the workin, class are raised and if possible, brourht % ve mijor axes of the election detate. This is possible with the nation=1 question an. Trelond. Unfortunately, the Officials’ concentration onthe lowest level of economic and Socizl issues te the exclusion of a full revolutionary perspective, wis not isolated a0 this election,

+2 miiast the Lesembly Ta mid-1972, with the local covemmmont on] nese sly elections, the uritish Government wos attenptin, to eresta . tow aaministrative structure witl: which to consolidate the "moderate" pro-im epinlists, toke further sections of the antiunionist worsin ¢liss irom supuort for resistance in orler to isolate the revolutiomiry movetent andl briny; stabilisation in Imperialist interests closer.

The erention of the Asseably wos the keystone of Trithiin's etrate;y aroun.

which the pacification of the North wes to be achievel. It wis an election objactively quite different from orthodox dest inster of local -overnment elections.

They oauie 2s a culmination of the processes of the Wwitish policy since the imposition of dimect rule in 1972 ana as such op iosition to this stricture was the prim cay task of anti-imperiolists.

flow coull this best be curries out? Three min questiors faced revolitioniwiest 4 Tew structure was to be formed ghich suet he oj ‘oped - wis it possible to perticipeate in elections to the structure on the bisis of op .osition to ite eyistnace?

Could the more backword elements of tne corkin class, those under the influence of the reforniets, be better educotel by acitation in porticipsticn or in boycott?

Could revel tionmiry forces bé mobilised, the m.se movement stren: thonea by acitetjon in .articipction or boycott?

Thase questions are not dif fi@ilt with Marxist cnlysis. Coneiter the consciousneww of the anit-urionist workin, class - there wis no "brow, urivereal upswing”, 4netend a workin: class Inere: sin ly fra, menwet anil disorientatel since the struct le had pusse] from its peck with the Jestruction of Stornent in “ereh 1972 to ebb, and the continuin- repression accoupatiel by politival LAROUGTEELTY « The overwiclmin,; wei, ht of this actor merit that the tasks of pevyolutionarics could most menidi, fully be carried out in porticipstion in the elections. mt the precise miture of the elections aml their role in the inveriniist stretey necescitnted a hi;h ‘decree in accuracy and proeision in a itation.

For Lirxieta tuere is no eontridietion in perticipatin®= in Slactions, or even in the parliameits themselves, in ordur to ajitete for the ultimete smashin of the bourcesis institutions - it iathc basis for revolutionary Yarsist participation in all elections they ta'ze part in. Tis election was not different im This respect put ite pecilicr nature mule 2 particularly enact mode of p ticipation essential.

This mode, the only revolutiomiry Sp vorch pos ible siven the precise circumstances, wos onc clear pro ramne hen ‘ed by oprosition to the Aseeribiy = Gxplsininy its role in the imperialist plan - linked with demants for the endims of ali repression, the type of deanna essential for the mobilisation of the masses at time of ebb in siray le, and stressin, the extra-parlinment ry methots of strum te.

aut not only was this the only penninly revyolutiomiy approach pest ible = participation on any basis which did net op ose the Assenbly clearly ond unequivocally would objectively be to contribute ta the building of the Lssembly and the consolidation of imperialism. It would have been to imply acceptance of the Assembly.

Yet no Republican or Socialist croup attempted to impleme st this tactic.

