} at

At the Political Committee meeting of the (Irish Svmpathising Section of the Fourth International) the recent letter to the press which purports to have been issued by the Saor Eire G.H.Q.. was one of the items discussed on the agenda. The statement. which we consider to be of dubious origins alleges that one of our comrades, Peter Graham, was a Dublin unit O/C of Saor Eire. and that he participated in Saor Eire actions. We wish to emphasise that Graham (who was murdered by unknown persons in Dublin in October 1971) was not a member of Saor Eire, even less a unit O/C. Comrade Graham. as the Irish representative of the Fourth International was under the political discipline of the International and net Saor Eire’s, Peter did sympathise with SE but then he did with all socialist and republican forces fighting for Irish national liberation: and as a revolutionary socialist he gave full support to the Northern onalist minority, when it came into ‘arp conflict with British Imperialism and - Orange agents in 1969, To stress this point we point to the fact that the Constitution of the Fourth International does not allow a member of the International to have dual membership with another political organisation.

Frequently, the British and International Press have made wild allegations about the Fourth \nternationa). and its members and political associates. The most stupid, was the accusation that when Ernest Mandel ‘General Secretary of the International), came . to Dublin last year it was to run guns to Ireland, rather than to have a public debate with Dr. Patrick Lynch on Marxist Economics at U.C.D. Even more farcical, in a very sick sense, was the contention that Maureen Keegan (another member of our group) died with a cancer caused by handling explosives.

The ‘Saor Eire G.H.Q.' letter would at first glance seem to fit into the same pattern, but that would be a superficial impression. The Statement, while seeming to denounce the Fourth International militant in a very crude fashion is otherwise almost entirely devoted to technical details of S.E. arms dumps, their disappearance to the London Underworld, RMG in Graham's death.

that the letter was in response to a Fy é At the funeral of Peter Graham {MENT and accusations of the misappropriation of considerable sums of money. The purpose of this could be designed to slander, by association, those political prisoners in Portlaoise who were once members of Saor Eire. It also seems to imply that the Portlaoise prisoners were somehow involved It is quite within the bounds of possibility allegations made by the men in Portlaoise in their recent statement of resignation from Saor Eire. This statement said that S.E. had increasingly been used as a cover by undesirable elements in the furtherance of had engaged in the harassment of, and used bully-boy tactics against, bone-fide republicans it then notes that mystery still surrounds Comrade Graham’s death.

In our opinion the only possible explanation for the ‘S.E. G.H.Q.’ letter is that a person or persons unknown wants to load the blame for the murder onto the men in Portlaoise, and so attempt to divert attention from himself/themselves. If seen in that light then rather than denouncing Graham, the person(s) who wrote the letter were using Graham's reputation (he was a well respected individual among all sections of the Republica and revolutionary left), in order to give their scheme some credibility.

As far as the Revolutionary Marxist Group is concerned, the revolutionary militants, at this time incarcerated in Portlaoise, who have resigned from Saor Eire, had no hand in the gangster style activities described in the letter. Their public statement of resignation from S.E. clearly states in no uncertain terms that they split from that organisation, because it has been used as a cover for criminal activities. The concluding remarks of the Portlaoise statement leaves us in no doubt as to their political credibility and desire to work for purely political ends, ““we again wish to reaffirm our allegiance to the establishment of a democratic Workers Republic in Ireland and pledge our support to the revolutionary forces who are struggling to attain it.” :

POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.M.G.

The re-emergence of mass demonstrations and protest on the streets of the North of Ireland has added a further dimension to the crisis facing British Imperialism. The past weeks have seen an upsurge in the mass struggle for liberation and has exposed to a large degree the breakdown of the British Government's strategy for the North.

And, with this, the initiative has pessed from the grasp of the Brish Government and a new phase of the struggle is opening in which the people are again asserting their demands for liberty and can again determine the course of event.

The marches and rallies and the creation of a united front of anti-unionist groups — the Political Hostages Release Committee in Belfast and Armagh — have provided a basis from which a new mass movement can be created and the people’s own structures of power re-established as a step towards the working class taking power into its own hands.

In the period leading up to the second anniversary of internment it was generally recognised by the bulk of the republican and socialist movement that unity was essential.

