“very noses of the British Army. Fer from being…”

very noses of the British Army. Fer from being docile and prepared to leave it the $.D.L.P., the minority were on the streets. The idea that the release, when it came, of the 2 P.D. hunger strikers, was the result of the S.D.L.P,’s intervention, was greeted with howls of derision. th this situation, if the S.D.L.P. makes too close a move towards Faulkner, their credibility which took a tumble over the internment issue, will fall headiong.

The balance sheet of the Assembly seems to be an impasse. The prospects of power-sharing, nil. The Assembly has proved a rather expensive red herring. The hook Was baited, but the fish didn’t bite.

THE NEXT MOVE The protern posed for Viestmenstar s still therefore, Sow 2 actiese tte | R_A_ from the Tenor ty wothang Mat Cae eRe oF sotegt ‘ y 7 -quite likely that Whitelaw ai nd Co. will continue tw pay lip service to powersharing and the Assembly for some time to come. !t is possible that this will continue into the Spring, when, as Heath pointed out in his letest ‘pep-talk’, time runs out for the Assembly. They sill howewer be preparing for the onby mows left to them: heavy repressson agaenst the Reputvlicars and the anti-unionist Community 2s @ whole.

We are siready seeing the build-up of this, The Republicans are suffering increased harassment from the quisiings in Leinster House, Black propaganda is pumped owt faster and more thoroughly. Any emergence of » solidarity movement, or hints at the development of demands for troops out, are the targets for sabotage and conspiracy charges. In the 6 counties the British Army is stepping up its searches and security sweeps through the ghetto areas.

Once again the success or failure of this, as with the past attempts of British Imperialism to crush resistance, lies in the ability of the minority to stand together and organise their own defence. The emergence of the Political Hostages Release Committee is an important step towards this, both in its ability to mobilise and in the way the organisations concerned, didn’t let their political differences hinder them from working together against the common enemy. -“SF FR * ‘ pay CF EeEN ——¥ 4 ee ev *?

Elections never give an accurate reflection of society’s political awareness, Political consciousness is determined by a complex of material conditions and ideological traditions, A simple X on a ballot paper once in every four years is obviously nowhere near adequate to give expression to those feelings which are formulated unconsciously and by indirect pressures. Only an election system based on a yearly franchise and accompanied by the right to recall successful candidates at any time could have any hope of giving a generally correct reflection of political awareness.

Nonetheless, elections under the capitalist system present us with at least a distorted picture, and the genuine outlines of the real situation can be cautiously inferred from this. That is why for revolutionaries propaganda mongering must give way to sober assessment when it comes to discussing election results, In this light one of the most distressing results of the Local Government and Assembly elections outcome is not so much the apparent meag re showing of the Republicans but their failure to make a realistic evaluation of their election strategy. For instance, the Officials commented on the Local Government elections that “Perhaps the only political group which can regard the (Election) results with satisfaction is the Republican Clubs” (Irish People June Sth). Although they later expressed “disappointment” after the Assembly elections (where they did no worese than in the Local Government elections) they searched for the causes not in the weakness of their own movement, but in “‘the vicious sectarian murders and sterile anti-working class activities of the Provisional Alliance”.

On the other hand, the Provos were no more willing to deal with the reality of the not relieve them of the duty to analyse why they were unable to rally any more than the hard core vanguard in the Catholic ‘ghettos’ to that correct position.

thei attitude towards the military results.

MEANING OF THE RESULTS Perhaps the main reason why the Republican leaders have been slow to face up to the election results is that the surface picture is none too attractive. In the Assembly elections the Officials managed only 1.8% of the total vote, A revolutionary organisation in a situation Where the general population has gone through a four year period of mass struggle must surely be worried:about that kind of showing. Worse still in the “storm centre” of Belfast they got only 0.9% of the total valid poll. While if we consider only areas where they had candidates the cange to 1.4% makes little difference. In addition it must be remembered that in the second “‘storm centre of Derry, where the S.D.L.P. won three seats and the Nationalist Party won a vote bigger than that won by the Republican Clubs anywhere else, the Officials did not feel strong enough to field a candidate.

But if we examine the results more deeply the situation improves. All told, in the areas where the offficals had candidates they got 5% of the vote. And considered as a percentage of the Minority’s vote (i.e, the S.D.L.P. vote) this represents nearly 15%, It is more difficult to make even an emperical assessment of how the Provos faired. The turn-out in both elections was quite high. But the “authorities” were much disappointed that 30% to 40% didn’t bother to vote at a time when the “fate of the North” was being decided. Naturally a great portion of this abstension resulted from general political alienation and was present on both Catholic and Protestant sides, Nonetheless in a few key areas the Provos support made itself felt. In the Catholic Ardoyne during the Local Government elections between 60%—70% of the people boycotted the polls.