43 = and because of the specific nature of the election, the norme by which small revolution.ry sYoups supszert the candidates of other groups - thoir breaking with elase collabarstion or on their class composition (see below: 1974 Gen. Elections) were not sufficiently precise, There could only be one type of intervention in the | elections which would in effect break breal with class collaboration - that outlined | above; while class com.osition in this instance did not necessarily imply the vote would be class ageinst class, workers a:minst imperialist. ipain, this wes not sufticiently exact fiven the objective nature of this election, a The REG, itself too weak to stand in the elections, wis thus forced by the jack of revolutionary participation by any proup,;, in order to five 2 revolutionary Unrxist presence in the slections to adopt a boycott position ard to attempt to inject revolution:zry content inte the boycott campaizn, People's Teronracy acknowleded the role and character of the structure ta be ereated and from its evaluntion cencluded that their opyositign could be expressed beat in boycott. tut PD did not propound an active boycott. To the: election Pi) counterposed an abstraction - calls for the struj: le to cotitinwe - when the wortcin: class required conérete suide ee Thus one of the irimiry objects of revolutionary a;itation arourd elections, the education of the more baciward elements wich cannot be so easily reached in the normed neat oan “tary course of agitation, wre negiected. Imperialism waa ennbled by thie wealmese of the stratary notonly of Fu but of the -mejor sections of the pte taper ini iat Moveneit in general to easily outmenousvre the revolutionsry vanuard an4 further isolate it by sttippiny, more of these elements from active resistance, fhis failure: to pive revolutionary form to the boycott was the almost inevitable result of the failure to ausess the conjumeture. This dictated that muy uoycott of this election hnd also to be of - precise nature to. heave revyolition— ary form. Opposition to the assembly could not be rallied to a boycott camcign because such opposition did not exist in a mss form and did net have any real presence outside the revolutionary vancuerd itsclf. The mss of the anti-unio ist w workin: cless nad not understood what the Assembly represented ex its place in the repressive structure, not becunse the propaganda of the revolutionary -roups had been inevequate; but becuase it had not learnt of its choracter throwh their actual] conorete experience. PD. he le the mistake of identifyine the consciousness ef the vanguard with that of the miss of the workin: class, a mistake, whivh, if FTepeited, could only contribute “ the further isolation of the yangierd, Provisional Sinn kein also failed to offer-a realistic alternative. to the -@lections and so no attempt was made to give a revolutionary dynamic to the boycott, The abstract slogans put forward - to contime the resistance strug, le couched in terns which did not ever ¢-neretise this to the extent of supporting moss proteat jas doomed to failure at any time but meas upsurge.

The RUG, which at that tive had itself not fully comprehended the character of (the downtuen, attempted to give the boycott some revolutionary meaning - to relete it +9 tne needs and consciousness of the mss of the working class, The only possibility for an active boyeott wis to counterpose the working class structures of organisation, such as were still in the recent memories of the anti-unionist work- )ang class; for the construction and reconstruction of strect and area committees for

ll eeSeee 44 the organiention of defence SQ2inst reartionsry Assasinetion squids and the harassment of the tritish urny and for the coordinition of the miss resistance coupsign. Thus a way forward and a method of strus le, cleorly linked to the needs of the sorkin., Glas: wis «ut for: +d.

In presentiny this boycott policy the iG strencthened its position within the revolutionary van.uard in the orth, Despite the call for non-porticipation, Imperinliam wis able to form the Assemoly., It was neither prevebted from doim: so, nor was the Assenbly significantly wealened. Neither ws The mse moverent stren-thened, rather it had been we.ke ed by the revol tiomry groups' inability to relate to the comacious needs of the workin; class. Imperinlisn we able, almost unapposed to stren,then its hola on tho more backward elements, PD and Sinn Fein could not meet the challenye they had set themselves and Were not able to promote a boycott to further the strug le, ut while the boycottists failed tc Stren then the anti-imperialist strug cle, their position wis qualitatively superior to that of anti-imperialists who took part in the election. This was solely hecause this purticipation was nt. carried out on a revolutiomery basta, The Republican Clubs did not plece opposition te the S3enky om the mor issues of repression at the hend of their campeicn, Prticipstion in eleetic is for revolutiomrics an auxilinry to the min extra-parlivsentary strucsls This participation mist be used to buila the mss movement, and in this ease to stren-then the on-oinge ainti-imserialist strug; de, Tut there wis no atte pt to do this, From the first mistake of droppin-election participation to the level of an abstraction by not Linking 14% te extra-jarlicnentery aaitation, the Republican Clubs went on to repeat their tistekes of the Free Sinte General Election by participation uolely on the terme leid down by the ruling class, Thus, at the local vivernuent elections the Remblican Clubs accepted the definition of local wovernmont Isid dow by Imperialisn, Agitation was lirtited to the dust-bin level. of the petit-bourresis local politicians and thus appeared qualitiatively little different from the policy of many other non-workins class candidates, The Republican Clivbs called for more facilities ina similis minner to the other eindidates, while mekin. oceasional reference to the Workers’ Republic - but entirely failing to relute the two and this xploin how the social and eeonomic probleme could recliy be solved.