A break had to be made from the situation brought about by British political manouevering and the resultant apparent passivity of the ant-utmondt peopée The people had taker the cetatee @ he Current struggle wrth the extat rae of the not grant the ward bier was forced into an ever growing crisis as the struggle developed into an anti-imperialist campaign.

But after the fall of Stormont the deficiencies of the leadership of the campeign became increasingly evident. There was @ failure to bring the mass of the anti-unionist people to the forefront of the struggle in 2 lasting and positive besis. As 2 result the anti-imperialist movement was Out-menoeuvred, The street committees 1. THE FAILURE OF THE WHITE PAPER:

ITS IMPLICATIONS The Revolutionary Marxist Group, as soon as the All-ireland British offensive was formulated in the White Paper, showed the impossibility of it being implemented in terms foreseen by Imperialism. The injection by Westminster of Centrist parties capable of making this project viable has failed, The traditional Unionist parties now back on the political forefront, in order to succeed the British, need to crush the nationalist resistance. This will imply in the coming period an intensification of the action of the British Army; Secondly, the crisis of the Loyalist organisations, sanctioned by the split of the anti-Catholic hard-liners decided to carry out harsher actions against the Catholic ghettoes. Whatever force will first initiate the Action against the ghettoes it does not qualitatively change the type of response needed ~ Politically. the recreation as far as possible of the no-go-are.., of the organs of dual power such as street con. mittees, ghattoes assemblies, co-ops etc, Militarily, the arming of the people for self-defence against pogroms, or other attacks of the British Army, of the vigilantes, joint defensive actions by the two wings of the and the mass movement subsided before the promises, poses and bullying of the British Government.

As was intended,the elections added to the disorientation of the minority and for a period it appeared that war-weariness,combined with the seductive but false formula for justice and peace offered by the British Government, had successfully de-activated the struggle of the minority.

But the inability of the Whitelaw regime to reconcile the loyalists to the British strategy forced him to attempt to appease them and further repression was used agains the minority.

Whitelaw hoped to capitalise on the apparent disillusionment of the anti-unionist population by launching an attack on individuals in the vanguard of the struggle. This led to the arrest and imprisonment of Michael Farrell and Tony Canavan.

PHRC FOUNDED It was against this background that the various Republican and Socialist groups in the North came together to create the PHRC. It had delegates from anti-internment political groups as diverre as the Republican Clubs, Provisional Sinn Fein, NICRA, PO, RING, the CPI and the N.L. Workers’

spt And it had the backing of the people through such non-political bodies as the Reistives of Political Prisoners, the League of Ex-Servicemen (CESA) and the Association of Legal Justice.

All united behind three demand s— for the release of all internees, the release of all political prisoners and the ending of ai! repressive legisiation.

The first activities of the PHRC coincided with the mass protest in support of Michael Farrell and Tony Canavan. Over 5,000 marched in one PD demonstration and the following week some 8,000 marched behind the banners of the PHRC to ¢ rally at Dunville Park, There speakers from Republican movement and other Catholic Defence Corps. In this sense the initiative of joint actions from Provisionals and Officials in Derry is an encouraging sign of what can be achieved.

2 DIALECTICS OF THE TWO FRONTS As has been seen in 1969, the Southern population must be prepared to defend the Northern resistance this time. (The shift towards a greater collaboration between British Imperialism and the Free State is clear. This has meant for the last year an extension of repression against the Republican movement to help Britain. This type of repression is quite selective for the moment, but THERE lies the basis for an offensive against all other civil rights left in the South, against the Official wing of the Republican Movement and other Socialists, the Working-class movement.

The combined offensive of British ° — imperialism and of the Free State calls for an all-lreland movement (a) in support of the Northern Resistance (b) for the immediate defence of the threatened civil rights in the South, starting with the defence of the Republican militants, jailed. The current situation has some similarities with the Palestinian struggle, This Struggle has shown that for the Palestinian Resistance either frontal military attacks on the Jordanian or Lebanese states and the refusal to criticise them because they are primarily Arab brothers whatever class interests they have, are two sides of the same coin and inevitably lead to political disasters, to military defeats, when the masses are not | mobilised around a clear revolutionary programme. Likewise in Ireland the only viable solution is the setting up of a broad front of anti-imperialist nature raising directly in political terms the question of the link the Struggle North and South, the question of support for the liberation struggle.

