Ireland and the Fourth International

Papers, journals and pamphlets of the Fourth International's supporters in Ireland, 1969–1996

FIANNA FAILS ARIS CRISES: Let us have a United Ireland Lord...but not yet

By James Gallagher

In Socialist Republic: Vol. 3 no. 5, 1980 · scan page 9 · about 1,048 words

The Southern state and its partiesPartition and the national questionRepublicanism and the IRALoyalism and unionism

No public scan is online for this item; the text below was read from a privately held copy.

Machine-read text, not corrected. Cut from the scan by machine, by the size of the headline type. Where columns were set close together, lines of a neighbouring article can run in, and a headline can be missed so that two articles share a page. For anything you quote, read the scan.

Scan page 9

The recent series of articles in the May, June, and July issues of the monthly current affairs magazine, Magill, which seek to uncover the real story behind the 1970 Arms Crisis, are of major interest to. all these who wish te see an end to British rule in Ireland.

CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE, The story behind the removal of three prominent Ministers from the 1970 Fianna Fail cabinet, and then the dismissal by the courts of the charges made against Charlie Haughey and others, ef illegal gunrunning te the North, has not been adequately told up tonew. A genuine conspiracy of silence has cloaked one of the most vital turning points in recent Irish history. All the politicians centrally involved, from Jack Lynch and Liam Cosgrave through to Haughey himself, have done their best to discourage discussion. Some of them, such as Jim Gibbons and Des O!Malley, have threatened libel action. For this reason the magazine's editor Vincent Browne had to go to the extraordinary lengths of having the 'Arms Crisis!!! articles printed in England and then resort to ad hoc distribution arrangements in Ireland.

This has meant that although Magill's normal circulation of 35,000 has shot up to around 80,000, large numbers of Irish people, especially in the Six Counties, remain in ignorance of its contents. The main sectors of the mass media have collaborated in the conspiracy of silence. RTE!'s Frontline programme was prevented from covering the issue by a directive from Director-General George Waters. The daily press has been just as bad, only choosing to make some comments on relatively trivial parts of the story.

The fullest 'coverage! they gave resulted from the fracas kicked up in the Dail by Noel Browne, and those loyal little pro-British quislings on the Fine Gael and Labour benches. Who do they think they are with their talk about 'threats to democracy!? Remember the late unlamented Cosgrave coalition and its pro-Brit policies: * I|'We must say or do nothing which might antagonise the Northern Unionists!' -- a call for collaboration which only encouraged the loyalists to become more confident they could get away with their bigotry.

* The introduction of systematic police torture and the attempted frame-up of Osgur Breatnach and the IRSP?

VALUABLE INFORMATION.

The Magill series on the 1970 Arms Crisis tells us an awful lot. Unfortunately Socialist Republic does not have the space or resources to cover all the details. But the most important new information can be highlighted. Most of this seems to come from the personal diaries of Peter Berry, who at the time of the Arms Crisis was Secretary to the Department of Justice, the top civil servant in the 26 County state in charge of suppressing the IRA. Vincent Browne uses the information from Berry and other sources to show as conclusively as possible that:

* The plan to import arms for use in defending the North's Catholic ghettoes had full government authorization. Jack Lynch lost éffective control of cabinet policy after August 1969, For example the famous !'!we won't stand idly by!'! speech, broadcast on RTE after County ruling class!) incidents are detailed.

* the Battle of the Bogside, and which gave the impression that the 26 County government was prepared to take real action such as the sending of troops across the border, was in fact written by Haughey and Blaney after the cabinet had thrown out Lynch's draft speech prepared by his civil servants. Blaney and Haughey were the main participants in a sub-committee in charge of Northern policy. This group authorized the paying over of money for 'relief'. Berry became aware of the arms importation plan in October 1969 through two police spies in the IRA Army Council. and informed Jack Lynch. (Both of these incidentally were on the 'Official' side in the IRA split. The 26 County police had no inside information on the Provisionals when they were set up. So much for the theory that the split was created by the agents of the 26 Irish Army intelligence officer, Captain James Kelly reported the following from a meeting in Gerry Fitt!'s home on September 13:

NF itt made clear the urgency of the situation and that it was of paramount importance to get in arms immediately... '!no, you have it all wrong. It (civil war) could happen any time. It could happen this minute. ! Fitt said." (Magil! May 1980, p. 40). - Many similar * Jack Lynch sat tight on the information about the arms importation, claiming later that he only knew of the plan in April 20, 1970. He avoided the issue right up to the last possible minute, and probably would not even have sacked Blaney and Haughey until his hand was forced by Liam Cosgrave. Cosgrave was leaked the information, and after failing to have it printed in the press, went to Lynch.

Haughey tried to shift responsibility for the arms importation on to the other court defendants, avoiding the issue of governmental _authorization. Haughey's line of defence that he 'knew nothing! endangered Captain Kelly and John ‘Kelly's defence since they could not possibly argue ignorance of what was done. He callously dis-— regarded Captain Kelly's appeal to use the most effective line of defence -- telling the truth.

The court threw out the prosecution case, thus accepting the Kelly argument that there was governmental authorization. Haughey was able to use the ambiguity created by his own "Me fein!! defence to continue merrily along with his Fianna Fail career.

DON'T TRUST FIANNA FAIL What lessons can be drawn from this? The main one is to avoid secret and ambiguous deals with Fianna Fail. This party will go to any lengths, (including material aid to 'violent subver sives'), to protect its hold over its supporters who genuinely desire a United Ireland. It must be pressured openly and publicly and not allowed to slip through loopholes it is adept at creating. At its heart is the insoluble contradiction of wanting a United Ireland but avoiding spelling out how it can be achieved. Behind this screen it manoeuvres to fantastic lengths, usually collaborating enthubiastically in the only 'Irish dimension! it is allowed 'by peace and in agree agreement with! its British masters -- the suppression of anti-imperialists who genuinely try to end the evil of partition.

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