Imperialism wis creatin, a structure of leeal government with jurisdiction over only sewerage and reerention and the Republicen Clubs did not coherently step outside this to present 2 real siternative = to call for the Penlacg— ment of this by a it re dewooratic system, by 2 syster: whieh could out increased power into the hands of the workin. «ln = be iy

15 The aasembly elections of the followin: tenth were similsrly approzched, The Rerublican Clubs did not pose a clear revolutionary alternitive to the pro-imperialists, This could hwve been achieved on the basis of opnosition to imperialésm on the issues which dominated the oprression cf the working class - the repression of the Uritish aruy and the whole mechirery of repression, internment and the political prisoners.

igain, the Republican Clibs projecendised almost solely arcund extremely limited socinl and economic deiends,. This wis the expression of the false concretisetion of the desire to relate to the consciousness of the most backward elements of the werling class. in 11 point "Programme of Action" was put forwird which covered a number of issues, housing, education, social security benefits, wage restrictions, hoalth charses, industrial training, prices, speculative investment ond nationslisation.

It was a progremme which micht have been taken directly from a socialdemocrat group in titain .or Almost any imperinlist couctry ct a time of stability - it tosk no account of the actual political situation in the Horth of Trelind, euch a programme could have been utilised to back up other demands directly related to the immediate needs aid consciousness of the werking clasa, the dominating concern of the working class - interrment, repression, ond drawing them into a camprign of opposition to the Assembly.

The SDLP wie the only credible group from the snti-unionist popul-tion which stated its opiosition to internment and British Army harcesment Wasa central plank of its cnngeien. Thus, the failure of the Republican Clubs to push these questions left them easily outflanked by the reformists. The SDLP were able to draw to their fleg all the less politically conscious layers of the working class,junchallenged by aiti-inperialists. und by the very niture- of the dew nds put formrd, the Repmblican Clubs could not relite their projramme to the actusl on-going extra-parliament= ary strug.le agninst repression -nd British Imperialism. Thus they failed te contribute to the struggle of the working eclnas or te the development of the class-consciousness of the more. bechword elements, 1974 GHA REUCTION-— the ebb deepens The British General Election of February underlined the continuing inability of the Irish revolution ry movement to cope with the cobb of stru; le or to prosp the poteiiti-l of electoral porticipotion, Clearly, for iarxists, there was no perspective for boycotting the 1974 General slection - participation to 7id the rebuilding of the mss movement wis the only conerent policy. Any :cssible basis for boycott had been broken by the continiing ebb and demobilisation of the mss movement. The boycott tactic had “lost its revolutionsry meaning".

The BMG, not fielding its own candidates, adcpted a position of support for ali anti-imperialist candidates, Thia was based. on. the principle that supsert should be determined ty the class composition of organisations standing, Thus support should be piven to eetablished tendencies within the worsing class meve ent although they roy not necessarily have broken from class collaboration - but that they nevertheless represent 2 counterposition to rulang class parties; that it would therefore he a class vote. The RWG expressed its support for all anti-imperialiet candidates; McAliskey, McManus and Republican Clubs, and mounted a campnign in support of Albert Price in West Belfast. Price was an independe™tcandidate standing on a limited canpeizn ticket - free the political hoatages, repatriate the Winchester hunger strikers, then a key agitational issue. The RIG had originally called for the anti-imperialist orgenisations to unite behind common candidates campaigning on 2 basic anti-repression platform.

With the failure of the groups to resp ond te this, support for 211 anti-imperialiats became the central thrust, with particular emphasis on Albert Price = candidate unaligned to any of the organisations but who, as father of the hunger striking Price sisters, could have been a focus of a general anti-repression canpeim around the election. Unfortunately, the failure of other anti-itmerialiat rroupes to support Price acted against this.

Again, the opportunity to strengthen the mass movement and the strug:le in ceneral Was missed in the election.

The Republican Clubs participated on a set of anti-imperialist demends against Surmingdale, against interament and British Army herrassement end calling for the withdrawal of the British troops, an ammesaty for ali political prisoners and for the "re-conquest of Ireland, the full ownership of Ireland by the people who make [reland - the Irish working clase".