3. THE IRISH CIVIL RIGHTS ASSOCIATION, EMBRYO OF A POLITICAL ANTI IMPERIALIST FRONT The establishment of such an organisation means uniting around democratic demands such as the repeal of the emergency laws, the release of the Political prisoners, and raising the fundamental demand of self-determination of the Irish nation. But to extend such a front some other layers of society likely to be radicalised by the current struggle must be involved in such a Front. Thé orientation taken at this level must be clear. Provisional Sinn Fein which has initiated this organisation has carried several misconceptions on the nature, the structure, the aims, the tactics of this organisation, For instance, the way ICRA DISUNITY demands of the platform.

regrettable. phase of the struggle.

people. sectarian gro@nd. and Britain.

. was completely disorganised. 5. MARCH SEPARATELY — STRIKE TOGETHER all the constituent political bodies shared the platform to protest against internment.

Whitelaw, by lifting Farrell and Canavan, had confidently hoped for aconfrontation with the vanguard of the struggle, beliving the mass of the people to be demoralised. He miscalculated. When the confrontation came to the crunch it was he who was forced to back down.

The announcement of the release of Farrell, Canavan and 100 other political prisoners on the eve of the second anniversary of internment appeared as a clumsy effort to sabotage the following days demonstrations. In effect, it made imperialism appear weak and for the people had clearly won a victory on the streets.

Despite these early successes the unity of the committee was not to remain entirely intact.

Unlike the other organisations in PHRC, NICRA refused to submerge its own demonstrations under the united PHRC banner. NICRA insisted that they had the sole right to organise the major August 9 rally in Belfast. The result of a situation where one group claims to have a monopoly on anti-internment protests was clearly evidenced by the lack of democracy on the platform and the subsequent scuffles between stewards and the crowd as several speakers were refused the right to speak. It came in stark contrast to the PHRC rally only a few days earlier when all speakers were united behind the It was regrettable that NICRA chose to withdraw from the Committee,for although its departure made little immediate impression on the number supporting the PHRC (some 10,000 turned out for the march several days later), that any group should chose to leave a united movement for the ending of internment is Similarly, the later decision by the Republican Clubs to opt out is to be regretted. However, they too had failed to actively support the committee,by not mobilising militants for its rallies and marches, for instance.

EXPANDING THE P.H.R.C.

The creation of this body has been an important factor in bringing the people beck onto the streetsend the PHAC can go on to become 2 key to the opening of a whole new For this to take place development of the PHRC must come in two ways — through expansion outside Belfast and Armagh and by the strengthening of its roots among the So far the functioning PHRCs have proved highly successful in organising protests. Cooperation between the two committees has also been occuring. A successful merch and rally was held in Belfast in support of the interned mother of two small children, has been set up raises the following problems: (i) it has been created from the top to the bottom (ii) the nature of the Front limits itself to Provisional Sinn Fein, Aontacht Eireann and the periphery, (iii) the central demands are not linked with what must be the main thrust of such a movement, understood in the perspective of building an anti-imperialist front i.e. the national question. The term “Front” must not have the meaning of ‘‘cover’”’ as too many see it, but a regrouping of all organisations and individuals determined to fight around the democratic demands put forward. In this respect it is imperative that an organisation such as the Official Republican Movement be invited to participate in ICRA, not only because the more organisations are represented the better,or because the common experience of such groups would be greater, but primarily because such a@ movement cannot be efficient against repression North and South if built on 4. THE FIGHT IS NOT AGAINST REPRESSION IN ITSELF The abstract idea of fighting repression in itself is misleading. What people can figtit are CONCRETE INSTANCES OF REPRESSION.

j ICRA must campaign on aspects of repression selecting concrete example of this repression around which a CENTRAL CAMPAIGN should be organized (the question of political prisoners is of course of the utmost relevance because it relates very crudely the question of police repression in the South to the liberation struggle, to the open collaboration between the Free State At the time of Sean Mac Stiophain’s arrest important mobilisations spread all over the country, but the potential energy of the people protesting against the government The decision to enter and build an organisation such as {CRA on the part of the RMG flows from the fact that a movement built on democratic demands, on civil rights against repression, for the reunification of the country, possesses dynamics which lead ‘the movement far beyond the initial prospects put forward. Similarly, because in a backward country the fight for democratic rights is essential, does not imply that a revolutionary party or ‘organisation does not carry on an independent propaganda in order to influence the building Mrs, Brnda Cassin of Armagn. Clearly a further expansion of the committees across the six counties will allow coordinated activities and increasingly effective protests. Such coordination would only be possible under a central leadership and already. the Belfast body has been recognised as such, The Committees have so far, however, been very much composed of political groups, albeit with support from various non-political bodies.