For the Assembly elections the Provos changed their tactic from a boycott to a “spoiled vote” campaign..The response from the Provo supporters was obviously confused. In West Belfast where many of the hardened Catholic “‘ghettoes” are, 5% of the Poli was spoiled while 32% of the electorate didn’t turn of the Provos campaign for this. ”

vanguard to analyse these mistakes.

results is that they point the way to vanguard, ‘out to vote at all. It was in this constituenc that the S.D.L.P. hoped to get three, and possibly, four, seats but in the event they only got one and they blamed the effectiveness What the reality behind the meagre statistics shows is that the Republicans still have a solid base in the Catholic community upon which they can build. Although the “respectable” press is gloating over the “unbelievable victory of the S_D.LP.” and gleefully sounding the death kneil of the Republican movement, strength of Republicanism. An article in The Times (London) wamed that “ it would | be a grave error to write them off comple tely, ‘and concluded mournfully that “a continuation of sectarian murders and trouble at the Orange Marches this month seem likely to lead to a Provisional revival”.

Nonetheless it should not be forgotten _ that the present situation is a deterioration on the period following internment when even the British Army was compelled to admit that the vast majority of Catholics supported the Republicans. The subsequentlossof support is due to a series of strategical mistakes committed by both wings of the Movement. In the case of the Provos the mistakes flow from the fact that their ' strategy and tactics are merely a spontanious reaction to the feeling of the Catholic masses with all their limitations and prejudices. Consequently, even after the slightest shift among the Catholics, the Provos can become rapidly isolated and just as quickly thrown back into the limelight.

With the Officials things are different. Their growing isolation is the product, not of a spontaneous reaction in the Catholic community, but of genuine political and theoretical mistakes on their part. That is why it will be a useful contribution to raising the consciousness of the revolutionary What is important about the election overcoming such mistakes. This is most evident in relation to the role of the Protestant working class. The Officials have insisted on restricting the mass agitation to purely democratic issues and issues which affect ' Catholics and Protestants as workers, so as not to alienate the Protestant workers. The election results indicate however that while the Catholic population is basically moving in a revolutionary direction, the Protestant masses are still firmly under the influence of ' Orange Unionism. Put simply what this means is that the revolutionary consciousness of the Catholic and Protestant workers is developing unevenly. The conclusion to be drawn by revolutionaries is not that the revolutionary development of the Catholics should be restrained to the level of the Protestants but that it should be lead forward so that under its pressure the consciousness of the Protestant working class can grow. That is to say, it ismecessary to have a strategy for breaking up the Unionist to “opt out”. It is only in a situation where the whole apparatus of Unionism has been broken down that it will be possible to break the Protestant workers from reactionary Orangism and win them to revolutionary ideas.

If the election results can bring home to the Officials the real relations between the Catholic and Protestant workers in the Irish revolution this will help them break out of the cul-de-sac they now figd themselves in wihiregard to the mass struggle. It would also help them develop a more realistic attitude to the Provos which would undoubtedly lead ' to a strengthening of the revolutionary PREPARING FOR THE NEXT PHASE It is important that Republicans assimilate the lessons of the election results because the next period will be such that it will be absolutely vital for revolutionaries to present a united front and face the practical task of leading a Catholic population which will be under strong attack. Ia the next phase revolutionaries must combine a correct programme, which corresponds to the real needs of the situation (and not the subjective backward consciousness of the Protestant working class) with correct methods of struggle.

A revolutionary programme must demand immediate and full democratic rights for the oppressed Catholic community. These demands will include a call for a speedy end to internment and the release of socialist and republican prisoners. They would also include the call for EQUAL (not proportionate) opportunities in employment, xousing, and social benefits. Above all the xentral democratic demand must be the right of the Catholic masses to self-determination md Union with the rest of Ireland. A failure to put forward these demands and to fight vigorously for them will result in an inability to gain the confidence of the Catholic peoples Combined with a struggle for democratic demands must be a struggle for TRANSITIONAL demands which strike at the very basis of capitalist society itself, and which aim . to mobilise the Catholic workers as workers, thereby separating them in practice from the middle class leadership of the S.D.L.P. Among these transitional slogans should be the demand for workers control of their factories, a sharing of power without loss of pay in order to fight unemployment, (which not only — divides the Catholic and Protestant workers but also the Catholic workers thentselves), a setting up of defence squads within the factories to prevent sectarian attacks from Protestant reactionaries etc, Finally, it must not be forgotten that the next phase will develop under the impact of an attack of the Catholic communities by British imperialism backed by Loyalist reaction. This armed resistance will be one of the most important methods of struggle from the start. The technical preparation for this is already sufficiently well advanced. But the task of the I.R.A. units must no longer be, to function as the “armed wing” of the Republican Movement or even simply as the “army of the people”. The task of the I.R.A. if it is to advance the armed struggle is to train and prepare broad layers of ordinary people to build their own “peoples militia”. It is only the ARMED PEOPLE and not the PEOPLES ARMY which at this stage can withstand the attack of British imperialism and Loyalist reaction.