But while these in themselves represented an advance from the Clubs' position in the assembly elections, limited to an economic and social prorrannre, they remained demands on election leaflets, and not on the strests. There was no perspective of linking the denanis to a mass movement on the streate and transforming them into a concrete way forward for the strugele. It is thia factor i i i i

i7 whieh determines the revolutionsry content of en election gampiion: the mobilisation of the worlcing cinss around those derands.

Sinn Fein (Kevin Street) characterised the election 2s an “irrelevint distraction" in their press statements. Sinn Fain appreciated that the election had been called by British Prire Minister Heath in an eitert ta strengtnen the Tories against the British working class. From this they ignored. the possibilities the election offered to reyolution:ries in the North of Ireland from the conclusion that it releted solely to "Enplish intersets" and thet it would rot deal with intercmert, the “Snohester huiyur esrikere of the political hostages. And rithout the participstion of anti-impericlists to bring tuese issues into the electoral arena, this was the case. The duty of revolutionaries is to use such op ortunities to bring issues of repression +o the forefront of the detcte and in deing so not only force other groups into stating their position = EMbarraes ne questions at that stage of the Lssenbly and Sumpincdale, both being in unstable eabryonic stages - but would hove goined further aunpert for the anti-iwperialists from those who enre about such issues, the antiunionist woreing clses, Thus 5 initiative would have been taven to tring disorientated elements within the worting cluss back inte the atru,cle - to educate the more bckward clenente upon which the SDLP and the imperialists have beet. able to thrive ond to attack the reformists’ hase of suport. ‘he Ginn Wein decision to ignore the elections wes iced atronely in Belfast und passed with « gm:1l mijozvity in Derry. It was not 2 clear ent decision, os the Isc« cf howopeneity within the oriisvtion dictates.

The reforsist elemets within Sinn Fein will be supportin:, particination in future elections, b.t not on +he besie of it backing up extro-p7rlisment— ary struggle, rather that it should be 2 centre focus of Sinn Fein activity.

Me recent le:zslisin; of Sinn Fein will aid these trends.

The socialists within the rcoke of Simm Fein and those outeide atbenpting to influence sections oft the orecniesation are correctly wary of fostering the -poxrLinwentery pretunsions of these olements, bat this ust not vind earot be done by eounterposing a blarket policy of boycott.

The only couerent socizlist ompesition to this tendency can be on the sis of & principled revolutionary 2 Eroach te elections, Thus to participate on i revolutionary basis is the very oposite of compromise with refornism or opening 2a opoortunity for 455+ tendency. It is te denonstrate in action thet socinlists, and only sociulists, have © coherent strates, of strugrle and that socialists c:n utilise effectively all forms of etrugzle and ean offer « wey forward for the working clase ond evolve tactics for the current ebb of struggle - thus outflanking the reforiists on 3 nrincipled revelutionary socialist Pasis. Hevolutionzry socialists, $i guat be stated again, sarticipste in elections to abrengtuen the mse wovyeuent «nd the consciousness of the mas of the woring clases for not to do sd when there is no vinble alternative by qaich tiis cin more effectively carried out will allow anti-revohitionsry elements to eopsdlidate their position and will detract from the mas movement .and the development of the stiru:gle for freedom.

48 he = : ee " = i z = eed An Paobiseht (8/3/74) is weenie 2. wy fer fatire Sinn Fein election in every street, snd. that the polities: possililitics of the present situation be anlysed, cxplowed, debuted, understood nnd exploited so tint, if necessary, the purty may be ready ta. uit forward candi dates for the next genexal election, expected before the summer". The artic e closos, “The Tiititary vevolt ogainst Liperinlisu, of course, must cont nue unbaited".