This was unavoidable given the circumstances of the inception of the body. This came at a time when the struggle was in a downturn. While organisations of the working class such as street committees and the mass movements have been thrown up spontaneously at periods of upsurge such structures have by necessity to be built by political groupings at other times. This can be done incorrectly.

The PHRC was created in the only way possible at the time — by the conscious decision of political groups to unite behind basic demands. It must Rot be forgotten also that much of the initiative for the Committee came from such groups as the Relatives of Internees and that the active presence in the PHRC of such bodies give it a definite link with the community. This link must, if the rnovement is to prosper and grow, be built up and roots sunk deep into the people, ROOTS IN THE MASSES The priority must now be for a strengthening of the organisation within the people. Local committees must be set up in the anti-unionist areas. These are things that the people in the districts thernselves can develop. Not only do they represent the best way in which to organise a protest movement but also they may be seen as preparation for the building and rebuilding of street committees and people's assemblies — organs of the people invaluable in bringing the mass of the people into the anti-imperialist struggle on an active footing, and schools in which the working class can learn of thejr own power and capabilities. They have existed in the past and continue to do so on a small scale in some areas, but largely they have faded away. The opportunities they opened up must not be missed again. of ICRA, its strategy, to denounce resolutely the representatives of the National Bourgeoisie within this front (Desmond Fennell — Aontacht Eireann etc.)

Along this line can be defined the positions of the RMG towards ICRA: — we recognise that such a movement because of its demands challanges the actual state; because its dynamic leads in a more efficient way to linking the struggle North and South by building the embryo of a political front, the only organisation capable of helping the Northern Resistance against the over-all British Strategy. — such a movement built on democratic basis (that is to say by a co-ordination of rank-and-file branches defining their policy at a national convention), must be also non-sectarian (a) by involving both wings of the Republican movement and other Socialists organisations or Trade-Union Branches. (b) although this movement must campaign around a central issue related to the national struggle, all democratic rights denied in this country must be taken into consideration, _ allowing a broadening of ICRA (important rights such as Women’s Rights, Rights of Workers-Strike-Picket — etc. (c) because of the tendency of some leaders of ICRA to project a programme of reforms which can be integrated in the present system, it is imperative for all Republican and Socialist militants involved in ICRA to point out the dangers of substituting a series of demands related to the national struggle which can be fought for by a reformist project which aims at changing the government rather than challenging the state and throwing out the presence of British Imperialism on both sides” : of the border.

Confusion and perplexity marked the initial response of most political commentators to the Assembly election results. No one was quite sure what the final outcome meant in terms of the success or failure of Britain’s strategy in Ireland.

The Irish Independent (The semi-official organ of the National Coalition Government)

in its June 30th editorial judged that the voting patterns undermined the future of the White Paper proposals and warned that “Mr. Whitelaw has, certainly, enough to cause him considerable worry’’. By July 2nd the tune had changed and an editorial declared the final outcome as a “Solid Gain” and commented that “The result is no basis for throwing up the hands in despair and intoning the obsequies of Mr. Whitelaw’s proposals — Rather the reverse”

Apart from this overall judgement there were many contradictory assessments of different aspects of the post-elections situation, For instance on the reported S.D.P. overture to the CraigPaisley coalition the influential Manchester Guardian remarked that “There is 2 temptation for the S.D.LP.

© Sah Mr. Feuktewr ... and t seek an Binary to a wretched Assembly”. But Chris Glennon reporting from London for the Irish Independent, wrote in a main front page article that “The prospects of the i S.D.L.P. and the hardline Protestant leaders getting together contributed to the reasonably hopeful mood attaching to the Heath-Cosgrave discussions”.

There were also conflicting assessments of Faulkners ability to hold the Official Unionist biock together. The Sunday Press stated that “’Mr. Faulkner can feel quite happy as the leader of the biggest single block within the pro-union vote and can be relied upon to win back some of those who stood as “Unionists” without the Official tag’. But the London Times considered somewhat more realistically, that ‘with a right-wing dagger still posed over him, Mr. Faulkner is certainly going to find it difficult to keep control of his party to begin with at least”

On the question of power-sharing and Faulkners willingness to compromise with the S.D.L.P, there was still more confusion. The Irish Independent reported that Faulkner “appears enthusiastically (!)

in favour of a new power-sharing Assembly and even a Council of Ireland (! 1)’. But at the same ‘ moment the Irish Times wes reporting Faulkner as saying that “The S.D.L.P. has produced a manifesto which | think is very close to old-time nationalism. The prospects for co-operation with them look very remote to me”.

It would be useless to further document the many contradictory statements of the political observers, since they abounded on every conceivable aspect of the Assembly Election results. However, the significance of this confusion is that it emphasises that all these commentators either did not understand Precisely what Britain is trying to achieve in Ireland and were therefore incapable of commenting intelligently on the situation: or that they did understand but realised that the situation is so hopeless that they tripped each other up attempting to paper over the cracks.

This conclusion is verified by the final judgement made by all the pundits within a few days of the elections on the most salient feature of the final results, The splintering of the Orange Monolith, and the emergence of the S.D.L.P. as the sole parliamentary representative of the Catholic people are now generally regarded as the two most important “solid gains’. However when considered in relation to Britain's long term strategy and its conjunctural tactics, these solid gains appear in a different light THE UNIONIST DISINTEGRATION The break-up of the Unionist camp has been hailed @s a weakening of the forces of reaction. It has been argued that since the Unionists find themselves so atomised they must now finally realise that they will be forced to share power with the minority. But in fact the break-up of Unionism merely represents ’@ more open expression of one of the major contradictions confronting Britain's strategy. As such it is not a decline but an open Consolidation of the forces hostile, from a reactionary Mandpoint, to Britain.

As we explained in relation to the White Paper “proposals, the North of Ireland economy has ‘ undergone a process of diversification over the past thirty, forty years. This diversification was accomplished with the help of British capital, with the result that British imperialism succeeded in tying a major section of Unionism (i.e. the Official Unionists) more closely to it. This section is prepared to act in accordance with the interests of Britain and carry out the rationalisation it deems necessary.

However, there still remains a sizeable section , Of Unionism which continued to be relatively independent of British capital, whose interests are closely related to the Six Co. statelet and economy and which is prepared to fight for its specific interests. In addition the Protestant working class a occupies a special position in the production process. As a result of the peculiar evolution of the Northern economy, it dominates the leading areas of employment in industry and enjoys a significant degree of patronage from the six Co.

Statelet. Accordingly considerable layers of the grotestant working class also have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.

Indeed, if anything, this latest development represents a setback for Britain's policy. Britain's aim was to try to isolate the Loyalists by winning a significant section of the Protestant workers to the Official Unionists and the ‘’Centre’’ Union of Alliance and the NILP. But the Loyalist.

emerged not only as the largest block butals e dominant block within Unionism.

To continue to talk about the possibility of power-sharing in this situation is nothing short of 2 fliaht from reality.

The more astute politicians of Official Unionism realise this and are prepared to draw back to prevent their isolation from the Protestant masses. “Originally the Official Unionists took a deliberately ambigious position on the White Paper and especially on “power-sharing”. They were not Prepared to share executive power with anyone whose primary aim was not unification with the South., The exact meaning of this was not clear, since the S.D.L.P. had declared for a ‘New North”

and not unification as its immediate objective. The Official Unionists avoided saying whether they were prepared to share power with the S.D. LP.

However immediately after the election results the Official Unionists were forced to abandon their equivocation and launch a broadside against the S.D.L.P. Faulkner compared them to the “‘old time Nationalists’ and declared that the possibility of collaboration with them was “very remote’.