The srticle faile to stress the importance 6f activity by bhe res of the worukng class and raises the spectre of increasing elitism by the orginisation. liass.struggle not complemented, augmented anc strnethened by the military campaign, as wae the case during the upsure + up to 1972, but replaced by the military cauprig¢n iscloted from the mss cf the working Class, .nd there is « denger that electorsl tarticioation, u-winked to MlS8 activity, will centribute to + is elitisn, The basis of purticipetion is left largely Weloeifica but for one cantenee: thst the existing notiomlist PSOunSs at westminster, Plaid (1 vu ord the Beottish iImtionalists could be pursunded through the Geltic I iseue to give a Westminster voice to the Troops Out Movement. This 7 2sition of using elections, and even participation in porliament, to st. engthen the Miss movement mist be extended to 11 possible future Sinn fain porticip lien and to give it 2 revelutionsry role, directly lirk te agitation on the streets spninst imperialisn, the Pecple's Democracy agnin called for a boyeott on the sloman "i imit - Dontt Yote, In explaniny their position, some conrused thinking wes sown: "Those who favour abstention or = vote of disappmovel are only fool ce the people. What they are doing is asking people to take tert in the imperialist political machire to nrotest at an institution imposed by thst machine. This attitude gives credibility to the whole impericlis: relationship between Ireland and Britain"s But it is ne ¢onteadiction for Marxiste to participate in elections on the bisis ef ognosition to the ruling cliss structure, Rather, when the overwhelming balk of the anti-unionist workiug class is voting in 2nd has ite attention feeusscd On elections then it is the duty of Mearyists to step inte the dzeeiisnt of the election tamp.ign and to use it. The nlternative, im ait but tines of the most dynemic unsuree when the mass of tha fartine cias= has Pejected parliamentarianism, is to geshire inpotentiy Teom the side-Hines 2ndto tise an opsortunity for reaching présier Glements oi the working ¢inas. Nand wcegardiess of any protests made by voting for crti—Somingdile cumlidates, the Assembly will still exist after the General Ptection on ¥eb 28", the article continued, But neither perticipation nor boeyestt could bring the .ssembly crashing down. as the article foes en to state, this cold only be déne throush tase mobiltsations on the streets. “o how can this mobiliaction, the "street power” be *Unfree Citizen, Vol. 3 No. 19, Feb 18, 1974 - "Fight -— Don't Vote".

19 regenexated? 1 boycott could not and did not mobilise any sections ot ‘the working class but an active eampaign behind anti-imerialist candidates coulda huve given the miss movement a boost of morale and mach necded impetus. The FL article posed the question incorrectly - neither tactic could imediately smash the Assembly, the re2l question was how the mas resistance could be vided, its rebuilding fostered.

Tha anewer was, by aidtation in all areas, includine the elections against imperialism, its repression ond explaining ite rele and how it could be overcome. Sut a confusion cs to the relitionship between these different forms of agitation was present. annlysing 3's 1969 election perticipation, the arti@le atetes, “kistory has proved us right - for the decision to field candidates in that election and the large number of yotes east for PD brought on the downfall of Stormont its@lf, ns it was desisned to do". Yet a few lines lcter it continued, "The old Stormont was not brought crashing down by hallot boxes, but by street power", Participation in slections ig a method of strugsle, of building the comtivity of the woricdin’, class in the stre:ts, te be applied when it is an effentive wey of educatiry the working classi ng5 waa the case in Horch 1974. Participation was not 2 "held atep" as the article suggested, bat an attempt ‘eanlting from an aeses— suent of the consciousness of not just the vinguard but of the breed mes of the workings ¢liass, to bring the struccle a step forward and to counter the ebb. and it- is in such a period of ebb in strug#le, when the militency of tino worxiny class has passed its peck, thet abstract slowans euch as "Picht - Don't Vote" lose any pevolutior-ry meaning with the finding of little sesponse within thy working clase, and to con'riimte to the yroces of the jsoiction of the vanguard from the working class mse.

Opposition te, perticipation in westminster elections on the principle thet "those whe call om p ople to yote in representatives to the British Parliament are “Skint people to vote for their own opnression ani for the cintinuance of British pile im Ireland" ie to dona woraliatic straight-jactet alien to Morxism, Inflexibility on such «= baaie of tactics we eyourmeterised by Lenin ve "like mking n difficult uscent of an unexplore’l and hitherto inscecessible mountain aaa refusing in sdvance ever to move in gigc-zags, ever to retrace ones steps, or ever to abandon a course once selected ant to try others", fLeft-/ing Comunism), Such inflexibility will do nothing to enhance the reputation of socinlists within the working clese.

Heins outflanked and made ir elevint throuch inflexibility will not gain credibility - this will be achievel by a readiness to utilise all srems of stryyj.le .4 te proville na coherent stratesy for the downturns: of struc le - jownturns which are the expressions of (OBS consciousness.