The Loyalists have obviously shaken the credibility of the Official Unionists and reduced Britains ability to manoeuvre. The only will be forced to retreat. The retreat of the Official Unionists was a spontanious reaction to an immediate problem. When the British Strategists sit down to serious consider the situation as it now stands, we can be sure that their retreat will be even more decisive.

THE S.D.L.P.

The emergence of the S,D.L.P. as the sole parliamentary voice of the Catholic minority is hailed as the secor xolid gain’ emmanating from the el The victory must of course be recognised @S uy.) for British Imperialism. in the sense that a massive vote for the S.D.L.P. represents a shift ‘in emphasis from the mass and military struggle to parliamentary and constitutional inactivity, Britain has gained a oreathing spell. But the importance of this breathing spell should not be exagerated. After all, the S.D.L.P. was the only “National’’ party on the minority side contesting the elections. Apart from voting Unionist or Alliance, in most cases the Catholics were offered no major alternative.

But in terms of Britain's long range objectives and even in terms of its immediate goals, the S.D.LP.'s victory means at best a stalemate.

The S.D.L.P. represents the Catholic middle-class (such as it is) in the North, This middle class is comprised largely of a petty-bourgeoisie which provides consumer and professional services for the Catholic population. This social layer would like to see a substantial improvement in the material conditions of the Catholics since that would consolidate its own position too.

But many of the depressed Catholic areas are located along the border and it is the border itself which has to an extent created these depressed areas by arbitratly dividing from their natural hinterlands. in addition the artificial nature of the Six Co. statelet has forced the Protestant capitalist class to pressurise the Catholic masses with adverse social policies which keep dawm their living standards through unemployment, bad housing and the encouragement of emigration, So it is only in the context of the abolition of the border and the establishment of some kind of all-Ireland institution which could grapple with these depressed areas and permit a reasonable degree of consumer prosperity in Catholic areas that the ambitions of this class would be satisfied, Thus the S.D.L.P. responded very cautiously to the White paper proposals. They expressed ‘strong reservations and deep disappointment’ at the watering down of the “Irish Dimension’’ which it considered to be of central importance. Without , the “Irish Dimension” the rest of the proposals were of little significance, The ‘power-sharing Proposals were dismissed as‘‘not clear’ and subsequently ignored, In their own minds they unceremoniously reduced the Assembly to a _ conference table at which real concessions would be negotiated.

So for Britains White Paper Strategy, the massive victory of the S.D.L.P. does little to relieve the situation. Without the Irish Dimension Britain will be unable to coax the S.D.L.P. asa whole into Dower- sharing, NOT. to mention the fact that WHAT DIRECTION NOW there are five distinct groups:

from_ ae working class.

_With the Irish dimension Britain would be unable te crystalise an even moderately progressive wing ' Of Unionism of any significance with which the S.D.L.P. could share power. And without ‘power-sharing’ there can be no immediate political, or should we say constitutional, way forward.

Here were at the heart of the matter. The establishment of viable institutions of power-sharing, are important for Britains plans in Ireland. Without them it will be impossible for the South to recognise the North, or openly join hands with Britain.

in other words without power-sharing no Federal solution — at least not by constitutional means.

In order to create institutions of power sharing, it was vital that a large centre movement, flanked on one side by a greatly weakened Nationalist movement losing to the centre and on the other side a strong Official Movement trailed by a shattered loyalist rump, should emerge in the post White Paper Period. No matter what the political Pundits may now Say in retrospect as the attempt to cover up the gravity of the situation it was the major task of the Assembly elections to prepare this line-up.

In this the Assembly elections manifestly failed.

The Irish Independent headline after the election results were announced stated the correct conclusion quite bluntly — “‘NO CHANGE” | After four years of near civil war in which the toughest para-military police measures were alternated with significant political in itiatives, Britain's long term perspective crashed through the fence when it came to take the first hurdle.

The meaning of this should be weighed carefully.

it happened because the class forces representing this policy were politically too weak. Political weakness in any society means an inability to enforce certain relations between people without resorting to force above an historically and socially acceptable level. For nearly five years now Britain has been resorting to a very high level of force, in attempting to implement its policy. So far this has failed, if Britain is to strengthen her political will she can only do this by increasing the amount of force necessary to her ends. Put simply it means that inevitably Britain will have to take a qualative leap from paramilitary police measures to outright military measures to accomplish its objectives.

To see what this will mean in terms of the future developments of struggle in Ireland we must ask:

What type of relations between what social groups do the British want to implement? Basically (1) the official unionist bourgeois class (I!) the Loyalist bourgeois class, (111) the Protestant (V) the Catholic masses. Britains immediate aim is to bring the Protestant working class under the hegemony of the Official Unionists, Once that relationship has been established the Loyalists will _ be isolated and the Possibility of implementing the Federal Solution will again be present. Britains “constitutional” efforts were directed towards Creating attractive conditions in the South combined with smashing the self-confidence and self-assurance of the Catholic masses. In this way it hoped to convince the Protestant workers that no threat wes posed in its Privileged position and so ~ win them away from the Loyalists, But as we noted this initiative was too weak and now a more decisive initiative, a military initiative is necessary.

Of course a military initiative will have both a different form and a different method. Two Courses are Open to Britain. It could eliminate the problem of the Protestant working class and the Loyalists by “taking them on” full scale. It could sap their resistance by imposing a decisive military defeat on them. But this would have many negative effects, the most obvious of which would be reactivation of the confidence and combativity of the Catholic masses, A renewal of the Catholic communities willingness to Struggle in a situation where the Protestant working class and Loyalists had been reduced to Passivity, would leave British Imperialism in a very dangerous position.

The second course open to Britain would be to launch an offensive against the Catholic masses, ‘lis would have the effect of reassuring the ‘otestant working class against the threat to its . Privileged position, The Official Unionists would be seen as a more determined opponent of “subversion” and “terrorism” and would naturally be in a better position to compete with the Loyalists for the Support of the Protestant ' Needless to say it will be the fatter course that Britain will opt for and while at the moment the politicians at Westminster may be patting the Catholics on the head and fuming at the Loyalists “his will undoubtedly change. As the various power blocks haggle over the nature of the Assembly mass action from below is likely to develop on both sides and the situation from Britain's standpoint will deteriorate. It is then that Britain will strike with its new phase of aggression.

The Assembly has held its first Session. Its birth was heralded by optimistic prophecies and a fair degree of commotion, although after the elections even the British bourgeois press had to admit that the White Paper strategy had failed, Nevertheless, Power sharing, it was said, was here to Stay, there was now.a consensus.

In reality the three blocks in the Assembly (19 S.D.L.P., 22 ‘official’ Unionists, though how “‘official’’, i.e, pro-Faulkner, is Gebateable, 27 loyalists coalition), could not reach even a sham agreement. The session began with the joint rejection by unpledged unionists and loyalists of the “constitutional arrangements for the North laid down in the White paper’, and ended with the loyalists ‘sitting-in’ after squabbles on Procedure and the appointment versus the election of the standing order committee.

Meanwhile on the streets, and in the ghettoes, the oppressed minority is ; has not taken the sting out of the mass _ mobilizations of the last few weeks, WHITELAW’S FAILURE Whitelaw needed two things from the Assembly elections, One, the emergence of a strong centre party, to lead the 6 counties by the nose, through power sharing and the ‘Council of | Ireland’, into eventually the kind of federated State more profitable for British Imperialism. Two, the weaning of the minority from the Politics of the street and the gun, and their reintegration into ‘normal ' political life, This hasn't happened, The Alliance and the N.1.L.P. have virtually disappeared, The only way now that e centre party could emerge is by forcing the S.D.L.P. and the ‘moderate’ unionists or parts of them, into an uneasy coalition, This is unlikely, Faulkner is faced with a Party which, although loyal to him at the moment,only in fact has 13 of its members pledged to support power-sharing, This is too weak to counter-balance the weight of Paisley and Craig, who also did better as a whole at the polls, Inevitably the Unionist Party will tend to slip towards the Loyalists rather than Faulkner, and if Faulkner is to stay he will have to move that way too. Certainly he is unlikely to be able to come to terms with the S.D.L.P. over the reorganisation of the R.U.C.

The S.D.L.P, themselves are ina dfficult Position, their electorial success has not kept the minority off the streets, The Farrell, Canavan crisis, and the recent anniversary of internment saw big and well-organised Protests, under the ,

state by leading the Catholic community